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1. SUMMARY 
This thesis is about human factors in aviation security. It consists of three main 
sections that is employment of competent job applicants (PRE-EMPLOYMENT 
ASSESSMENT OF AVIATION SECURITY SCREENERS), training of employed screeners 
(TRAINING OF AVIATION SECURITY SCREENERS) and effects of age in X-ray 
screening (AGE EFFECTS IN AVIATION SECURITY SCREENING). Based on visual 
cognition research, psychophysical methods and psychological test theories, a 
reliable and valid pre-employment assessment has been developed which focuses on 
one of the most important tasks in aviation security, the X-ray screening of 
passenger bags. An X-ray screening test that is independent of knowledge was 
developed and evaluated. The X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) measures 
the ability to cope with the image-based factors bag complexity, superposition and 
viewpoint of threat items relatively independent of knowledge. Further, the influence 
of ability on detection performance was tested using a cognitive test battery which 
consists of 12 general cognition tests that best match the X-ray screening task. 
Structural equation modeling further revealed the three main factors ability, training 
and age. Therefore, the effect of training on detection performance was examined. 
Previous studies in the hold baggage screening (HBS) area showed a training effect 
for improvised explosive devices (IED) that are normally not seen at checkpoints and 
vary enormously in their visual appearance. The question whether this training effect 
can also be shown for other objects such as knives that are quite often seen at 
checkpoints in the cabin baggage screening (CBS) area is discussed in this study. 
Empirical results reveal that even in the CBS area where screeners encounter many 
different objects, training is essential to store all different types of prohibited items in 
the visual memory. Thus, working experience helps to familiarize with many different 
items, however it is not enough to acquire the full visual memory representation of 
threat items. Moreover, transfer effects could be observed implying that acquired 
detection skills can easily be generalized and used to detect new, but similar looking 
items. Regarding viewpoint effects, an increased detection performance could also be 
found for unusual views, however no significant interaction between viewpoint and 
training. Last, the effect of age on X-ray screening was investigated. One could 
assume that older screeners with more working experience should be able to 
compensate age related declines. Contrary to expectations overall results of a visual 
search task and threat image projection (TIP) data, that is detection performance on 
the job, provide evidence that age-related differences in job-specific fluid 
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performance even exist when persons are practiced in that ability and may use any 
strategy available to maximize their performance. Further analyses show that the 
age effect is different for tasks which require visual cognition abilities compared to 
tasks which require visual knowledge. 
In summary, this thesis clearly showed the influence of visual cognition abilities for 
the X-ray screening task of aviation security screeners and therewith emphasizes the 
importance of a reliable and valid pre-employment assessment procedure. Further, 
working experience alone is not enough to familiarize with as many different threat 
items as needed to store all different types of prohibited items in the visual memory. 
A significant increase in detection performance due to an individually adaptive 
training system could be revealed. In addition, relatively large age effects could also 
be found for experienced aviation security screeners. 
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2. OUTLINE 
For years terrorist attacks have presented a constant threat to civil aviation and 
since 9/11 a new dimension of threats poses an additional challenge to security 
measures. Thus, the importance of aviation security clearly increased during the last 
years. To improve and facilitate security processes, large investments into 
technology were made. Despite state of the art machines which provide automatic 
detection of explosive material, multiple views of X-ray images or liquid explosive 
detection systems, requirements on aviation security screeners were rather 
increased than reduced. According to Howell and Cooke (1989), advances in 
technology are associated with larger cognitive demands on human operators. While 
procedural and predictable tasks are processed by machines, human operators have 
become responsible for tasks that require inference, diagnosis, judgment, and 
decision making. As well in aviation security the final decision is still made by the 
human operator despite state of the art technology. Furthermore, nowadays that 
changes have to be implemented within a few days or weeks (e.g., the liquid 
regulation implemented in November 2006 after the terror plot in London was 
uncovered), the human operator is the most capable and adaptable resource in the 
system. Thus, the human-machine interaction and the tasks of human operators in 
aviation security should be investigated and adapted accordingly in order to achieve 
the best outcome. 
In this thesis, the human factor in aviation security was investigated. Several studies 
that are part of the three main topics pre-employment assessment of aviation 
security screeners, training of aviation security screeners and age effects in aviation 
security screening are reported. All studies focus on the X-ray screening task which 
is considered to be one of the most important ones in this field. Based on the 
knowledge of basic object recognition theories and psychophysical methods, test 
procedures were developed and validated in order to select and certify the human 
operator for the X-ray screening task. Further studies investigate whether training 
can improve detection performance and whether other factors such as age or gender 
influence the performance additionally. 
PART I: PRE-EMPLOYMENT ASSESSMENT OF AVIATION SECURITY 
SCREENERS. The major task of aviation security screeners is to ensure that no 
prohibited items are brought into the security restricted area and hence on board an 
airplane. To understand the single tasks and to define the basic job requirements a 
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job analysis was performed in PART I „TASK ANALYSIS TO DEFINE THE TASKS OF 
AVIATION SECURITY SCREENERS AND DEVELOP RELIABLE AND VALID PRE-
EMPLOYMENT ASSESSMENT TOOLS”. This analysis revealed the six main tasks X-ray 
screening, baggage search, body search, handling of passengers, teamwork, and 
coping with negative feedback. Further, a cognitive task analysis (CTA) was 
performed for the X-ray screening task. X-ray screening of passenger bags means to 
recognize prohibited items among many harmless objects that are brought along by 
passengers. Most object recognition models agree that recognition is defined as a 
process in which a stimulus representation has to match a visual memory 
representation. Only if this matching process leads to an activation which is high 
enough to exceed the internal threshold, the object is recognized (for an overview 
see Graf, Schwaninger, Wallraven, & Bülthoff, 2002). Thus, recognizing specific 
objects like threat items in X-ray images requires a visual memory representation of 
these objects. If a certain type of forbidden object has never been seen before, no 
representation in visual memory could be formed and the object is not recognizable 
unless it is similar to stored views of another object. Further, studies that deal with 
visual search, figure ground segregation and mental rotation could show that these 
processes influence detection performance as well (Wolfe, 1994; Wolfe, Oliva, 
Horowitz, Butcher, & Bompas, 2002; Palmer, 1999; Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995; Tarr, 
1995). These findings from basic research studies are consistent with descriptions of 
experienced aviation security screeners. According to them the appearance of threat 
objects in X-ray images have to be learned and thus objects which are not known 
cannot be found. Further, detection of threat items becomes more difficult if the bag 
is very close-packed and many other objects distract attention. Further, objects can 
be superimposed by other objects in the bag or shown in an unusual view which 
impedes the detection as well. Both, findings from basic research studies and the 
CTA proposed that the X-ray screening task involves both, knowledge-based and 
image-based factors. Whereas the knowledge has to be learned on the job, image-
based factors are rather related to visual abilities which a job applicant should 
already possess before getting employed. The distinction between knowledge- and 
image-based factors was further defined in the second study of PART I „AVIATION 
SECURITY SCREENERS VISUAL ABILITIES AND VISUAL KNOWLEDGE 
MEASUREMENT”. Whether visual abilities and visual knowledge are in fact two 
different factors in the X-ray screening process, whereof only one is relatively 
independent of experience was tested in this study. Therefore, detection 
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performance of experienced experts and novices was measured using two X-ray 
screening tests. One test, the Prohibited Items Test (PIT) includes a large variety of 
prohibited items and measures the knowledge about the visual appearance of threat 
items in X-ray images of passenger bags. The other one, the X-Ray Object 
Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) measures the ability to cope with image-based factors. 
Bag complexity, superposition and the viewpoint of threat items are defined as 
image-based factors. For the interpretation of X-ray images these factors always play 
along. It is obvious that the detection of a threat item becomes more difficult if it is 
in a close-packed bag, superimposed by other objects in the bag, or shown in an 
unusual view. In the X-Ray ORT all three image-based factors are varied 
systematically and the threat items are well known to everybody. Results revealed 
large differences between experts and novices for the PIT, but not for the X-Ray 
ORT. Thus, the assumption could be verified that the knowledge about which items 
are prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images is dependent on experience 
and training compared to image-based factors which are related to visual abilities. 
These results lead to the assumption that measuring the visual abilities of job 
applicants could increase detection performance later on the job. Therefore, the X-
Ray ORT was evaluated in the third study of PART I “INCREASED DETECTION 
PERFORMANCE IN AIRPORT SECURITY SCREENING USING THE X-RAY ORT AS PRE-
EMPLOYMENT ASSESSMENT TOOL”. This study tested whether the X-Ray ORT is a 
reliable and valid pre-employment assessment tool. Therefore, different reliability 
and validity measures were calculated. The results show that the X-Ray ORT 
measures the image-based factors reliably. Further, the two validity measures, 
concurrent and discriminant validity could show that the X-Ray ORT measures in fact 
X-ray screening processes. Moreover, criterion-related validity revealed that 
screeners who perform well in the X-Ray ORT also have a better detection 
performance on the job. The detection performance on the job was measured using 
threat image projection (TIP) data. Another analysis shows that screeners who were 
employed based on their results in the X-Ray ORT perform in fact on a significantly 
higher level in the PIT after half a year than their colleagues who were not employed 
with this test. As the image-based factors bag complexity, superposition and 
viewpoint of threat items are related to the general visual cognition processes visual 
search, figure-ground segregation, and mental rotation, it can be supposed that 
these factors can also be measured with general visual cognition tests that are 
mostly part of general intelligence test batteries. Therefore, 12 subtests that are 
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assumed to match the X-ray screening task best were selected and applied to job 
applicants. Whether this cognitive test battery (CTB) can as well predict on the job 
performance and therefore be used to select new job applicants was investigated in 
the fourth study of PART I “KEEP IT SIMPLE: COGNITIVE TEST BATTERY TO SELECT 
JOB APPLICANTS FOR THE X-RAY SCREENING TASK IN AVIATION SECURITY”. 
Analysis showed the relationship between ability and detection performance later on 
the job using structural equation modeling (SEM). As expected, factor loadings on 
the latent variable ability were all substantial and significant. However, results prove 
that the cognitive test battery can be reduced to four subtests without losing any 
explained variance. Additionally, an overall analysis tested the relative importance of 
different factors such as ability, training, age, personality traits etc. on detection 
performance. In all models factor loadings for ability, training and age were invariant 
over time and reveal the importance of these variables. Age even displays not only a 
direct, but also an indirect effect on performance in X-ray screening. 
PART II: TRAINING OF AVIATION SECURITY SCREENERS. As discussed at the 
beginning and verified by the first studies, abilities and knowledge are needed to 
maximize the detection performance of threat items at security checkpoints. 
Screeners have to be familiar with as many different forbidden items as needed to 
represent all different types of threat items. Whether this knowledge can be gained 
with job experience and on the job training only or if a specific training system is 
needed has to be investigated. According to Schwaninger and Hofer (2004), the 
detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the Hold Baggage Screening 
(HBS) area can be improved significantly with an adaptive training system. As IEDs 
are normally not seen at checkpoints and vary enormously in their visual 
appearance, a representation of such objects in the visual memory is rather difficult 
to acquire. Consistent with the general model on object recognition a training system 
helps to store different shapes of IEDs in the visual memory and enables a better 
matching process afterwards. However, it can be argued that for other objects like 
knives, guns, and several other prohibited items that are quite often seen at 
checkpoints, working experience alone suffices to store representation of these 
objects in the visual memory and thus training effects are smaller for these items or 
even not observable. The first study in PART II „THE ROLE OF RECURRENT CBT FOR 
INCREASING AVIATION SECURITY SCREENERS’ VISUAL KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITIES 
NEEDED IN X-RAY SCREENING” investigates whether an adaptive training system in 
the cabin baggage screening (CBS) area helps to improve the detection of prohibited 
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items for all kinds of threat objects. Therefore, experienced aviation security 
screeners’ visual knowledge was tested before and after two years of training with 
the individual adaptive training system X-Ray Tutor (XRT). Further, this study 
investigated whether image-based factors which are stated to be rather independent 
of training in fact cannot be improved significantly within these two years. Results 
indicate that knowledge-based factors in X-ray screening can be improved 
substantially with an individual adaptive training compared to image-based factors 
that show only a small increase. The second study in PART II „INVESTIGATING 
TRAINING, TRANSFER, AND VIEWPOINT EFFECTS RESULTING FROM RECURRENT 
CBT OF X-RAY IMAGE INTERPRETATION” tests additionally whether training effects 
can be shown for all threat categories in similar ways. It can be expected that the 
training system is more effective for threat items that are normally not seen at 
checkpoints than for threat objects which are quite often brought along by 
passengers. Further, the design of this study enables to examine transfer effects, i.e. 
whether the training system enables a transfer of knowledge on new items that are 
similar in their appearance, but not trained. Last, it should investigate whether 
different views can be stored in visual memory and hence the viewpoint effect 
decreased with training. Increase in detection performance was found for the group 
which trained with the adaptive training system, but not for the control group which 
received a conventional training. For the XRT group increases could be found for all 
threat categories. However, this increase differed depending on the threat category. 
Whereas the detection performance increase was large for the category IEDs and the 
category Other, only small differences before and after training could be found for 
knives and guns. This result implies that job experience has already an effect on the 
detection of threat items. Threat objects like guns and knives which are relatively 
often taken along by passengers and therefore more often seen at checkpoints are 
detected better than IEDs which are normally not seen on the job. Nevertheless, the 
effect of job experience is quite small compared to the training effect which can be 
achieved with an adaptive CBT. Further, training helps to transfer the gained 
knowledge to other untrained objects that are similar in shape. That is, an effective 
training enables the screener to detect similar, but unfamiliar objects. In this study, 
large viewpoint effects were revealed. This is consistent with object recognition 
studies (Graf et al., 2002; Hayward, 2003; Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995, 1998). After 
training, both views were better recognized than without training. However, no 
significant interaction could be found. That is, contrary to the expectation, the 
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detection performance for difficult views was stable even after six month of training. 
However, it must be pointed out that the XRT training algorithm only provides the 
screeners with unusual views of objects once a screener can detect a prohibited item 
well when depicted from the easy perspective. Thus, it is unclear whether a 
significant interaction between viewpoint and measurement would have been 
observed if the training duration would have been increased (e.g., to one year). 
PART III: AGE EFFECTS IN AVIATION SECURITY SCREENING. For the X-ray 
screening task factors such as age, gender, personality traits and working 
engagement can be considered to influence the detection performance. However, 
results indicated that gender and personality traits show rather small effects and are 
therefore not further reported. However, it should be considered that these factors 
could be rather important determinants for other tasks at the security checkpoint. In 
contrast the influence of age on detection performance in X-ray screening was 
unexpectedly high. Moreover, so far little is known about the long-term effects of 
intensive job-specific training of fluid intellectual abilities in cognitive aging research. 
Effects of job experience and training on detection performance of aviation security 
screeners are covered in PART III of this thesis. Study one in PART III “USE IT AND 
STILL LOSE IT: THE INFLUENCE OF AGE AND JOB EXPERIENCE ON DETECTION 
PERFORMANCE IN X-RAY SCREENING” investigates if age related declines can be 
found in the X-ray screening task and whether these declines can be compensated 
with job experience. Whereas many previous studies reported a reduced age effect 
on performance by means of job experience, no positive effects could be found for 
the X-ray screening task. Our results show clear age effects for a speeded visual 
search task and on the job performance which cannot be compensated with on the 
job experience. However, in Experiment 2 screeners who are employed for a longer 
time seem to profit more from experience in one of the two measurement conditions. 
With sufficient amount of practice they might be able to achieve similar performance 
level as young screeners. This raises the question whether the age effect could be 
reduced with training rather than experience. As the X-ray screening task requires 
screeners to find threat items in passenger bags that are mostly relatively seldom 
seen at checkpoints it could be expected that experience alone is not sufficient. Thus, 
the second study in PART III “TRAIN IT OR LOSE IT: THE INFLUENCE OF AGE AND 
TRAINING ON DETECTION PERFORMANCE IN X-RAY SCREENING” examines whether 
this age effect can be compensated with training on both, image-based and 
knowledge-based factors. Results revealed that the age effect in regard to the ability 
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to cope with image-based factors is similar for experienced and trained aviation 
security screeners. However, for knowledge-based factors younger and older 
screeners differ. Interestingly a covariance analysis revealed even larger age effects 
for older screeners. Thus, training is needed to reach expertise in the X-ray 
screening task, but cannot reduce the age effect. Results show that older screeners 
already try to compensate their decline with more training hours compared to 
younger ones, but are still not able to reach the same level. However, it should be 
noted that large individual differences were found in both studies of Part III. There 
are as well older screeners who perform on a significantly higher level than their 
younger colleagues. As the age effect seems to be an important determinant in this 
X-ray screening task it certainly remains to investigate whether age effects are 
comparably large when a screener got employed in younger days. Further analysis 
should test whether mandatory training hours should be adapted taking age into 
account.  
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3. SELECTION AND PRE-EMPLYOMENT ASSESSMENT OF 
AVIATION SECURITY SCREENERS - A TASK AND COGNITIVE 
TASK ANALYSIS APPROACH 
3.1 ABSTRACT 
This study provides an overview about the development of a reliable and valid pre-
employment assessment for aviation security screeners. By means of a task analysis 
the job and tasks respectively of aviation security screeners were examined. Then, 
X-ray screening of passenger bags which is considered as one of the most important 
tasks of aviation security screeners was investigated using cognitive task analysis 
(CTA). Results from several studies are summarized within the CTA1. 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION    
For years terrorist attacks have presented a constant threat to civil aviation and 
highlighted the importance of aviation security. Furthermore, threats at new 
dimensions demand a reliable security check not only for hold baggage, but also for 
passengers and their carry-on baggage. For example the terror attack on September 
11, 2001 has shown a new dimension. Former terror attacks were comparable to 
Lockerbie 1988 when a Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed by a bomb in the hold 
baggage. As a result, immediate changes regarding hold baggage screening were 
introduced and automated systems for detecting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
in hold baggage were developed. However, in recent past, suicide bombers have 
become likely and therewith the importance of enhanced security checks of 
passengers and their carry-on bags has become a necessity. Although new state of 
the art machines, such as automatic liquid detectors, millimeter waves, X-ray 
machines with automatic detection of explosive materials etc. facilitate the detection 
of threat items, the final decision is still made by human operators (screeners). 
Howell and Cooke (1989) have argued that with advances in technology, cognitive 
demands on humans are rather increased than lowered. While procedural and 
predictable tasks are processed by machines, the human operators have become 
responsible for tasks that require inference, diagnosis, judgment, and decision 
making. In aviation security the human operator is a critical decision-maker and 
                                                 
1 I gratefully acknowledge the help of Adrian Schwaninger in preparing the manuscript. Most of this 
chapter was submitted for publication.  
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probably the most capable and adaptable resource in the system. Above all, 
nowadays that changes in regulations cannot be anticipated in many cases and have 
to be implemented within a short period of time (e.g. liquid regulation after the 
terror plot in London 2006 was uncovered), the human operator is an essential 
component of aviation security. Nevertheless, he can also be the weakest link if not 
skilled or trained enough. The challenge in aviation security is to ensure maximum 
security while keeping the workflow at checkpoints efficient. Moreover, a reliable 
security check demands sufficient time and sufficient human resources which is 
sometimes in conflict with commercial pressure security companies are facing. In 
order to increase security and efficiency, all relevant factors in the security process 
should be evaluated by means of a job and further task analysis. Once the job 
requirements are defined, reliable and valid measures can be developed to increase 
security and efficiency.  
Furthermore, analyses should investigate whether the measured factors relate to 
relatively stable abilities or to aptitudes, i.e. the capacity to acquire the relevant 
competence through training. The better the relationship between abilities, aptitudes 
and acquirable knowledge is defined, the better the selection criteria. Factors that 
cannot be trained should be addressed by a pre-employment assessment procedure 
to ensure that only people who have the capabilities needed to fulfill the job 
requirements are employed.  
In the following we describe how a job and task analysis can be applied in order to 
define the relevant job requirements and further define selection, competency 
assessment and training criteria. 
  
3.2 JOB AND TASK ANALYSIS  
Job and task analytic techniques are useful tools to understand the context in which 
the human operator’s work is taking place. According to Seamster, Redding, and 
Kaempf (1997) a job and task analysis should be performed primarily in order to 
identify the important tasks and responsibilities of a specific job. The job and task 
overview then provides a clear description to define the most important tasks. These 
should further be analyzed by means of a traditional or cognitive task analysis (CTA) 
depending on the task demands.  
Methods to perform a job or task analysis are similar and should be chosen carefully 
in order that they best match the goals. According to Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992) 
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two data collection techniques can be distinguished, subject and observation based 
ones. That is, inputs from personnel who are familiar with the task can be collected 
using verbal protocols and questionnaires (subject based) or experts can be 
observed on the job (observation based). Subject based methods include amongst 
others the critical incident technique, questionnaires, interviews and verbal protocols. 
Observation based data collection techniques are activity sampling and observations. 
Seamster et al. (1997) suggest using observations and unstructured interviews 
rather as part of a preliminary task analysis. For a detailed description about the 
application of the above mentioned data collection techniques and other task analysis 
procedures see Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992), Seamster et al. (1997), Jonassen, 
Hannum, and Tessmer (1989). The data analyses should as well be in line with the 
goals and match the data collection. Results can be visualized with charts, 
summarized using statistical methods or presented with a verbal report. 
3.2.1 Job and task analysis at the security checkpoint 
In the following we report a primary job and task analysis in the field of aviation 
security as an example. At Zurich Airport there are three areas and workplaces 
respectively: the cabin baggage screening (CBS), hold baggage screening (HBS) and 
cargo screening. All screeners are assigned to one workplace only. Because of the 
separated workplaces and slightly varying tasks, the areas CBS and HBS were 
examined separately in order to identify the primary job tasks. For the cargo 
screening area no job analysis was performed. In the following, we report our 
findings for the CBS area only. However, it can be stated that except for one of the 
defined tasks, all main tasks for the HBS group differ only in their importance. 
The major task of aviation security screeners is a reliable security check of 
passengers and passenger bags to ensure that no threat items or dangerous goods 
are brought into the security restricted area. Furthermore, this check should be done 
as efficiently and customer-friendly as possible. For the job analysis in the CBS area 
a subject and observation based data collection method was chosen. That is, inputs 
from personnel who are familiar with the task were collected and observation 
methods were applied by professionals. First, professionals observed aviation 
security screeners at their workstation. Further, unstructured interviews with 
screeners were conducted regarding their primary tasks they have to fulfill. Based on 
these inputs the security check can be reported as follows. 
As can be seen in Figure 1.1, the security check of passengers and their carry-on 
bags is conducted by a crew that consists of four to six screeners. Each screener 
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works at an assigned position for a defined time. Normally after 20 to 30 minutes 
positions are changed. Each position is linked to a specific task. Besides the body and 
baggage check, X-ray screening of passenger bags (see Figure 1.1, position 2) is one 
of the most important tasks at the checkpoint. Based on the X-ray image, the 
screener in front of the screen has to decide whether the carry-on bag is OK and can 
pass or has to be hand-searched. As it is well known, missing a threat item can have 
fatal consequences. However, rejecting too many harmless bags results in long 
waiting lines. Thus, for the screening process the knowledge about the appearance of 
threat items and visual abilities could be assumed to be rather important 
determinants to achieve a certain level of security without sacrificing efficiency. If the 
screener decides that a baggage have to be hand searched, another screener (see 
Figure 1.1, position 3) is responsible for the baggage check. For this task, language 
and communication skills are needed.  First, screeners need to explain to passengers 
why they have to open the bag in order to obtain acceptance. Second, the 
conversation may gives a hint whether the passenger is a potential threat or not. 
Passengers could also try to bring prohibited items into the security restricted area 
and the airplane by wearing them on their body. Therefore, at minimum one female 
and one male screener are responsible for the body check (Figure 1.1, position 4). At 
Zurich Airport, the body check is done by means of a metal detector and a manual 
body search if required. In the next years, this manual body search might be 
Figure 1.1. Different working positions at the security checkpoint. 
2 
1 
3 
4 
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replaced partially by new technology (e.g. millimeter wave technology). Millimeter 
wave technology allows scanning people for the presence of threat objects. As 
clothing and other organic materials are translucent an image of the passenger can 
be provided which can then be interpreted. Whether this body search is done 
manually or using millimeter waves, specific abilities should be considered for both 
approaches. Another position is in front of the X-ray machine (Figure 1.1, position 
1). The assigned screener has the responsibility to inform passengers about the 
security check and place their bags on the belt. This is done by the aviation security 
screener to ensure that bags are placed randomly on the belt. Otherwise a terrorist 
could place his bag that way that a prohibited item becomes very hard to detect in 
the X-ray image. In addition, this procedure ensures as well that the distance 
between two bags is large enough and thus enough time is given for the operator 
who has to interpret the X-ray image. As well for this task language and 
communication skills are needed. Thus, for nearly all positions in the CBS area, 
dealing with passengers is important. As a result, the communication between 
aviation security screeners and passengers can be assumed to play a key function to 
ensure an efficient workflow. Hence, language and communication skills, as well as 
customer service skills were defined as basic job requirements. Moreover, a crew 
always consists of several screeners who have to work as an efficient team, not only 
during normal operations, but especially in stressful situations. The factor teamwork 
becomes even more important taking into consideration that screeners are randomly 
assigned to a crew and especially at bigger airports do not know each other very 
well. Furthermore, passengers are often not pleased to pass the security control and 
therefore screeners have to be very patient and need the ability to cope with 
negative feedback even if they do their job very well. Thus, especially social skills, 
but also specific personality factors such as emotional stability, openness, 
extraversion etc. should be taken into account when people get employed.  
To sum up, the job analysis revealed the six tasks X-ray screening, baggage search, 
body search, handling with passengers, teamwork and coping with negative feedback 
to be important in the CBS area.  
3.3 COGNITIVE TASK ANALYSIS IN X-RAY SCREENING 
Based on the job analysis, job specific knowledge and abilities should be identified 
that are needed to perform the single tasks proficiently in a next step. Depending on 
the task, a traditional (behavioral) task analysis or a CTA can be applied. Whereas 
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the traditional task analysis focuses mainly on procedural tasks that are noncritical, 
the CTA identifies and describes cognitive elements, processes such as decision 
making, problem solving etc. as well as knowledge and skills that are required for 
similar job components Seamster et al. (1997). According to Seamster et al. (1997) 
behavioral task analysis describes the task in terms of time spent, criticality and 
frequency. In contrast, CTA should be used for high performance tasks which require 
large amounts of knowledge or information, significant decision making or problem 
solving, heavy workload or time pressure, multi-tasking, substantial changing 
situations or considerable teamwork. Generally, these cognitive processes are more 
difficult to study because they are not directly observable. Moreover, traditional task 
analysis and CTA can also be used as complementary tools. Usually traditional task 
analyses are used to specify the basic job tasks and precede the CTA.  
As stated by Seamster et al. (1997) quite often a CTA includes a comparison of 
novices and experts to find out which skills and knowledge are domain specific. 
These findings can help to identify selection criteria for required skills and define 
training sessions to acquire job specific knowledge and procedures. 
CTAs can be conducted either using research or operational methods. Although 
research methods are often considered as too complex and time-consuming in 
operational settings, they can be very useful if the field of application is very broad 
and relatively unknown. Methods to collect and analyze data are the same as 
described above for the job and task analysis. For more operational methods which 
can be implemented within few weeks or months see Seamster et al. (1997). In a 
final step, a report should be written that provides a clear description of the CTA. 
This should include the objective of the CTA, job description, analyzed tasks, 
participant selection, materials and procedures used for data collection, data 
analyses, results and conclusion. 
As an example, we performed a CTA for the X-ray screening task which is considered 
to be one of the most important tasks within the security check. First, a primary data 
collection was conducted to describe the cognitive structures and processes 
underlying the X-ray screening task. Based on this information data collection and 
analysis were performed using research methods. As the job analysis was previously 
reported, we focus on the description of the CTA in the following.  
3.3.1 Primary data collection regarding the X-ray screening task 
Besides the body and baggage search, X-ray screening is a major task in aviation 
security. Often, screeners have only a few seconds to decide whether an X-ray image 
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of a passenger bag contains a threat item or not. At security checkpoints it is of 
utmost importance that all threat items are detected without sacrificing efficiency. If 
too many bags are wrongly judged as not ok and have to be hand-searched, long 
waiting lines at checkpoints have to be taken into account. The X-ray screening task 
demands large amounts of knowledge, probably visual cognition abilities, decision 
making, and often multi-tasking under time constraints. Because of these factors, a 
CTA is reasonable. It must be noted that the conducted CTA focuses on the visual 
task only. 
In a first step, unstructured interviews, verbal reports and observations were 
conducted for the primary data collection. Results of these data collection techniques 
as well as theories from basic research studies in object recognition let assume that 
the screening process involves both, knowledge-based and image-based factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schwaninger, Hardmeier, and Hofer (2005) defined the knowledge about which items 
are prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images as knowledge-based factors. 
X-rayed threat objects like the electric shock device depicted in Figure 1.2a can look 
quite different than they do in reality. Furthermore, some items in the bag look like 
harmless objects, but are in fact threat items that are not allowed on board an 
airplane (see the knife in Figure 1.2b). Again other objects like improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) in Figure 1.2c are normally not seen at checkpoints and are therefore 
more difficult to recognize without appropriate training. 
a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b c 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1.2. Threat items in x-ray images: (a) an electric shock device, (b) a knife and (c) an 
improvised explosive device (IED). 
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Considering the X-ray images in Figure 1.3, it can be seen that bag complexity, 
superposition and viewpoint of threat items in X-ray images influence the detection 
performance as well. 
The detection of a gun 
becomes more difficult if 
there are many other 
objects in the bag which 
distract attention (high 
bag complexity). 
Furthermore, it is as 
well more difficult if the 
gun is superimposed by 
other objects in the bag 
or if it is shown in an 
unusual view. Schwaninger et al. (2005) defined these factors as image-based 
factors in X-ray screening. Bag complexity, superposition and the viewpoint of threat 
items can as well be transferred to the visual cognition processes visual search, 
figure-ground segregation and mental rotation which are well known from object 
recognition studies. Research studies in this field revealed that it becomes harder to 
detect a target object if many objects are presented within a scene (e.g. Wolfe, 
1994; Wolfe, Oliva, Horowitz, Butcher, & Bompas, 2002). Further, the detection is 
more difficult if the target object is superimposed by other objects and relevant 
components are not visible (Palmer, 1999). Last, viewpoint-dependent theories in 
object recognition predict systematic effects of viewpoint and familiarity (Tarr & 
Bülthoff, 1995b; Tarr, 1995). According to Palmer, Rosch, and Chase (1981) the 
easy viewpoint of an item refers to the canonical (i.e. easy recognizable) perspective. 
Thus, objects in the frontal or canonical view which is normally more often seen are 
easier to detect then ones presented in unfamiliar views. Although it is known from 
object recognition theories that different views of an object can be stored in the 
visual memory which facilitates the detection of rotated objects, people with good 
mental rotation abilities are probably more able to detect a prohibited item even if it 
is shown in a rotated view they have never seen before.  
In state-of-the art X-ray screening equipment, different materials in X-ray images 
(organic, metallic materials etc.) are coded using different colors. Therefore, it can 
be assumed that a color vision deficiency can impair the X-ray image interpretation 
Figure 1.3. Image-based factors in x-ray images: left bag complexity, 
middle superposition and right viewpoint. 
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task. There are different kinds of color deficiencies which are mostly inherited. The 
most common form is the red/green color blindness which occurs in about 8% to 
12% of males and about 0.5% of females.  
3.3.2 Materials and Procedure 
Knowledge-based factors 
An important factor in the X-ray screening task is the knowledge about which items 
are not allowed in the security restricted area and what they look like in X-ray 
images. To measure whether knowledge-based factors could in fact be improved with 
on the job experience or a specific training, the Prohibited Items Test (PIT) was 
developed. This test includes all kinds of prohibited items according to international 
prohibited items lists (EU, ECAC, ICAO). To keep the image-based factors constant 
all items are shown in the easy view only and bag complexity as well as 
superposition were kept relatively constant over all trials. In the PIT a total of 160 
trials are shown to participants whereof 80 images are harmless bags (i.e. without 
any prohibited item). Each image is shown for 10 seconds on the screen. Then 
participants have to decide whether the bag was OK (included no prohibited item) or 
NOT OK (included a prohibited item) by clicking on the respective button on the 
screen. Further they have to indicate to which of the seven categories the prohibited 
item belongs to and how sure they are in their decision. For more information about 
this test, its reliability and validity measures see Hardmeier, Hofer, and Schwaninger 
(2006a). 
 
Image-based factors 
The defined image-based factors bag complexity, superposition, and viewpoint of 
threat items were supposed to be important determinants for the interpretation of X-
ray images. As the image-based factors are related to visual search, figure-ground 
segregation and mental rotation, these processes can also be measured with 
intelligence tests which mostly include subtests about visual cognition abilities.  
Another possibility is to apply an X-ray screening test which measures the defined 
image-based factors in X-ray images independent of knowledge. To this end, the X-
Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) was developed. This test includes a total of 
256 X-ray images of passenger bags. In this test only guns and knives, object 
shapes that are well known by novices are shown. Furthermore, all X-ray images are 
displayed in grayscale as the meaning of color in X-ray images is not known to 
novices. All three image-based factors in the test are varied systematically. A total of 
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eight different guns and eight different knives are used. All of them are shown in an 
easy and rotated view. Each of these items is then placed twice in a bag with high 
complexity level and in a bag with low complexity level whereof in one of them with 
high superposition by other items and the other one with low superposition. Thus, all 
factors are combined with each other and each threat item is shown once in each 
possible combination. The X-Ray ORT is a computer based test which is very easy to 
use. Test participants receive a short introduction which explains the test, as well as 
some exercise trials to familiarize with the test taking procedure. In order to ensure 
that object shapes are known, all guns and all knives are shown for 10 seconds on 
the screen before the test starts either in the frontal or rotated view. All images are 
displayed for 4 seconds on the screen only. Then participants have to decide whether 
the bag was OK (contained no gun and no knife) or NOT OK (contained a gun or a 
knife) by clicking on the respective button on the screen. Additionally, they have to 
indicate how sure they are in their decision2 by using a slider control. The test itself 
is subdivided into four parts and after each part participants can take a short break if 
desired.  
 
Color vision 
Whether people have color deficiencies can be measured with a color blindness test.  
An easy to use and often applied test is the Ishihara color blindness test (Ishihara, 
2005). This test consists of a series of pictures of colored spots in which Arabic digits 
in slightly different colors are embedded. These digits can easily be seen with normal 
color vision, but not with a color vision deficiency. This test is very easy to apply and 
takes only a few minutes to complete.  
 
Procedure 
To investigate whether knowledge-based and image-based factors can be 
distinguished, the detection performance between experts and novices was 
compared in the PIT and the X-Ray ORT. Schwaninger et al. (2005) expected larger 
effects between both groups for knowledge-based factors that are more related to 
specific knowledge than for image-based factors that are measured with the X-Ray 
ORT. To further test and verify these results of the first study, the detection 
performance of aviation security screeners in both tests was compared before and 
after two years of individually adaptive computer-based training (CBT). Further, 
                                                 
2 For the analysis of detection performance only OK and NOT OK responses were taken into account.  
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correlations between the X-Ray ORT and the PIT, on the job performance and 
theoretical knowledge were calculated in order to validate both tests. Last, the 
detection performance of screeners who were employed based on the test results in 
the X-Ray ORT and screeners who were employed without using the X-Ray ORT was 
compared. 
3.3.3 Participants 
Results that are going to be presented are based on 453 aviation security screeners 
aging between 24 and 65 years (M = 48.94 years, SD = 9.09 years). 134 novices 
aging between 21 and 26 years (M = 23.24, SD = 1.22), and 101 job applicants in 
the age between 19 and 55 years (M = 35.25, SD = 9.79) who were employed using 
the X-Ray ORT as pre-employment assessment tool. Depending on the analysis, the 
sample size had to be adjusted.  
3.3.4 Data analysis 
Signal detection theory provides valid methods to measure the detection 
performance of screeners taking the hit rate and the false alarm rate into account. A 
hit is a correctly identified threat item, whereas sending a harmless bag to be hand 
searched is called false alarm. Further, a missed threat item is defined as a miss and 
a correct rejection refers to a correctly identified harmless bag. Figure 1.4 shows why 
the hit rate alone is not a valid detection performance measure. For example 
screener B in Figure 1.4 reaches a hit rate of 90% by simply judging most bags as 
NOT OK. This can be seen considering the high false alarm rate of nearly 80%. In 
contrast screener A reaches the same hit rate, but with a very low false alarm rate 
(about 10%). Thus, screener A guarantees security without sacrificing efficiency. The 
detection performance measures d’ and A’ take the hit and false alarm rate into 
account. D’ equals z(pHit) – z(pFA alarm) whereas pHit refers to the hit rate, pFA to 
the false alarm rate and z to the z-transformation (Green and Swets, 1966). D’ of 
screeners is related to the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves which can 
be seen in Figure 1.4. These curves show how the hit rate of a screener changes as a 
function of changes in the false alarm rate. As an example, d’ of screener A with 2.5 
is remarkably higher than d’ of 0.5 of screener B. 
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Furthermore, the detection 
performance measure d’ is 
independent of subjective 
response bias. The response bias 
can vary depending on the 
personality of screeners, cost and 
benefits etc. As an example if a 
screener judges more bags as 
NOT OK due to a test situation 
he/she changes his/her position 
on the ROC curves while d’ 
remains the same (see also A2 
and B2 in Figure 1.4).  
In the reported studies we 
calculated either the detection 
performance measure d’ or A’. In order to enable a basis of comparison, all results 
are calculated using d’.  
3.3.5 Results 
Effects of experience and training on knowledge-based and image-based 
factors 
To investigate to what extent knowledge-based and image-based factors differ, 
Schwaninger et al. (2005) tested the detection performance for experienced aviation 
security screeners and novices in the PIT and the X-Ray ORT. Results showed that 
detection performance between experts and novices differed remarkably in the PIT, 
but only little in the X-Ray ORT. This difference becomes even more evident if the 
relative difference between experts and novices is computed using the following 
formula:  
 
novices
novicesexperts
e Performanc Detection
e Performanc Detection  -  e Performanc Detection
 
Figure 1.4. Detection performance measure d’. 
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As can be seen in Figure 1.5a, percentage difference between experienced screeners 
and novices was 94% in the PIT and only 31% in the X-Ray ORT. Further, a detailed 
analysis for image-based factors revealed that the detection performance decreased 
significantly if threat items are shown in close-packed bags, were superimposed by 
other items in the bag or shown in an unusual view (see Figure 1.5b and 1.5c). 
Although experienced screeners perform on a slightly higher level than novices, the 
decreased detection performance for the three image-based factors in the difficult 
condition could be found for both groups. Thus, as well experienced screeners cannot 
compensate effects of image-based factors with their experience. Further, large 
individual differences could be found for both groups. Based on these test results 
Schwaninger et al. (2005) assumed that knowledge-based factors are indeed 
influenced by experience and on the job training. Further, image-based factors 
measured with the X-Ray ORT can rather be related to visual cognition abilities which 
are less dependent on experience.  
Figure 1.5. (a) Relative difference between experts and novices in the PIT and the X-Ray ORT, (b) 
image-based factors in the X-Ray ORT for screeners and (c) for novices. Adapted from Schwaninger et 
al. (2005). 
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To summarize, it could be shown that experience seems to influence knowledge- and 
image-based factors differently. Based on this study and the results of the primary 
data collection phase it was assumed that experience and on the job training alone is 
probably not enough to store 
the appearance of all kinds of 
prohibited items in the visual 
memory. First, some threat 
items are seldom or normally 
not seen at checkpoints (e.g. 
IEDs). Second, other prohibited 
items look quite different than 
in reality (e.g. electric shock 
device). Therefore, it could be 
assumed that a training system 
that enables to see many 
prohibited items within a 
training session helps to store 
all kinds of prohibited items in 
the visual memory. An 
individually adaptive training 
system which includes all kinds 
of prohibited items in different 
views was developed 
(Schwaninger, 2004, 2005b). 
Whether this training system 
helps to increase detection 
performance of aviation security screeners in the PIT and the X-Ray ORT after two 
years of individually adaptive training (2 times 20 minutes per week) was 
investigated by Hardmeier, Hofer, and Schwaninger (2006b). As can be seen in 
Figure 1.6a, the detection performance of experienced but untrained aviation 
security screeners (first measurement) is generally lower than the one of trained 
screeners (second measurement) in both tests. Further, the detection performance 
increase was higher for the PIT than for the X-Ray ORT. Relative difference for the 
PIT was 85.0%, but only 22.7% for the X-Ray ORT (see also Figure 1.6b). For more 
details about this study see Hardmeier et al. (2006b). Thus, an individually adaptive 
Figure 1.6. (a) Detection Performance with standard 
deviations in the PIT and X-Ray ORT for the first and second 
measurement and (b) percent difference in these two tests. 
Adapted from Hardmeier et al. (2006b). 
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CBT can strongly increase the knowledge about which items are prohibited and what 
they look like in X-ray images. However, it seems that image-based factors are 
influenced by both experience and training only to a limited extent and can therefore 
rather be related to individual abilities. On the basis of these results, it can be 
assumed that employing people with the ability to cope with image-based factors 
would lead to a better detection performance later on the job after training.  
 
X-Ray ORT as pre-employment assessment tool 
The rather small difference in the X-Ray ORT between novices and experienced 
aviation security screeners as well as between experienced and trained screeners 
supports the assumption that this test measures in fact visual abilities in X-ray 
screening. Compared to knowledge-based factors, these abilities can only be 
increased to some amount by experience and training. Therefore, the X-Ray ORT 
could be a useful instrument for pre-employment assessment purposes. Before 
applying this test to job applicants the X-Ray ORT was validated. Therefore, 
Hardmeier et al. (2006a) compared the test results in the X-Ray ORT with results in 
the PIT, the Computer Based Questionnaire (CBQ) and threat image projection (TIP) 
data. A medium correlation between both X-ray screening tests was expected as 
both tests deal with X-ray images. The PIT measures mainly the knowledge about 
prohibited items in X-ray images as image-based factors were kept relatively 
constant. Nevertheless, as well in the PIT image-based factors play along. However, 
the CBQ which is a multiple-choice test about airport specific issues and procedures 
at airports should be less correlated with the X-Ray ORT. Further, test results in the 
X-Ray ORT were correlated with TIP data. TIP is a technology that allows to measure 
detection performance on the job by projecting fictional threat items into real 
passenger bags. After each TIP image screeners receive a feedback message that a 
fictional threat item was present (for more information see Schwaninger & Hofer, 
2004). TIP data were aggregated over a period of 17 months of 86 aviation security 
screeners. If the ability to cope with image-based factors is in fact important for the 
X-ray screening task, screeners with high ability should as well show a better 
detection performance on the job.  
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Results revealed a rather high correlation of r = .62 between the X-Ray ORT and the 
PIT (see Figure 1.7a). This result evidences that both X-ray screening tests measure 
similar processes, i.e. the interpretation of X-ray images. By contrast there was only 
a small correlation of r = .25 between the detection of prohibited items in X-ray 
images and the theoretical knowledge about airport specific issues which was 
measured with the CBQ, a multiple-choice test (Figure 1.7b). Regarding TIP data a 
medium to high correlation (r = .51) between detection performance in the X-Ray 
ORT and on the job performance was found (Figure 1.7c).  
 
Based on these results Hardmeier et al. (2006a) assumed that the X-Ray ORT is a 
valid instrument which can account for a part of the detection performance variability 
and therefore be used as pre-employment assessment tool to select job applicants. 
101 job applicants who passed the pre-employment assessment successfully were 
employed as aviation security screeners. All of them had to reach a defined score in 
the X-Ray ORT which was clearly above the average detection performance level of 
novices. Further, applicants had to pass the color blindness test by Ishihara, an 
English and German language test, a physical exam and a job interview3. Whether 
the X-Ray ORT in fact helps to increase detection performance of aviation security 
screeners later on the job was also investigated by Hardmeier et al. (2006a). They 
compared the detection performance in the PIT of screeners who were employed 
with the X-Ray ORT and screeners who were employed without this test. Screeners 
who were not employed using the X-Ray ORT had a working experience between 2 
and 26 years (M = 9.71, SD = 5.50 years). Screeners who were all hired as aviation 
                                                 
3 Except for the X-Ray ORT all tests in the pre-employment assessment were as well used for the group 
that was selected without the X-Ray ORT. 
Figure 1.7. Correlation between test results in the X-Ray ORT and (a) test results in the PIT, (b) test 
results in the CBQ and (c) detection performance on the job (TIP).  
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security screeners based on the test results in the X-Ray ORT had maximum one 
year of working experience when taking the PIT.  
The results show a significant difference between these two groups in terms of their 
performance measure d’. If the X-Ray ORT was used as additional selection criterion 
as part of the pre-employment assessment procedure, detection performance later 
on the job was increased significantly (see also Figure 1.8). 
 
3.3.6 Conclusion 
Results support the assumption that image- and knowledge-based factors are 
important determinants in the X-ray screening task. The hypothesis that image-
based factors (bag complexity, superposition, viewpoint) are related to visual abilities 
that are rather independent of experience and knowledge could be verified. The 
detection performance decreased with increasing bag complexity, superposition and 
unusual viewpoint of threat items for experienced and trained aviation security 
screeners as well as for novices. Further, large individual differences for all three 
groups could be found. That means, that there are large differences between people 
to cope with the image-based factors and these differences are still evident after 
individually adaptive training. Further analyses could show that results in the X-Ray 
ORT correlate with the detection performance in the PIT and above all with TIP data, 
Figure 1.8. Detection performance in the PIT for screeners who were not selected 
using the X-Ray ORT as pre-employment assessment tool (left)  selected with the 
the X-Ray ORT (right). Adapted from Hardmeier et al. (2006a). 
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i.e. detection performance on the job. Therefore, the ability to cope with image-
based factors should be defined as basic job requirement and be measured within a 
pre-employment assessment procedure. Whether the detection performance can in 
fact be increased using the X-Ray ORT as pre-employment assessment tool was 
investigated in a second step. Results evidenced, that screeners who were selected 
with the X-Ray ORT showed a significantly better detection performance after one 
year of employment compared to screeners who were not hired using the X-Ray 
ORT. Besides the ability to cope with image-based factors that should already be 
available when people get employed, the knowledge about the visual appearance of 
threat items is essential. In comparison with experienced aviation security screeners, 
novices showed a poor detection performance of prohibited items in X-ray images of 
passenger bags. Thus, the knowledge what threat items look like can be learned with 
experience and on the job training. However, a follow-up study found that an 
individually adaptive training system can increase the detection performance of 
experienced aviation security screeners enormously. As a large number of prohibited 
items look quite different in X-ray images than in reality, are seldom seen at 
checkpoints or only seen in an unusual view a training system seems to be 
important. Thus, an individually adaptive training system that includes a wide range 
of prohibited items in different views is important and should be used after 
employment.  
To sum up, for the demanding X-ray screening task two factors should be taken into 
account when employing people and training employees. Only people with the 
relevant visual abilities should be employed. After employment screeners need to 
learn what prohibited objects look like in X-ray images. Therefore, an individual 
adaptive training which displays a large number of prohibited items within a short 
time should be provided. 
 
3.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We could show how useful a task and cognitive task analysis respectively could be in 
order to understand a specific task like the X-ray screening job. However, the task 
analysis clearly revealed that the job of an aviation security screener includes various 
tasks which should be taken into account when job applicants get employed. Besides 
X-ray screening, baggage and body search, dealing with passengers, teamwork and 
coping with negative feedback were found to be important for screeners working in 
36/161 
 
the CBS area. Similar requirements could be found for the HBS area. A CTA was 
performed for the X-ray screening task which is supposed to be one of the most 
important tasks at security checkpoints. 
As could be seen, X-ray screening includes different factors which should be taken 
into account when employing and training aviation security screeners. Whereas 
knowledge-based factors are part of screeners training, abilities should already be 
available when people get employed. One possibility to measure the ability to cope 
with image-based factors in X-ray screening is the X-Ray ORT. This test is a reliable 
and valid instrument to measure the ability to cope with bag complexity, 
superposition and viewpoint of threat items in X-ray images. Whether these abilities 
can also be measured with visual cognition tests that are part of general intelligence 
tests have to be examined in further research studies. These tests should include 
processes that reflect the X-ray screening task, thus processes such as visual search, 
figure-ground segregation, mental rotation, vigilance and probably logical thinking 
should be taken into consideration. Moreover, further research studies should 
investigate whether color blindness impairs the detection performance. As different 
materials in X-ray images, such as organic, metallic material etc. are coded using 
different colors, it is assumed that color vision is an important determinant for the X-
ray screening job. So far, several airports conduct a color vision test before 
employment to ensure that the detection performance in X-ray images and thus the 
security is not impaired by some unknown factors. However, so far no research study 
have be done in order to investigate whether people with color vision deficiencies 
perform in fact worse in the X-ray screening task. Thus, the color vision test is a 
precautionary measure which is important but should be confirmed by a scientifically 
research study. 
Further studies should clarify whether the remaining defined tasks such as baggage 
and body search, dealing with passengers, teamwork and coping with negative 
feedback are more related to abilities and have to be clarified within a pre-
employment assessment or can be learned on the job. 
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4. AVIATION SECURITY SCREENERS VISUAL ABILITIES AND 
VISUAL KNOWLEDGE MEASUREMENT 
4.1 ABSTRACT    
A central aspect of airport security is reliable detection of forbidden objects in 
passenger’s bags using X-ray screening equipment. Human recognition involves 
visual processing of the X-ray image and matching items with object representations 
stored in visual memory. Thus, without knowing which objects are forbidden and 
what they look like, prohibited items are difficult to recognize (aspect of visual 
knowledge). In order to measure whether a screener has acquired the necessary 
visual knowledge, we have applied the prohibited items test (PIT). This test contains 
different forbidden items according to international prohibited items lists. The items 
are placed in X-ray images of passenger bags so that the object shapes can be seen 
relatively well. Since all images can be inspected for 10 seconds, failing to recognize 
a threat item can be mainly attributed to a lack of visual knowledge. 
The object recognition test (ORT) is more related to visual processing and encoding. 
Three image-based factors can be distinguished that challenge different visual 
processing abilities. First, depending on the rotation within a bag, an object can be 
more or less difficult to recognize (effect of viewpoint). Second, prohibited items can 
be more or less superimposed by other objects, which can impair detection 
performance (effect of superposition). Third, the number and type of other objects in 
a bag can challenge visual search and processing capacity (effect of bag complexity). 
The ORT has been developed to measure how well screeners cope with these image-
based factors. This test contains only guns and knives, placed into bags in different 
views with different superposition and complexity levels. Detection performance is 
determined by the ability of a screener to detect threat items despite rotation, 
superposition and bag complexity. Since the shapes of guns and knives are usually 
well-known even by novices, the aspect of visual threat object knowledge is of minor 
importance in this test. 
A total of 134 aviation security screeners and 134 novices participated in this study. 
Detection performance was measured using A’. The three image-based factors of the 
ORT were validated. The effect of view, superposition, and bag complexity were 
highly significant. The validity of the PIT was examined by comparing the two 
participant groups. Large differences were found in detection performance between 
screeners and novices for the PIT. This result is consistent with the assumption that 
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the PIT measures aspects related to visual knowledge. Although screeners were also 
better than novices in the ORT, the relative difference was much smaller. This result 
is consistent with the assumption that the ORT measures image-based factors that 
are related to visual processing abilities; whereas the PIT is more related to visual 
knowledge. For both tests, large inter-individual differences were found. Reliability 
was high for both participant groups and tests, indicating that they can be used for 
measuring performance on an individual basis. The application of the ORT and PIT for 
screener certification and competency assessment are discussed4. 
 
4.2 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of aviation security has changed dramatically in the last years. As a 
consequence of the new threat situation large investments into technology have 
been made. State-of-the-art X-ray machines provide high resolution images, many 
image enhancement features and even automatic detection of explosive material. 
However, it is becoming clear since recently that the best technology is only as 
valuable as the humans that operate it. Indeed, reliable recognition of threat items in 
X-ray images of passenger bags is a demanding task. Consider the images depicted 
in Figure 1.2. Each of the three bags contains a threat item that could be used to 
severely harm people. Even though most people would probably recognize prohibited 
items like the electric shock device in Figure 1.2a when depicted in a photograph, 
this and other threat objects are relatively hard to recognize for novices because the 
shape features look quite different in an X-ray image than in reality. Other 
dangerous items (e.g., the switchblade knife in Figure 1.2b) might be missed by a 
novice because they look similar to harmless objects (e.g. a pen). Several other 
threat objects are usually not encountered in real life (e.g., improvised explosive 
devices, IEDs in Figure 1.2c), which stresses the importance of computer-based 
training in order to achieve a high detection performance within a few seconds of 
inspection time (Schwaninger & Hofer, 2004). 
In short, the knowledge about which items are prohibited and what they look like in 
an X-ray image is certainly an important determinant for detection performance. The 
Prohibited Items Test (PIT) has been developed to measure this knowledge-based 
component and it therefore contains a large number of different forbidden objects 
according to international prohibited items lists. 
                                                 
4 A similar version was published in the IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 2005. I gratefully 
acknowledge the help of Adrian Schwaninger and Franziska Hofer in preparing the manuscript. 
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As pointed out by Schwaninger (2003a) several image-based effects influence how 
well threat items can be recognized in X-ray images (Figure 1.3). Viewpoint can 
strongly affect recognition performance, which has been shown previously in many 
object recognition studies (for reviews see Graf, Schwaninger, Wallraven, & Bülthoff, 
2002; Schwaninger, 2005a; Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995a, 1999). Since objects are often 
superimposed on each other in X-ray images, the degree of superposition can affect 
detection performance substantially. Another image-based factor is bag complexity, 
which is determined by the type and number of objects in a bag. 
The Object Recognition Test (ORT) has been developed to measure how well 
screeners can cope with such image-based factors. In order to reduce effects of 
visual knowledge, only guns and knives are used in this test, i.e., object shapes that 
are usually well known also by novices. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of image-based and knowledge-
based factors in X-ray screening using these two different tests. To what extent 
screeners know which items are prohibited and what they look like in passenger bags 
is measured by the PIT. It includes prohibited items of different categories in X-ray 
images of passenger bags while keeping effects of view, superposition, and bag 
complexity relatively constant. The objects are displayed in an easy view with a 
moderate degree of superposition in bags of limited complexity during 10 seconds 
per image. If a participant fails to detect a threat item it is therefore rather related to 
a lack of visual knowledge than to an attentional failure or visual processing capacity 
limitations. Since many different prohibited items with shapes that are often not 
known from everyday experience are used in the PIT, a substantial difference in 
detection performance between novices and screeners could be expected. The ORT 
measures how well someone can cope with image-based factors such as view, 
superposition, and bag complexity. As mentioned above, only guns and knives are 
used in this test, i.e., object shapes that are well known by both screeners and 
novices. Therefore, smaller differences between screeners and novices might be 
expected for the ORT compared to the PIT. However, expertise might increase visual 
abilities that are necessary in order to cope with image difficulty resulting from 
effects of viewpoint, superposition, and bag complexity. Therefore, the effect size of 
the interaction between image-based effects and expertise is an important measure 
in this study as well. 
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4.3 METHOD 
4.3.1 Participants 
A total of 268 participants took part in this study. Half were aviation security 
screeners, the other half were novices.  
All participants were tested with the ORT and then the PIT. The screener group 
consisted of 67 females and 67 males at the ages of 24 and 57 years (M = 41.05 
years, SD = 7.84 years). All had undergone initial classroom and on the job training 
and they had at least two years of work experience in airport security screening of 
carry-on bags. 
The novices group consisted of 134 males between 21 and 26 years (M = 23.24 
years, SD = 1.22 years). 
4.3.2 Materials and Procedure 
Prohibited Items Test (PIT) 
This test contains a wide spectrum of prohibited items which can be classified into 
seven categories according to international prohibited items lists. The PIT version 
used in this study included a total of 19 guns, 27 sharp objects, 14 blunt and hunt 
instruments, 5 highly inflammable substances, 17 explosives, 3 chemicals, and 13 
other prohibited items (e.g., buckshot, ivory). All prohibited items were depicted 
from an easy viewpoint and combined with a bag of medium complexity and low 
superposition, so their shapes could be seen relatively well and the influence of 
image-based factors could be minimized. X-ray images were taken from Heimann 
6040i machines and displayed in color. 68 bags contained one threat item, 6 bags 
contained two threat items, and 6 bags contained three threat items. Each bag was 
shown twice resulting in a total of 160 trials. There were four blocks of 40 trials. 
Block order was counterbalanced across four groups of participants using a Latin 
Square design. Trial order was randomized within each block. Only responses to 
images containing one threat item were used for statistical analyses.  
The PIT is fully computer-based and starts with a self-explanatory instruction, 
followed by a brief training session with eight examples to familiarize the participants 
with the procedure. Feedback is provided after each trial only in the introductory 
phase. Each X-ray image was displayed for a maximum of 10 seconds in the 
introductory and test phases. This duration is long enough to ensure that missing a 
threat item can be mainly attributed to a lack of visual knowledge rather than a 
failure of attention. For each image, participants had to decide whether the bag was 
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OK (no threat) or NOT OK (threat) and indicate on a slider how sure they were in 
their decision (confidence ratings on a 50 point scale). In addition, participants had 
to indicate the threat category of the prohibited item(s) by clicking the corresponding 
buttons on the screen (for NOT OK decisions only). Pressing the space bar displayed 
the next image. As the test was subdivided into four blocks, participants were 
allowed to take a short break after a block was completed. 
 
Object Recognition Test (ORT) 
As explained in the introduction, Schwaninger (2003a) pointed out that image-based 
factors such as viewpoint, superposition, and bag complexity can substantially affect 
detection performance in X-ray images. The ORT has been designed to measure how 
well people can cope with such image-based factors rather than measuring 
knowledge-based determinants of threat detection performance. To this end, guns 
and knives with the blade open are used in the ORT, i.e., object shapes that can be 
assumed to be known by most people. In addition, all guns and knives are shown for 
10 seconds before the test starts, which further reduces the role of knowledge-based 
factors in this test. 
In reality, a threat object can be depicted from a difficult viewpoint in a close-packed 
bag and be superimposed by other objects. The X-ray images used in the ORT vary 
systematically in image difficulty by varying the degree of view difficulty, bag 
complexity, and superposition, both independently and in combination. This makes it 
possible to investigate main effects as well as interactions between the image-based 
factors. All X-ray images of the ORT are in black-and-white, as color, per se, is 
mainly diagnostic for the material of objects in the bag, and thus, could be primarily 
helpful for experts. 
Eight guns and eight knives with common shapes were used. Each gun and each 
knife was displayed in an easy view and a rotated view to measure the effect of 
viewpoint. In order to equalize image difficulty resulting from viewpoint changes, 
guns were more rotated than knives based on results of a pilot study. Each view was 
combined with two bags of low complexity: once with low superposition; and once 
with high superposition. These combinations were also generated using two closed-
packed bags with a higher degree of bag complexity. In addition, each bag was 
presented once with and once without the threat item. Thus, there were a total of 
256 trials: 2 weapons (guns, knives) * 8 (exemplars) * 2 (views) * 2 (bag 
complexities) * 2 (superpositions) * 2 (harmless vs. threat images). There were four 
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blocks of 64 trials each. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across four groups 
of participants using a Latin Square. Within each block the order of trials was 
random. 
The ORT is fully computer-based. After task instructions an introductory session 
followed using 2 guns and 2 knives not displayed in the test phase. Feedback was 
provided after each trial but only in the introductory phase. Prior to the test phase, 
the eight guns and eight knives used at test were presented for 10 seconds, 
respectively. Half of the guns and knives were shown in an easy view and half were 
depicted in a rotated view. At test, each object was presented in the easy and the 
rotated view with low and high superposition and with low and high bag complexity. 
Each image was displayed for 4 seconds. This duration was chosen to match the 
demands of high passenger flow where average X-ray image inspection time at 
checkpoints is in the range of 3-5 seconds. For each X-ray image, participants had to 
decide whether the X-ray images contained one of the guns or knives shown in the 
introductory phase or not (NOT OK or OK response). Confidence ratings had to be 
provided by changing the position of a slider (90 point scale). The next trial was 
started by pressing the space bar. Short breaks were possible after completing one 
of the four blocks. 
 
4.4 RESULTS 
It is important to take the hit rate as well as the false alarm rate into account if 
threat and non-threat images are used in a computer-based test requiring OK and 
NOT OK responses. The reason is simple: A candidate could achieve a hit rate of 
100% simply by judging all bags as being NOT OK. Whether a high hit rate reflects 
good visual detection performance, or just a lenient response bias, can only be 
determined if the false alarm rate is considered, too. Psychophysics provides several 
methods in order to derive more valid estimates based on hit and false alarm rates. 
A well-known measure from signal detection theory is d’ (Green & Swets, 1966). It 
equals z(H) – z(FA) whereas H denotes the hit rate, FA the false alarm rate and z 
represents the transformation into z-scores (standard deviation units). An often used 
“non-parametric” measure is A’ (Pollack & Norman, 1964). This measure represents 
an estimate of the area under an ROC curve that is specified by only one data point. 
More specifically, A’ corresponds to the average area for the two linear ROC curves 
that maximize and minimize the hit rate. The term “non-parametric” is a bit 
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misleading because it only refers to the fact that the computation of A’ doesn’t 
require an priori assumption about the underlying distributions (MacMillan & 
Creelman, 1991; Pastore, Crawley, Berens, & Skelly, 2003). This has sometimes 
been regarded as an advantage over SDT measures such as d’ and ∆m (for a more 
detailed discussion of this issue. See also Hofer and Schwaninger (2004). Although 
only A’ data are reported in this study, it should be stressed that similar results were 
obtained for d’ data. Moreover, correlations between A’ and d’ were very high for 
both tests and screeners groups (ORT: r = .94 for screeners and r = .97 for novices, 
PIT: r = .95 for screeners and r = .98 for novices, all p < .001). 
The results section is organized as follows: first, ANOVA results of the ORT are 
presented. These analyses were conducted to investigate whether detection 
performance of aviation security screeners and novices is affected by image-based 
factors. In addition, the effect of expertise on the three image-based factors 
measured by the ORT was examined. Second, overall detection performance in the 
ORT is compared to overall detection performance in the PIT5. More specifically, the 
effect of expertise on image-based factors and knowledge-based factors is analyzed, 
comparing detection performance of aviations security screeners with that of novices 
in the two tests. Finally, the results of reliability analyses are presented which were 
conducted to evaluate whether the ORT and PIT can be used for measuring detection 
performance on an individual basis. 
4.4.1 ORT and Abilities to Cope with Image-Based Factors 
A’ scores calculated from hit and false alarm rates of the ORT were subjected to 
three-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) with the three within-participants factors 
view, bag complexity, and superposition. Results of aviation security screeners show 
that there were significant main effects of view (easy vs. rotated) with an effect size 
of η2 = .71, F(1, 133) = 318.59, MSE = 0.003, p < .001, bag complexity (low vs. 
high) η2 = .83, F(1, 133) = 652.96, MSE = 0.003, p < .001, and superposition (low 
vs. high) η2 = .61, F(1, 133) = 203.73, MSE = 0.003, p < .001. The following two-
way interactions were significant: View * superposition, η2 = .12, F(1, 133) = 17.91, 
MSE = 0.002, p < .001, bag complexity * superposition η2 = .12, F(1, 133) = 18.22, 
MSE = 0.002, p < .001. Note however, that the effect sizes of these interactions are 
rather low when compared to the effect sizes of the main effects. All other 
                                                 
5 A’ scores for the PIT were calculated using the responses to images of the following categories: guns, 
sharp objects, hunt and blunt instruments. 
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interactions were not significant. In short, there were clear main effects of view, bag 
complexity, and superposition with very large effect sizes (see also conventions by 
Cohen (1988). Some interactions reached statistical significance, but the effect sizes 
were relatively small when compared to the effect sizes of the main effects. 
Similar results could be observed for novices. Again, there were significant main 
effects of view (easy vs. rotated) η2 = .76, F(1, 133) = 428.33, MSE = 0.005, p < 
.001, bag complexity (low vs. high) η2 = .72, F(1, 133) = 333.14, MSE = 0.005, p < 
.001, and superposition (low vs. high) η2 = .63, F(1, 133) = 228.09, MSE = 0.004, p 
< .001. All two-way interactions were significant: View * bag complexity η2 = .06, 
F(1, 133) = 9.07, MSE = 0.004, p < .01, view * superposition η2 = .07, F(1, 133) = 
10.43, MSE = 0.004, p < .01, bag complexity * superposition η2 = .15, F(1, 133) = 
23.15, MSE = 0.004, p < .001. The three-way interaction between view, bag 
complexity and superposition also reached statistical significance, η2 = .03, F(1, 133) 
= 4.14, MSE = 0.004, p < .05. As for screeners, very large effect sizes were found 
for main effects whereas the interactions showed much smaller effect sizes. 
Figure 2.1 shows the main effects of each of the three image-based factors, 
averaged across the other two 
factors. A comparison of Figure 
2.1a (aviation security screeners) 
and Figure 2.1b (novices) reveals 
that screeners were slightly 
better than novices while both 
screener groups are substantially 
affected by the image-based 
factors view, bag complexity, and 
superposition. In order to 
examine whether expertise has a 
differential effect on these 
image-based factors, a four-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with the within-participants 
factors view, bag complexity, and 
superposition and the between-
participant factor expertise was 
computed. There were again 
Figure 2.1. Detection performance (A’) in the ORT with 
standard deviations (a) for aviation security screeners 
and (b) for novices. 
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significant main effects of view (easy vs. rotated) η2 = .74, F(1, 266) = 744.57, MSE 
= 0.004, p < .001, bag complexity (low vs. high) η2 = .77, F(1, 266) = 884.75, MSE 
= 0.004, p < .001, and superposition (low vs. high) η2 = .62, F(1, 266) = 428.20, 
MSE = 0.004, p < .001. Two-way interactions between view and bag complexity η2 = 
.04, F(1, 266) = 10.23, MSE = 0.003, p < .01, view and superposition η2 = .09, F(1, 
266) = 26.17, MSE = 0.003, p < .001, view and expertise η2 = .10, F(1, 266) = 
30.52, p < .001, and superposition and expertise η2 = .03, F(1, 266) = 9.39, p < .01 
were significant, as well as the tree-way interactions between view, bag complexity, 
and superposition η2 = .02, F(1, 266) = 5.47, MSE = 0.003, p < .05, and bag 
complexity, superposition and expertise η2 = .13, F(1, 266) = 41.13, p < .001. 
Although these interactions were significant, all have relatively low effect sizes when 
compared to the main effects. All other interactions were not significant. 
In short, these results indicate that the effects of image-based factors are apparent 
for novices and for aviation security screeners. Further, expertise does only slightly 
reduce these effects of view, bag complexity, and superposition. 
4.4.2 PIT, Visual Knowledge and Expertise 
In contrast to the ORT, the PIT has been developed to measure whether screeners 
know which items are prohibited and how they look in X-ray images of passenger 
bags. Whereas in the ORT only guns and knives are used – object shapes that are 
also familiar to novices – the PIT contains all kinds of forbidden objects based on 
international prohibited items lists. In this test, all target objects are shown in an 
easy viewpoint with a moderate degree of superposition in bags of moderate bag 
complexity. As mentioned above, each image is shown for 10 seconds and therefore 
missing a threat item in the PIT can rather be attributed to a lack of visual 
knowledge than to an attentional failure or visual processing capacity limitations. If 
detection performance in the PIT is indeed mainly determined by visual experience 
and training with X-ray images, large differences between novices and aviation 
security screeners should be observed in this test. As reported in the previous 
section, only moderate differences between novices and screeners were found for the 
ORT.  
In order to compare relative difference between experts and novices for the PIT and 
ORT, overall hit and false alarm rates were used to compute relative detection 
performance difference separately for the ORT and PIT using the following formula:  
(A’experts – A’novices) / A’novices 
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Relative detection performance difference between experts and novices was indeed 
much higher for the PIT than for the ORT (15.89% vs. 6.05%). This is consistent 
with the view that the PIT measures visual knowledge dependent on training and 
expertise, whereas the ORT measures more stable visual abilities used to cope with 
image-based factors such as effects of view, bag complexity, and superposition. 
This main finding was further analyzed using a two-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with the within-participant factor test type (ORT, PIT) and the between-
participant factor expertise using overall A’ scores from each test. There was a 
significant effect of test type (ORT vs. PIT) η2 = .80, F(1, 266) = 1075.10, MSE = 
0.002, p < .001, a significant effect of expertise (experts vs. novices) η2 = .44, F(1, 
266) = 206.11, MSE = 0.004, p < .001, and a significant interaction of test type and 
expertise η2 = .20, F(1, 266) = 65.30, p < .001. The interaction between test type 
and expertise is consistent with the hypothesis that the ORT measures rather image-
based factors whereas the PIT measures rather knowledge-based factors. 
It must also be noted however, that correlation analyses showed that the two tests 
are far from being orthogonal. Overall detection performance A’ of the two tests 
correlates with r = .51, p < .001 for experts, and r = .42, p < .001 for novices. This 
could at least indicate that detection performance in PIT is not only determined by 
visual knowledge but also by visual abilities used to cope with image-based factors 
as measured by the ORT. 
One potential argument against the analyses of this section could be that the expert 
group consisted of males and females, whereas the novices group consisted only of 
males. However, it is unlikely that gender effects can explain the differences found 
between experts and novices since no significant differences were found between 
male and female screeners, neither for the ORT (p = .70) nor for the PIT (p = .78). 
4.4.3 Reliability Analyses 
Internal reliability was analyzed using Cronbach’s Alpha and Guttman split-half 
coefficients separately for both participant groups (aviation security screeners and 
novices). Analyses were computed for signal plus noise trials (bags including a threat 
item) and noise trials (harmless bags), respectively. Reliability coefficients were 
computed on the basis of the percentage correct measures (i.e., hit and correct 
rejections), as well as on the basis of the screeners’ confidence ratings (CR) for hits 
and correct rejections. As can be seen in Table 1.1 high reliability coefficients were 
found for both tests and participant groups. 
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Note.  Cronbach Alpha values and split-half reliabilities (Guttman) for both tests in each group (experts 
and novices separately) calculated for percentage correct (PC) and confidence ratings (CR) separately for 
signal plus noise (SN) and noise trials (N). 
Table 1.1 
Reliability analyses for both tests and each group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results section has clearly shown that item difficulty in the ORT depends on the 
main effects and interactions between view, bag complexity, and superposition. 
Therefore, the high internal consistency also found for the ORT is a nice example for 
the fact that a test can be homogenous and multifactorial (see Kline, 2000). 
 
4.5 DISCUSSION 
The objective of this study was to examine the role of image-based and knowledge-
based factors for detecting threat items in passenger bags. As pointed out by 
Schwaninger (2003a), image-based factors such as effects of viewpoint, bag 
complexity, and superposition can substantially affect detection performance. The 
ORT has been developed to measure how well a participant can cope with these 
image-based factors. This test contains guns and knives depicted in an easy and 
difficult view shown in bags with low and high bag complexity while being strongly or 
little superimposed by other objects. Main effects with large effect sizes were found 
for aviation security screeners as well as novices. While screeners achieved a 
moderately better detection performance in the ORT, they were still significantly 
                Reliability Coefficients PC SN PC N CR SN CR N 
  PIT 
Screeeners 
Cronbach Alpha .840 .878 .887 .924 
Split-half .811 .915 .859 .948 
 
Novices 
Cronbach Alpha .871 .877 .885 .914 
Split-half .882 .862 .883 .890 
 
 ORT 
Screeners 
Cronbach Alpha .862 .934 .902 .962 
Split-half .733 .813 .792 .887 
Novices 
Cronbach Alpha .899 .910 .916 .959 
Split-half .778 .810 .759 .907 
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affected when threat items were rotated, superimposed by other objects, or shown in 
complex bags. This result is consistent with the view that the ORT does measure 
visual abilities necessary to cope with image difficulty resulting from effects of 
viewpoint, bag complexity and superposition. Large inter-individual differences were 
found both for novices as well as experts. Internal reliability was very high for both 
groups. Therefore, this test could be a useful tool both for competency assessment of 
screeners as well as for pre-employment assessment purposes. 
The PIT has been developed to measure whether a screener knows which items are 
prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images of passenger bags. In this test, all 
objects are depicted in an easy view. Bag complexity and superposition are moderate 
so that the threat item shapes are visible. Images are shown for 10 seconds, i.e., 
missing a threat item can be attributed to a lack of visual knowledge rather than to 
an attentional failure or a visual processing capacity limitation. If the PIT is indeed 
related to visual knowledge based on expertise and training, large differences 
between novices and experts should be observed. Indeed, relative detection 
performance difference between novices and experts was about three times higher 
for the PIT than for the ORT. This result is consistent with the view that the PIT 
measures knowledge-based factors whereas the ORT measures visual abilities used 
for coping with image-based factors. As for the ORT, excellent reliability coefficients 
were found for the PIT. This test could therefore provide a useful tool for 
certification, competency, and risk assessment as well as for quality control in 
general. 
In summary, the results of this study confirm that X-ray detection performance relies 
on visual abilities necessary for coping with image-based effects such as view, bag 
complexity, and superposition. Visual experience and training are necessary to know 
which items are prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images of passenger 
bags. Both aspects are prerequisites for a good screener and can be evaluated using 
the ORT and PIT. 
 
49/161 
 
5. INCREASED DETECTION PERFORMANCE IN AIRPORT 
SECURITY SCREENING USING THE X-RAY ORT AS PRE-
EMPLOYMENT ASSESSMENT TOOL 
 
5.1 ABSTRACT 
Detecting prohibited items in X-ray images of passenger bags is one of the most 
important tasks in aviation security. This screening process includes both, 
knowledge-based and image-based factors. That is, the knowledge about which 
items are prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images (knowledge-based 
factors) and the ability to cope with bag complexity, superposition and rotation of the 
threat item (image-based factors). The X-Ray ORT was developed to measure how 
well screeners and novices can cope with image-based factors. Schwaninger et al. 
(2005) could show that image-based factors are rather independent of knowledge 
and therefore can only be partly enhanced through training. As these image-based 
factors are very important in all X-ray screening tasks, using the X-Ray ORT as pre-
employment assessment tool should result in a remarkable increase in detection 
performance of screeners in the future.  To test whether the X-Ray ORT is a useful 
tool to select job applicants, detection performance of screeners selected with and 
without the X-Ray ORT was compared in the Prohibited Items Test (PIT), which 
mainly measures knowledge-based factors. This means that one group of job 
applicants (all novices) was hired using the X-Ray ORT, whereas the other group was 
hired without the X-Ray ORT. Both groups of screeners had undergone initial 
classroom training and a minimum of one year working experience in screening 
carry-on baggage when they took the PIT. Results evidence that in fact detection 
performance in the PIT is significantly higher for the group selected with the X-Ray 
ORT than detection performance of screeners selected without the X-Ray ORT.  
Furthermore, results reveal reliable and valid measurement of detection performance 
in both tests, the ORT and the PIT6. 
 
                                                 
6 I gratefully acknowledge the help of Adrian Schwaninger and Franziska Hofer in designing the study and 
preparing the manuscript for publication at the 2nd the International Conference in Air Transportation 
(ICRAT) 2006 in Belgrade. 
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5.2 INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, civil aviation has become more important and passenger flow still 
increases yearly. As a result, work load in aviation security increases enormously. To 
ensure effective and efficient work, it is very important to select and train people 
accurately. One of the most important tasks of aviation security screeners is 
detecting prohibited items such as guns, knives, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
and other prohibited items in passenger bags. During rush hours at checkpoints the 
decision whether a bag is OK (i.e. contains no prohibited item) or NOT OK (contains 
a prohibited item) has to be made within four seconds. This short time requires both, 
the profound knowledge about prohibited items and their appearance in X-ray 
images, as well as the ability to cope with image-based factors such as bag 
complexity, superposition and rotation of the threat item. 
Referring to a general visual cognition model, recognition is defined as a successful 
matching of the stimulus representation with the visual memory representation. 
Based on this model Schwaninger et al. (2005) revealed two main factors in 
detecting threat items in X-ray screening, knowledge-based and image-based 
factors. First, screeners have to know which objects are prohibited and what they 
look like in X-ray images in order to recognize them (knowledge-based factors). As 
the appearance of prohibited items in X-ray images can differ remarkably from real 
life, training is very important in order to recognize them. In addition, it could be 
shown that an effective training system like X-Ray Tutor can significantly increase 
detection performance by reducing the false alarm rate. That is, through training 
screeners learn to distinguish reliably similar looking threat and non-threat items. 
Second, image-based factors influence detection performance in X-ray images 
enormously. Schwaninger et al. (2005) have shown three different types of image-
based factors, namely bag complexity, superposition and rotation of the threat item. 
A threat item is more difficult to detect if it is shown in a close-packed bag as other 
objects can distract attention (effect of bag complexity). In addition, the more the 
threat item is superimposed by other objects in the bag, the harder it becomes to 
detect it (effect of superposition). Furthermore, a rotated threat item is more difficult 
to detect than a threat item shown in the frontal view (effect of viewpoint). These 
image-based factors are relatively independent of training and therefore rather 
related to visual abilities. The ability to cope with image-based factors can be 
measured using the X-Ray ORT. This test consists of 256 X-ray images, half of them 
including either a gun or a knife. These threat items are shown in the frontal and 
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rotated view, more or less superimposed by other objects in the bag, in a close-
packed or rather empty bag.  
The above described image-based factors are supposed to play a key function in the 
X-ray screening process. Coping with bag complexity, superposition and viewpoint of 
a threat item can only be partly enhanced through training and is therefore rather 
dependent on the ability of each screener (see also Schwaninger et al., 2005). 
Because these abilities play an important role in all X-ray image interpretation 
processes, screeners who have the relevant visual abilities should not only have a 
much better detection performance when untrained, but also after training and some 
working experience, compared to screeners who are less endued with image-based 
factors. To test this assumption, we compared detection performance of screeners, 
who were hired one year before using the X-Ray ORT with detection performance of 
screeners, who were selected using not fully standardized selection procedures. To 
compare detection performance of the two groups, we used the Prohibited Items 
Test (PIT). The PIT is a test including all kinds of prohibited items in X-ray images 
and therefore allows measuring knowledge-based factors in X-ray screening. This 
test provides a good possibility to measure the screener’s detection performance of 
prohibited items independently of the selection process. Furthermore, reliability and 
validity of both tests, the ORT and PIT were evaluated. 
 
5.3 METHOD 
5.3.1 Participants 
Two groups of aviation security screeners participated in this study. The 
experimental group consisted of 101 participants (71 male and 30 female) between 
19 and 55 years (M = 35.25 years, SD = 9.79 years), who were all hired as security 
screeners based on the results of the X-Ray ORT, which was used as part of the pre-
employment assessment procedure. When taking the X-Ray ORT, these job 
applicants had no X-ray image interpretation experience at all. Besides the X-Ray 
ORT, this group had to pass the color blindness test, an English test and a job 
interview as well in order to get employed. These screeners had about one year 
working experience in X-ray screening when this study was conducted (i.e. when 
taking the PIT). 
The control group consisted of 453 screeners (141 male and 312 female) between 24 
and 65 years (M = 48.94 years, SD = 9.09 years), who were hired without the X-Ray 
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ORT, but using an old selection procedure, which consisted of a color blindness test, 
an oral English test and a job interview. Working experience of these aviation 
security screeners varied from two years to 26 years (M = 9.71 years, SD = 5.50 
years) when conducting this study (i.e. when detection performance in the PIT was 
compared to the experimental group). 
5.3.2 Material 
The X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) 
The X-Ray ORT consists of 256 X-ray images and measures mainly image-based 
factors in X-ray screening. Therefore, only guns and knives are used as these threat 
objects are known by most people independent of visual experience or training and 
therefore are also well known by novices. Furthermore, all images are shown in black 
and white to eliminate color-diagnostic information for experts. To measure how 
good test candidates can cope with image-based factors, the image-based factors 
bag complexity, superposition and viewpoint are varied systematically with each 
other. That is, eight guns and eight knives were each combined with two bags with 
low complexity levels and two bags with high complexity levels, but once only little 
and once more superimposed by other objects in the bag. Furthermore, each bag is 
shown once with and once without a threat item. That is, half of the trials in the X-
Ray ORT are completely harmless bags and contain neither a gun nor a knife. In the 
test, each image is shown for four seconds on the computer screen. Then, the test 
candidate has to decide whether the bag is OK (contains no gun and no knife) or 
NOT OK (contains a gun or a knife) by clicking the respective button on the screen. 
Additionally, test candidates are asked to indicate how sure they are in their decision 
clicking on a 50 point rating scale on the screen. For a closer description of the test 
design refer to Hardmeier, Hofer, & Schwaninger (2005). 
 
Prohibited Items Test (PIT) 
The Prohibited Items Test (PIT) was developed to measure how well aviation security 
screeners know what prohibited items look like in X-ray images. The PIT contains all 
kinds of prohibited items and thus measures mainly knowledge-based factors in X-
ray screening. All prohibited items in the PIT can be classified into seven categories 
by ECAC, ICAO and EU prohibited items lists. A total of 19 guns, 27 sharp objects, 14 
hunt and blunt instruments, 5 highly inflammable substances, 17 explosives, 3 
chemicals and 13 other prohibited items (such as ivory, crocodile) are shown. In 
total the PIT includes 160 trials, half of them including prohibited items and half of 
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them containing no prohibited items at all. 68 of the trials containing a prohibited 
item included exactly one prohibited item, whereas the other twelve trials included 
two or three prohibited items at once7. As this test was developed to measure mainly 
knowledge-based factors in X-ray images, all threat items were shown in an easy 
view, combined with bags of medium complexity level and medium superposition. 
Thus, all three image-based factors are kept relatively constant in the PIT. 
Furthermore, all images were shown in color to provide a realistic test environment.  
Test taking procedure in the PIT was similar to the X-Ray ORT. First, a self-
explanatory instruction was shown explaining the task followed by some exercise 
trials to familiarize the participants with the test taking procedure. After each of the 
six exercise trials a visual feedback was given whether the bag was OK (contains no 
prohibited item) or NOT OK (contains at least one prohibited item). In the test itself 
no more feedback was given to the test candidates. In the PIT, all images are 
displayed for a maximum of ten seconds on the screen. Test candidates have to 
decide whether the bag contains one or more prohibited items by clicking the OK or 
NOT OK button on the screen. If the bag is judged as NOT OK, screeners have to 
indicate to which of the seven categories the prohibited item(s) belongs to by clicking 
on the respective button(s)8. Besides giving the answer OK or NOT OK, test 
candidates have to indicate how sure they are in their decision by clicking on a 50 
point rating bar on the screen. Pressing the space bar, the next image is shown. 
There are four blocks of trials, after which test candidates could take an individual 
short break if wanted. The order of blocks is counterbalanced across four groups of 
participants. Within each block the order of trials is random. 
5.3.3 Procedure 
To test whether the X-Ray ORT is a useful pre-employment assessment tool, 
detection performance of screeners selected without the X-Ray ORT9 and screeners 
who were hired with the X-Ray ORT was compared using the test results in the PIT. 
All screeners who were hired with the X-Ray ORT had completed a classroom training 
and about one year of working experience when taking the PIT. Experience of 
screeners selected without the X-Ray ORT varied between two and 26 years when 
                                                 
7 This was done to assure face validity. In reality more than one prohibited item can be in a passenger 
bag. Note that only bags including one prohibited item were used for analysis. 
8 The answer to which of the seven categories the prohibited item(s) belonged to, was not used for the 
data analysis. 
9 Screeners selected without the X-Ray ORT had to take a color blindness test, as well as a common job 
interview. 
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taking the PIT (for more details on detection performance and working experience 
see Riegelnig & Schwaninger, 2006). 
 
5.4 RESULTS 
All test results were calculated using the “nonparametric” detection performance 
measure A’ (see Grier, 1971; Pastore et al., 2003). A’ takes into account the hit rate 
(i.e. bags containing a prohibited item judged as NOT OK) as well as the false alarm 
rate (i.e. harmless bags judged as NOT OK). This is especially important considering 
the task of an aviation security screener. A screener, who judges nearly all bags as 
NOT OK, would for sure have a high hit rate, but at the same time a very high false 
alarm rate and thus be very inefficient in his job. A good screener is expected to 
recognize most forbidden objects without being mistaken. For further information on 
detection performance measures, calculation and assumptions about A’ see Green 
and Sweets (1966), Stanislaw and Todorov (1999) or MacMillan and Creelman 
(1991). 
5.4.1 Reliability and Validity of the X-Ray ORT 
Reliability of the X-Ray ORT is very high for trained aviation security screeners and 
novices. Cronbach Alpha values range from .887 to .966 for screeners and from .907 
to .970 for novices. As well split-half reliabilities (> .781 for screeners and > .778 for 
novices) support reliable measurement of detection performance using the X-Ray 
ORT. For more details about reliability of the X-Ray ORT see Hardmeier et al. (2005). 
Different validity measures of the X-Ray ORT were evaluated by Hardmeier et al. 
(2005) in order to determine whether the test measures what it is supposed to 
measure and whether it can be used in making accurate decisions. Internal, 
convergent and discriminant validity measures evidence the former, whereas 
criterion-related validity refers to the correctness of decisions. Large effects of bag 
complexity, superposition and viewpoint could be shown for aviation security 
screeners and novices and support high internal validity. Furthermore, convergent 
and discriminant validity could be shown based on all 453 screeners selected with 
the old selection procedure correlating results in the X-Ray ORT with results in the 
PIT (r = .61, p < .001) and results in the computer-based questionnaire (CBQ) (r = 
.27, p < .001), respectively. The CBQ is a multiple choice questionnaire including 
airport specific questions about safety and security regulations at airports. Therefore, 
neither the ORT nor the PIT should show a high correlation with the CBQ. Criterion-
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related validity was examined by correlating detection performance in the X-Ray ORT 
with on-the-job performance measured by Threat Image Projection (TIP) data (r = 
.41, p < .001). TIP systems project fictional threat images into real passenger bags 
during work. Therefore, TIP allows measuring on-the-job detection performance. 
After each TIP image screeners receive a feedback message that a fictional threat 
item was present. TIP data were aggregated over a period of 17 months of 86 
aviation security screeners. Detection performance was calculated using A’ scores, 
i.e. hit and false alarm rates. The correlation between the X-Ray ORT and TIP data 
evidences that abilities measured with the X-Ray ORT are indeed important 
determinants of detection performance on-the-job. For more details about calculation 
of these validity measures see also Hardmeier et al. (2005). 
5.4.2 Reliability and Validity of the PIT 
As for the X-Ray ORT, Cronbach Alpha and split-half reliabilities were calculated with 
453 aviation security screeners for the PIT. All reliability measures are based on 
percentage corrects (PC), i.e. hits and correct rejections, as well as on confidence 
ratings (CR), i.e. how sure screeners were in their decision. Based on signal 
detection theory, reliabilities were calculated for N trials (bags without a prohibited 
item) and SN trials (bags with prohibited items) separately. All reliability measures 
are listed in Table 2.1 for the two groups of screeners separately. All values are very 
similar for both groups and support reliable measurement of detecting threat items 
in X-ray images. Cronbach Alpha values are ranging from .870 to .943 and split-half 
reliabilities from .864 to .944. 
Cronbach Alpha values and split-half reliabilities (Guttman) of the PIT calculated for 
screeners selected without the X-Ray ORT (N=453) and screeners selected with the 
X-Ray ORT (N=101): PC = percentage correct, CR = confidence ratings, SN = signal 
plus noise trials, N = noise trials. 
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Note. Cronbach Alpha values and split-half reliabilities (Guttman) of the PIT calculated for screeners 
selected without the X-Ray ORT (N=453) and screeners selected with the X-Ray ORT (N=101): PC = 
percentage correct, CR = confidence ratings, SN = signal plus noise trials, N = noise trials. 
 
Validity of the PIT can be examined calculating convergent, discriminant and 
criterion-related validity. These measures were calculated based on all 453 aviation 
security screeners who were selected without using the X-Ray ORT as pre-
employment assessment tool. Convergent validity was tested correlating test scores 
in the PIT with test scores in the X-Ray ORT. A’ scores in the PIT correlated 
significantly with A’ scores in the X-Ray ORT (r = .61, p < .001) indicating 
convergent validity. This rather high correlation makes sense because both tests 
investigate X-ray image interpretation and obviously also in the PIT image-based 
factors are relevant. Furthermore, correlation between A’ scores in the PIT with 
percentage correct answers in the computer-based questionnaire (CBQ) indicates 
discriminant validity (r = .26, p < .001). As for the X-Ray ORT, criterion-related 
validity was estimated using threat image projection (TIP) data of the same TIP-
library used for the validation of the X-Ray ORT (for more details about this library 
please see Hardmeier et al., 2005). Correlation between test results in the PIT and 
on-the-job detection performance (TIP data) was r = .54 (p < .001). Thus, test 
results in the PIT can be used to predict on-the-job performance of screeners to a 
certain degree. 
5.4.3 Evaluation of the X-Ray ORT as pre-employment assessment tool 
In order to investigate whether the X-Ray ORT is a valuable tool for pre-employment 
assessment, the mean detection performance of both groups in the PIT was 
compared (see Figure 3.1). A significant difference in detection performance of 
Table 2.1 
Reliability analyses (PIT) 
Reliability Coefficients 
PC 
SN 
PC 
N 
CR 
SN 
CR 
N 
Screeners  
(Control Group  
N=453) 
Cronbach Alpha .874 .901 .910 .928 
Split-half  (Guttman) .871 .914 .900 .936 
Screeners 
(Experimental Group  
N=101) 
Cronbach Alpha .908 .943 .870 .883 
Split-half  (Guttman) .878 .944 .877 .864 
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prohibited items between screeners selected without the X-Ray ORT and the group 
hired with the X-Ray ORT can be shown. The job applicants who were selected with 
the X-Ray ORT are significantly better in detecting prohibited items in X-ray images, 
t(552) = 14.51, p < .001 one year after employment. To test whether the difference 
in detection performance is influenced by the age of screeners or working experience 
(see Riegelnig & Schwaninger, 2006 for the influence of these factors on X-ray 
detection performance) an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with selection procedure 
as between-participants factor 
and age and working experience 
as covariates was conducted. 
Results show that even if these 
two covariates are considered, 
detection performance of the 
screeners selected with the X-
Ray ORT is significantly higher 
compared to the other screeners, 
with an effect size of η2 = .07, 
F(1, 548) = 38.82, MSE = .004, 
p < .001. 
 
5.5 DISCUSSION 
Overall, the results of the present study show that employing job applicants based 
on their results in the X-Ray ORT results in an increased detection performance in X-
ray screening one year after employment, compared to detection performance of 
screeners selected without the X-Ray ORT. In this study, detection performance of 
two groups of screeners, each with a working experience of at least one year, was 
compared using the PIT, a computer-based X-ray screening test which measures 
rather knowledge-based factors in X-ray image interpretation. Compared to the 
screeners of the control group, who were not selected using the X-Ray ORT, job 
applicants who were hired based on the results in the X-Ray ORT as pre-employment 
assessment tool performed significantly better in the PIT one year after employment. 
The effect size with η2 = .07 (Cohen, 1988) is still eminent, even when possible 
influences of the factors age and working experience are considered as covariates. 
Therefore, the ability how well someone can cope with the image-based factors, i.e. 
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Figure 3.1.  Detection performance with standard deviations 
in the PIT for screeners selected without the X-Ray ORT 
(Control Group) left and screeners selected with the X-Ray 
ORT (Experimental Group) right.  
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bag complexity, superposition and viewpoint, predicts detection performance in X-ray 
screening to a certain degree at a later date. 
In addition, statistical analyses show for both X-ray performance measurement 
instruments high reliability and validity. The X-Ray ORT is not only a highly reliable 
and valid tool for measuring how well novices can cope with image-based factors in 
X-ray images, but also how well aviation security screeners with several years of 
working experience can handle these factors Schwaninger et al. (2005). 
Furthermore, in this study we show that the PIT is a reliable instrument for 
measuring visual knowledge in the X-ray image interpretation task. Cronbach Alpha 
values were all > .87 and Guttman split half reliabilities > .86. Validity of the PIT was 
examined calculating convergent, discriminant and criterion-related validity. The 
large correlation between the PIT and the X-Ray ORT (r =.61) supports convergent 
validity. A rather low correlation of r = .26 between the PIT and the CBQ (a test 
measuring general knowledge about security issues at airports) evidence 
discriminant validity. Furthermore, criterion-related validity of the PIT is also quite 
high (r = .54).  
To further investigate whether the X-Ray ORT used as pre-employment assessment 
tool can also predict on-the-job detection performance, Threat Image Projection 
(TIP) data could be measured. Currently, this is examined in a recently started 
study, in which the two screener groups will be compared with regard to their TIP 
performance. Because TIP data are only reliable when a large TIP-library with 
realistic images is used and data are aggregated over several months Hofer and 
Schwaninger (2005a), results are not yet available. As both tests, the X-Ray ORT 
and the PIT show high criterion-related validity, it can be assumed that the X-Ray 
ORT can effectively predict on-the-job detection performance.  
Besides the importance of a valid and reliable pre-employment assessment 
procedure, intensive individual adaptive computer-based training (CBT) is also very 
important to improve detection performance of security screeners during work (see 
for example Schwaninger & Hofer, 2004 for an evaluation study of CBT). In this 
context, it would be interesting if screeners with high values in the X-Ray ORT show 
a larger training effect than screeners with low performance in the X-Ray ORT. It 
could be assumed that screeners who are good in coping with image-based factors 
profit more from training than screeners who have problems with image-based 
factors. This is currently also under investigation. 
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6. COGNITIVE TEST BATTERY TO SELECT JOB APPLICANTS 
FOR THE X-RAY SCREENING TASK IN AVIATION SECURITY  
 
6.1 ABSTRACT 
The job of aviation security screeners is a highly demanding task which includes 
specific knowledge that have to be learned on the job and visual cognition abilities. 
Whether these abilities can be measured within a pre-employment assessment 
procedure using different subtests of well established intelligence test batteries was 
investigated in this study. Results revealed a relationship between the latent variable 
ability and detection performance in X-ray screening for both samples. Moreover, a 
multiple group confirmatory factor analysis proved the equality of factor loadings 
across both samples. However, 4 of the 12 intelligence tests are sufficient to explain 
detection performance in X-ray screening. The influence of the X-Ray Object 
Recognition Test on detection performance later on the job was tested additionally. 
Experiment 2 investigated the strength of relationship between detection 
performance, age, training, ability, personality factors and working engagement 
among aviation security screeners. Further, direct and indirect effects were tested for 
the most important predictors age, training and ability10.  
 
6.2 INTRODUCTION 
The X-ray screening task of aviation security screeners is very demanding and 
includes both specific knowledge and visual cognition abilities. Screeners have to 
acquire the knowledge about which items are prohibited and what they look like in X-
ray images of passenger bags. This job and task specific knowledge and expertise 
respectively has to be learned after people got employed. Further, considering X-ray 
images different factors such as bag complexity, superposition and viewpoint of the 
threat items can influence the detection as well. Studies in this area could show that 
detection performance decreases significantly if threat items are shown in close-
packed bags, if threats are more superimposed by other items and if they are shown 
in an unusual view. These effects were found for experts and novices. Furthermore, 
                                                 
10 I gratefully acknowledge the help of Patrik Marxer and Franziska Hofer in preparing the visual cognition 
test battery and to Adrian Schwaninger for his help in designing the study. 
60/161 
 
large individual differences could be seen for both, experienced aviation security 
screeners and novices (Schwaninger et al., 2005). Schwaninger et al. (2005) defined 
these factors as image-based factors in X-ray screening. As they could be found for 
both groups, they are rather related to relatively stable abilities than training. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that job applicants who are able to cope with these 
image-based factors perform better later on the job. Thus, measuring the ability to 
cope with image-based factors within a pre-employment assessment should increase 
detection performance later on the job remarkably. 
Therefore, the X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT), a reliable and valid X-ray 
screening test that measures image-based factors relatively independent of 
knowledge was developed by Hardmeier et al. (2005). Results could show that test 
results in the X-Ray ORT correlate significantly with threat image projection (TIP) 
data that measures detection performance on the job. Further, aviation security 
screeners who were selected with the X-Ray ORT performed in another X-ray 
screening test that measures all kinds of prohibited items and was applied within the 
recurrent competency assessment significantly better than screeners who were not 
selected with this test (Hardmeier et al., 2006a).  
However, the image-based factors should also be measurable with general visual 
cognition tests as these factors can be compared to the visual cognition processes 
visual search, figure-ground segregation and mental rotation that were investigated 
in many research studies. Furthermore, it can be expected that other abilities such 
as logical thinking, concentration or vigilance play also an important role. For 
example the detection of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which vary widely in 
shape and form, but share a common set of components differs from the detection of 
other prohibited items. As not one shape as a hole has to be detected, but the three 
components power source, detonator and explosive material, this task probably 
requires rather logical thinking. Moreover, screeners have to be constantly vigilant 
when performing the X-ray screening task. Thus, a cognition test battery (CTB) 
including 12 tests that best match the X-ray screening task was applied within the 
pre-employment assessment additionally. Most tests are part of well established 
German intelligence test batteries. Four subtests of the Leistungsprüfsystem by Horn 
(1983), three subtests of the Intelligenz-Struktur-Test 2000 (IST 2000) by 
Amthauer, Brocke, Liepmann, and Beauducel (2001), the Raven's Advanced 
Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1980), the Frankfurter 
Aufmerksamkeits Inventar (FAIR) by Moosbrugger and Oehlschlägel (1996) and 
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three tests which were developed by the University of Zurich (Marxer, 2004) were 
used. Tests from the CTB were expected to measure the following unobserved latent 
factors figure-ground segregation, visual search, mental rotation, spatial 
imagination, logical thinking and vigilance.  
In a first step the influence of ability on detection performance in X-ray screening 
was investigated using the CTB. A common factor model was estimated to measure 
which tests in the CTB predict on the job performance best and can therefore be 
used as pre-employment assessment tool. In terms of efficiency a possible 
shortening of the CTB was examined. Further, a full structural equation modeling 
(SEM) was estimated by defining the test results in the X-Ray ORT as additional 
indicator. We examined whether high and low performer in the X-Ray ORT can be 
distinguished in terms of their ability and further performance.  
In a second step other factors such as training, age, personality traits, etc. which 
may influence detection performance were added. Finally, we tested for direct, 
indirect and total effects in a reduced model that includes the most important 
factors. 
 
6.3 EXPERIMENT 1 
In Experiment 1 confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were used to differentiate 
cognition constructs. Further, the common factor model which was estimated to 
measure the relationship between ability and detection performance in X-ray 
screening was validated by another sample and the multiple group comparison. Last, 
a full SEM was estimated to investigate the relationship between the general ability 
factor and image-based factors that were measured with the X-Ray ORT. 
 
6.3.1 Method 
6.3.1.1 Participants 
The two samples used in this study consisted of 169 (M = 35.10, SD = 9.85; range 
20 to 55 years)  and 97 (M = 36.19, SD = 11.44; range 20 to 55 years) respectively 
job applicants who were employed as aviation security screeners based on their test 
results in the pre-employment assessment for aviation security screeners. The first 
sample (2006 sample) consisted of 66 females and 103 males, the second sample 
(2007 sample) of 51 females and 46 males. Part of the pre-employment assessment 
was the X-Ray ORT, the CTB, a German and English language test, a color blindness 
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test, a personality and work strategy questionnaire, a physical examination test and 
a job interview. All results except for the CTB and the two questionnaires were used 
as selection criteria.  
6.3.1.2 Measures 
Cognitive Test Battery (CTB) 
The CTB consists of 12 tests which are mostly part of well established intelligence 
tests. All tests were conducted computer-based and not in the original paper-and-
pencil form. To measure the second order factor ability, nine tests were assigned to 
the four first order factors figure-ground segregation, visual search, mental rotation 
and spatial imagination conducting CFAs. The remaining three tests Raven, Fair and 
a subtest of the IST 2000 (IST_MF) served as indicators.  
Figure-Ground Segregation. The latent variable figure-ground segregation was 
measured with the subtest LPS10 of the Leistungsprüfsystem by Horn (1983) which 
is a major German intelligence test battery and the Noiser. The LPS10 measures the 
ability to recognize a shape by ignoring irrelevant other features. Participants have to 
choose the only simple shape out of five which fits into the complex line drawing. 
The test includes 40 shapes of increasing complexity. Scored is the number of 
correct solutions that can be answered within 3 minutes. The Noiser was developed 
by the University of Zurich (Marxer, 2004). It measures how well people can 
recognize objects that are not fully visible. The test consists of 80 line drawings of 
simple objects which are increasingly destroyed (level of destruction: 75%, 80%, 
85% and 90%). Trials are shown for 4 seconds only and then participants have to 
mark the correct term out of 20 choices. Scored is the number of correct choices. 
Visual Search. Visual search was measured with the Letter Search Test (LST) and 
the Image Comparison Test (ICT) by Marxer (2004). The LST consists of a total of 60 
trials. Participants have to find a lowercase letter within three-dimensional uppercase 
letters. There are three difficulty levels increasing in the number of uppercase 
letters. Each trial is presented for 5 seconds only, then participants have to decide 
whether there was a lowercase letter or not. Only fifty percent of all trials contain a 
target object. For analysis d’ is calculated. The ICT comprises of two almost identical 
pictures that are presented next to each other. Participants have to mark all 15 
differences within 3 minutes. Scored is the number of correct marked differences. 
Mental Rotation. The latent variable mental rotation was measured with the LPS7 
and the Figurenauswahl (IST_FA) that are subtests of two major German intelligence 
test batteries, the Leistungsprüfsystem by Horn (1983) and the Intelligenz-Struktur-
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Test (IST 2000) by Amthauer et al. (2001). In the LPS7 participants have to mark 
the flipped number or letter in a row of equal but randomly rotated numbers or 
letters. Participants are given 2 minutes to complete as many trials as possible out of 
40. Again, scored is the number of correct solutions. The IST_FA is about rearranging 
several pieces to one of five possible figures. The test consists of 20 trials that have 
to be solved within 7 minutes. Scored is the number of correctly answered trials. 
Spatial Imagination. Spatial imagination was measured with the LPS8, LPS9 of the 
Leistungsprüfsystem and the Würfelaufgabe (IST_WÜ) which is again a subtest of 
the IST 2000. The LPS8 consists of eight trials that have to be completed within 4 
minutes. Participants have to mentally fold a leaf of paper into a defined form and 
determine for several sides which one of the leaf corresponds to the folded form. 
Again scored is the number of correct answers out of 40. The LPS9 measures spatial 
ability and asks participants to count the number of sides of three-dimensional 
geometric objects. Then they have to mark the correct number out of ten choices. 
Scored is the number of correctly marked numbers. The test duration is 3 minutes 
and maximum score is 40. Last, the subtest IST_WÜ consists of 20 trials that have to 
be completed within 9 minutes. Participants have to mentally rotate a cube and 
decide which of five alternatives match the target cube. 
Raven. Logical thinking was measured using Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices 
(Raven et al., 1980). This test measures non-verbal deductive reasoning and visual 
discrimination. Participants have to complete a 3 * 3 matrix of abstract figures 
whereof the last figure in the lower right corner is missing. They can choose the right 
figure out of eight alternatives. The total of 47 used matrixes increases in difficulty 
over time and the test duration is set to a maximum of 10 minutes. Again, scored is 
the number of correct solutions. 
Fair. The Frankfurter Aufmerksamkeits Inventar (FAIR) by Moosbrugger and 
Oehlschlägel (1996) measures vigilance. The task in this test is to discriminate 
between very similar looking signs as fast and accurate as possible. The participants 
are given 6 minutes to attend the test consisting of a total of 640 trials. The number 
of correctly detected targets as well as correctly rejected non-targets is used for 
analysis. 
Merkfähigkeitstest (IST_MF). The IST_MF is as well a subtest of the IST 2000 by 
Amthauer et al. (2001) and measures visual memory capacity. This test that 
measures performance of short-term memory for figures consists of 13 pairs of 
symbols that have to be memorized within 1 minute. Then participants have to select 
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the correct counterpart for all 13 symbols out of 5 alternatives within 3 minutes. 
Scored is the number of correct solutions. 
 
Detection Performance in X-ray screening 
The detection performance in X-ray screening was measured with two X-ray 
screening tests and TIP data. The prohibited items test and bomb detection test were 
part of the recurrent competency assessment which was conducted between 4 and 6 
months after employment. Both tests are about recognizing threat items in X-ray 
images of passenger bags. Images were displayed for 10 and 15 seconds 
respectively on the screen. Then, participants have to answer whether the bag was 
OK (included no threat item) or NOT OK (included a threat item) by clicking on the 
button. Both, the prohibited items and bomb detection test differed in the 2006 and 
2007 sample only insofar as other images were used. Results were calculated using 
d’ which is a psychophysical measure and takes into account the hit and false alarm 
rate (Green & Swets, 1966; MacMillan & Creelman, 1991). For details about these X-
ray screening tests, reliability and validity measures see Hardmeier et al. (2006a), 
Koller and Schwaninger (2006). TIP is a technology which allows displaying fictional 
threat items into real passenger bags. That way, detection performance on the job 
can be measured. Again, d’ was calculated and used as detection performance 
measure. For more information about TIP data see Hofer and Schwaninger (2005b). 
 
The X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) 
The X-Ray ORT is an X-ray screening test which was developed to measure the 
ability to cope with image-based factors in X-ray screening relatively independent of 
knowledge. It consists of 256 X-ray images of passenger bags. Half of them contain 
either a gun or a knife. The other 128 images are harmless bags. Each bag is 
displayed for 4 seconds on the screen and then participants have to decide whether 
the bag was OK (no threat item) or NOT OK (a gun or knife) by clicking on the 
respective button. Detection performance was calculated using the detection 
performance measure d’. Test construction, its reliability and validity measures can 
be seen in Hardmeier et al. (2005, 2006a).  
6.3.1.3 Procedure 
The performance in the CTB and the X-Ray ORT was measured within the pre-
employment assessment procedure. After employment all screeners had an initial 
training course which took three weeks. They also received training with the 
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individual adaptive training system X-Ray Tutor (XRT). After, screeners worked 4 to 
6 months before they passed the first competency assessment which includes three 
X-ray screening tests and a theoretical exam on computer.  
6.3.1.4 Modeling Description 
The goal of this study was to test whether results in the single tests of the CTB show 
a relationship to detection performance in X-ray screening later on the job. The 
model was tested using a step-by-step procedure. First, CFAs were conducted to 
investigate how well the indicator variables accurately reflect the latent variables. 
Then, a common factor model was conducted for each group (2006 sample, 2007 
sample) separately before the multiple group comparison (Byrne, 2001). Therefore, 
an aggregated covariance matrix was created and subjected to CFA using AMOS. As 
goodness-of-fit indices we report the sample-size-independent comparative fit index 
(CFI). Its values indicate a good fit the closer they are to one. According to Bentler 
(1992) values greater or equal to .90 indicate acceptable model fit. We also report 
the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA). RMSEA values less than or 
equal to .05 indicate good model fit. Furthermore, the information theoretical fit 
measures AIC, BCC, BIC and CAIC are reported because they are less sensitive to 
small sample size and are not based on statistical inference using probability theory 
(see Arbuckle, 2005). All information theoretical fit measures should be substantially 
smaller than they are for the saturated model (Byrne, 2001). 
6.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for all indicator variables. Table 3.2 depicts the 
sample correlation matrix for the 2006 sample and Table 3.3 for the 2007 sample. 
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Table 3.1 
Reliabilities, means, standard deviations of indicator variables 
 
 
Indicator variables 
 
 
Reliability 
2006 sample 
(N = 169) 
2007 sample 
(N = 97) 
M SD M SD 
LPS10 .83c / .69c 0.63 0.20 0.61 0.20 
Noiser .95a / .91b 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.02 
LST .73a /.81b 0.36 0.17 0.36 0.14 
ICT .83d 0.65 0.18 0.64 0.16 
LPS7 .83c / .61c 0.32 0.18 0.28 0.16 
IST_FA .76a / .79b 0.51 0.20 0.51 0.19 
LPS8 .83c / .70c 0.63 0.31 0.62 0.29 
LPS9 .83c / .75c 0.58 0.15 0.53 0.15 
IST_WÜ .80a / .86b 0.50 0.19 0.47 0.20 
Raven .93a /.94b 0.34 0.14 0.32 0.14 
Fair > .78b  / > .85c 0.34 0.07 0.27 0.09 
IST_MF .92a / .80b 0.54 0.20 0.56 0.24 
X-Ray ORT* > .91a / > .78b 1.74 0.33 1.85 0.22 
PIT 
CAT 
> .87a / > .87b 
> .88a / > .84b 
6.02 
-- 
1.68 
-- 
-- 
6.58 
-- 
1.72 
BDT1.0 
BDT2.0 
> .80a / > .77b 
> .88a / > .80b 
3.71 
-- 
2.49 
-- 
-- 
5.50 
-- 
1.93 
TIP .58 - .90b 9.00 1.19 8.12 1.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. a internal consistency (Cronbach alpha), b split-half reliability, c  retest reliability, d parallel test 
reliability. Split-half reliability for the LPS tests was calculated for the four subtests together. Split-half 
reliabilities of TIP data vary depending on the image-library used. Values for the CTB are standardized 
and detection performance measures of all x-ray screening tests except for the X-Ray ORT have been 
multiplied with an arbitrary constant due to security reasons. * Reliability measures for the X-Ray ORT 
were based on test results from novices. 
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Table 3.2 
Correlation matrix of indicators for 2006 sample 
Indicators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. ORT ---               
2. LST .200 ----              
3. Noiser .106 .360 ---             
4. LPS10 .150 .352 .447 ---            
5. IST_MF .155 .178 .465 .412 ---           
6. Raven .094 .357 .366 .635 .383 ---          
7. Fair .143 .159 .300 .306 .375 .361 ---         
8. LPS9 .047 .325 .328 .615 .336 .598 .363 ---        
9. IST_WÜ .103 .244 .266 .331 .269 .519 .315 .401 ---       
10. IST_FA .051 .360 .263 .410 .254 .431 .175 .472 .414 ---      
11. LPS8 .095 .391 .419 .587 .441 .655 .404 .640 .491 .439 ---     
12. ICT .107 .300 .300 .384 .257 .437 .203 .366 .269 .171 .452 ---    
13. LPS7 .077 .212 .232 .380 .216 .429 .182 .340 .290 .326 .358 .222 ---   
14. TIP -.168 .087 .135 .187 .164 .277 .208 .258 .115 .146 .214 .131 .204 ---  
15. PIT .299 .344 .200 .189 .173 .130 .094 .186 .082 .175 .211 .122 .182 .337 --- 
16. BDT1.0 .345 .257 .189 .151 .145 .228 .163 .134 .183 .249 .183 .135 .206 .154 .504 
 
 
Table 3.3 
Correlation matrix of indicators for 2007 sample 
Indicators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. ORT ---               
2. LST .228 ---              
3. Noiser .172 .386 ---             
4. LPS10 .183 .508 .496 ---            
5. IST_MF .121 .394 .353 .396 ---           
6. Raven .147 .448 .517 .648 .440 ---          
7. Fair .115 .322 .269 .505 .441 .529 ---         
8. LPS9 .244 .536 .480 .637 .440 .687 .428 ---        
9. IST_WÜ .172 .248 .289 .486 .263 .540 .307 .524 ---       
10. IST_FA .095 .392 .343 .449 .372 .442 .391 .474 .419 ---      
11. LPS8 .267 .535 .495 .701 .390 .667 .452 .645 .635 .537 ---     
12. ICT -.001 .269 .359 .299 .319 .226 .214 .299 .236 .291 .390 ---    
13. LPS7 .327 .259 .347 .416 .282 .399 .273 .387 .306 .270 .434 .113 ---   
14. TIP .073 -.052 .133 .297 .067 .325 .254 .259 .242 .156 .259 -.029 .345 ---  
15. CAT .192 .257 .368 .399 .159 .360 .139 .388 .242 .197 .378 .316 .383 .500 --- 
16. BDT2.0 .133 .288 .259 .338 .232 .395 .209 .330 .351 .220 .417 .103 .327 .480 .619 
 
 
We first specified a CFA model with the four first order factors figure-ground 
segregation, visual search, mental rotation, spatial imagination and the three 
indicators Raven, Fair, IST_MF to measure the second order factor ability. However, 
results indicate that the second order factor loadings between the second order 
factor ability and the four first order factors as well as the three indicators were all 
not significantly different from one. Thus, all 12 indicators load on one factor and 
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there is no need to model separate factors. Furthermore, another first order factor 
named detection performance (in X-ray screening) was defined. This factor 
measured the detection performance in X-ray screening with the three indicators 
prohibited items test (PIT), bomb detection test (BDT) and TIP. As can be seen in 
Figure 4.1, the common factor model includes the two first order factors ability and 
detection performance.  
 
 
We first estimated the model for each group separately before conducting multiple 
group comparison. For the measurement model with the 2006 sample all factor 
loadings on the two constructs ability and detection performance were substantial 
Detection Performance
X-Ray Screening
BDT PIT TIP
Noiser
LPS10
LST
ICT
IST_FA
LPS7
LPS9
LPS8
IST_WÜ
Ability
IST_MF
Fair
Raven
.46 / .57
.57 / .64
.75 / .80
.80 / .81
.52 / .53
.75 / .81
.53 / .60
.51 / .40
.48 / .61
.48 / .50
.56 / .60
.82 / .85
.61 / .78 .81 / .80 .40 / .61
r = .38 / r = .57 
Figure 4.1. Factor model with the two factors ability and detection performance in x-
ray screening (circles) and the 15 indicators. For clarity, measurement errors are 
omitted. Standardized loadings are indicated for the 2006 (left) and the 2007 data 
(right). 
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and significant. The covariance between ability and detection performance was 0.018 
(SE = 0.006), p < .01, corresponding to a correlation of r = .38. According to Hu and 
Bentler (1999), Marsh, Hau, & Wen (2004) the model fit was very good and should 
not be rejected (see Table 3.4). As indicated by the goodness-of-fit indices, the 
model for the 2007 sample reproduced the covariance matrix as well very well (see 
Table 3.4). Covariance between the two constructs ability and detection performance 
was 0.027 (SE = 0.007), p < .01 and the correlation significant (r = .57) 
respectively. In both models (2006 and 2007) no substantial modifications were 
required.  
 
Table 3.4 
Fit Indices for Model 1 and Model 2 
Model Χ2  (df) CFI RMSEA Pclose AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Model 1 
(2006 sample) 
125.72(89) .952 .050 0.497 
187.72 
(240.00) 
194.24 
(265.26) 
284.74 
(615.59) 
315.74 
(735.59) 
Model 2  
(2007 sample) 
98.99(89) .981 .036 0.720 
160.99 
( 240.00) 
174.58 
(292.60) 
238.48 
(539.98) 
269.48 
(659.98) 
In order to test the equality of factor loadings across both samples, a multiple group 
confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) was conducted. First, we tested whether the 
model configuration across the two groups is equal. According Bollen (1989) 
configural invariance means that the same causal structure holds in several 
populations. The configural invariance model fitted the data very well and evidenced 
that all items load in fact on the same construct Χ2(178, N = 169,97) = 224.81, p < 
.05, CFI = .964, RMSEA = .032, Pclose = .994, AIC = 348.81 (saturated model 
480.00), BCC = 369.06 (saturated model 558.39). Second, metric invariance was 
tested. Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998) defined metric invariance as 
precondition to compare relationships over different groups. This metric invariant 
model fitted even better and indicated that the indicators and their corresponding 
latent variables are invariant (Χ2(191, N = 169,97) = 232.02, p < .05, CFI = .968, 
RMSEA = .029, Pclose = .999, AIC = 330.02 (saturated model 480.00), BCC = 
346.03 (saturated Model 558.39)). Thus, factor loadings are the same. Further, the 
Χ2 difference test showed no significant difference between the two models (p = 
.89). Moreover, the relation between ability and detection performance was equal (p 
Note. Saturated model values for the information theoretical fit measures AIC, BCC, BIC and CAIC are 
reported in brackets. 
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= .19) indicating no difference across the two groups. In a third step, scalar 
invariance was tested by constraining the intercepts of the different indicators across 
the groups to be equal. This is a precondition for mean comparison of the latent 
variables across the groups11. Constraining all intercepts to be equal across the 
groups was first not supported by the data. The intercept of the indicator TIP was 
significantly different across the groups implying that the lowest level of TIP was 
significantly higher in the 2007 group. Therefore, we released this constraint for the 
final model which improved the model fit considerably Χ2(203, N = 169, 97) = 1.55, 
p < .01, CFI = .915, RMSEA = .046, Pclose = .736, AIC = 447.67 (saturated model 
540.00), BCC = 469.55 (saturated model 628.19). The partially scalar invariant 
model still allows us to compare the means across the groups meaningfully (Byrne, 
Shavelson, & Muthen, 1989; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998; Vandenberg 2000; 
2002). The mean level of ability was not significantly different across the groups (p = 
.11). However, detection performance in X-ray screening was significantly higher (p 
< .01) for the 2007 sample which can be explained with the higher amount of 
individually adaptive computer based training in the 2007 sample.  
In order to test what part of the variability in detection performance can be 
accounted for by the theoretical variables, we performed a full structural equation 
model analysis. Our main explanatory latent variable is ability of screeners. In 
addition, the test result in the X-Ray ORT is expected to account for a part of the 
detection performance variability. Again, a multiple group SEM was conducted to 
compare the effect sizes across groups. The model fit indicated with Χ2(206, N = 
169, 97) = 1.33, p < .01, CFI = .949, RMSEA = .036, Pclose = .986, AIC = 406.52 
(saturated model 544.00), BCC = 429.68 (saturated model 639.45) a good fit. In 
both groups, ability and the X-Ray ORT display a significant effect on detection 
performance. Furthermore, these effects are not significantly different across the two 
groups (p = .19). Whether the effect of ability varies across individuals with high and 
low values in the X-Ray ORT was tested using interactions. Therefore, each sample 
was divided into high and low X-Ray ORT performers using a median split (Yang-
Wallentin, Schmidt, Davidov, & Bamberg, 2004). Because of the small sample size, 
the number of indicators to measure the first order factor ability was reduced to the 
four indicators Raven, LPS8, LPS9 and LPS1012. Moreover, we used 10 percent as the 
                                                 
11 In this model the mean information is used in addition to the variance-covariance information from the 
data matrix. 
12 There was no difference in the substantive results, especially in the prediction of the detection 
performance by reducing the number of indicators of ability from 12 to 4 indicators. 
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critical significance level. Results evidenced that the effect of ability was equal across 
the two groups in 2006 and 2007 for both, the low and high X-Ray ORT performers. 
However, the effect in the group which performed on a high level in the X-Ray ORT 
was significantly larger (p < .10) for both samples implying that there is a positive 
relationship between generalized ability and the ability to cope with image-based 
factors in X-ray screening. 
 
6.4 EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 2 we tested what part of the variability in detection performance can 
be accounted by the six factors ability, X-Ray ORT, training, age, personality and 
working strategy, Furthermore, direct, indirect and total effects were tested for a 
reduced model which included the most important indicators. 
 
6.4.1 Method 
6.4.1.1 Participants 
The main sample in this study included again the 97 (M = 36.19, SD = 11.44; range 
20 to 55 years) job applicants who were employed as aviation security screeners 
based on their test results in the pre-employment assessment for aviation security 
screeners. Data from 130 aviation security screeners between 23 and 59 years (M = 
45.72, SD = 8.27) who were employed for at least 4 years were used additionally 
(screener group). 
6.4.1.2 Measures 
Cognitive Test Battery (CTB) 
For this analysis the cognitive test battery was reduced to the four most important 
indicators Raven, LPS8, LPS9 and LPS10.  
 
Training 
Training hours with an individual adaptive computer based training system were 
measured from employment to the first competency assessment for the 2007 
sample. For the screener group overall training hours were calculated. The XRT is a 
training system that includes a large image library of X-ray images of passenger 
bags and threat items in many different views. Threat items are projected into bags 
based on the individually adaptive training algorithm of XRT. The XRT starts with 
easy views at the beginning and increases image difficulty depending on the 
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screeners’ performance. Image difficulty is defined by more difficult viewpoints, 
increased bag complexity and superposition. Thereby a very efficient training can be 
provided to users. For more details about the training system and its evaluation see 
Schwaninger (2004), Koller, Hardmeier, Michel, and Schwaninger (2008). 
 
Personality Questionnaire (NEO-FFI) 
Personality was measured using the NEO-FFI by Costa and McCrae (Borkenau & 
Ostendorf, 1993), also called the Big Five. This test measures the five personality 
traits openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. In 
short, openness includes having wide interests, and being imaginative and insightful. 
People high in conscientiousness tend to be organized, thorough, and planful. 
Extraversion encompasses specific traits as talkative, energetic, and assertive. 
Agreeableness includes traits like sympathetic, kind, and affectionate. Last 
neuroticism is characterized by traits like tense, moody, and anxious. Each trait is 
measured with 15 questions. For each question, participants had to indicate if they 
strongly disagree, disagree, neither disagree nor agree, agree or strongly agree. 
 
Working strategies and working experience (AVEM) 
The AVEM (Arbeitsbezogenes Verhaltens- und Erlebensmuster) by Schaarschmidt 
and Fischer (1996) measures working strategies and working experience using 66 
questions. All questions measure 11 dimensions which can be summarized to the 
three main factors working engagement, individual hardiness and behavior under 
pressure, as well as attitude towards life and healthiness. Again, questions had to be 
answered with strongly disagree, disagree, partly disagree and partly agree, agree, 
strongly agree.  
6.4.1.3 Procedure 
For the 2007 sample the performance in the CTB and the X-Ray ORT was measured 
within the pre-employment assessment procedure. Both questionnaires, the NEO-FFI 
and the AVEM were as well part of the pre-employment assessment. After 
employment all screeners had an initial training course which took three weeks. They 
also received training with the individual adaptive training system. On average each 
screeners should train 10 hours during the initial training course and thereafter at 
least two times 20 minutes per week. Training hours until the first competency 
assessment was on average 18.37 hours (SD = 11.60). After the initial training 
course, screeners worked 4 to 6 months before they passed the first competency 
73/161 
 
assessment which includes three X-ray screening tests and a theoretical exam on 
computer.  
For the screener group the CTB was taken 4 to 6 years before the recurrent 
certification tests used in this study.  
6.4.1.4 Modeling Description 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to test the influence of other important factors on the 
X-ray screening task additionally. Again, the model was tested using a step-by-step 
procedure. First, CFAs were conducted to investigate how well the indicator variables 
accurately reflect the latent variables personality and working strategy and working 
experience. Then, a full SEM was conducted for the 2007 sample. Direct and indirect 
effects were then tested with both groups. 
6.4.2 Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics for all indicator variables are presented in Table 3.5. Further, 
the sample correlation matrix for the 2007 sample for all indicators is shown in Table 
3.6. 
 
Table 3.5 
Reliabilities, means, standard deviations of indicator variables 
 
 
Indicator variables 
 
 
Reliability 
2007 sample 
(N = 97) 
Screener Group 
(N = 130) 
M SD M SD 
Raven .93a /.94b 0.32 0.14 0.27 0.14 
LPS8 .83c / .70c 0.62 0.29 0.47 0.25 
LPS9 .83c / .75c 0.53 0.15 0.44 0.17 
LPS10 .83c / .69c 0.61 0.20 0.47 0.19 
X-Ray ORT* > .91a / > .78b 1.85 0.22 -- -- 
NEO-FFI_N .85a 1.11 0.48 -- -- 
NEO-FFI_E .80 a 2.83 0.41 -- -- 
NEO-FFI_A .71 a 2.99 0.34 -- -- 
NEO-FFI_C .85 a 3.23 0.45 -- -- 
AVEM_WE > .78a / > .76b 21.14 4.49 -- -- 
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2007 sample 
(N = 97) 
Screener Group 
(N = 130) 
Indicator variables Reliability M SD M SD 
Training -- 18.37 11.60 167.04 68.91 
Age -- 36.19 11.44 59.62 23.85 
PIT (Screener Group) 
CAT (2007 sample) 
> .87a / > .87b 
> .88a / > .84b 
-- 
6.58 
-- 
1.72 
6.55 
-- 
1.96 
-- 
BDT 1.0 (Screener Group) 
BDT2.0 (2007 sample)  
> .80a / > .77b 
> .88a / > .80b 
-- 
5.50 
-- 
1.93 
8.40 
-- 
4.27 
-- 
TIP .58 - .90b 8.12 1.02 -- -- 
 
Table 3.6 
Correlation matrix of indicators for 2007 sample 
Indicators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Age --             
2. Training .24 --            
3. AVEM -.42 -.07 --           
4. TIP -.38 .10 .09 --          
5. NEO_N .03 .14 -.23 -.00 --         
6. NEO_E -.19 -.16 .27 .07 -.43 --        
7. NEO_A -.02 -.12 -.14 .05 -.33 .38 --       
8. NEO_C -.03 -.16 .27 .01 -.43 .50 .38 --      
9. Raven -.60 -.23 .17 .27 -.01 .01 .01 .01 --     
10. LPS8 -.63 -.24 .18 .28 -.01 .01 .01 .01 .68 --    
11. LPS9 -.58 -.22 .16 .26 -.01 .01 .00 .01 .63 .66 --   
12. LPS10 -.62 -.24 .17 .27 -.01 .01 .01 .01 .66 .70 .64 --  
13. PIT -.58 .16 .14 .49 -.01 .10 .07 .01 .40 .42 .39 .41 -- 
14. BDT -.51 .14 .12 .43 -.01 .09 .06 .01 .35 .37 .34 .36 .65 
 
First, CFAs of the NEO-FFI and AVEM were conducted. For the NEO-FFI a CFA showed 
no significant loading of the component “Openness” on the latent factor personality. 
Therefore, the first order factor personality was described by the four indicators 
Note. a internal consistency (Cronbach alpha), b split-half reliability, c  retest reliability, d parallel test 
reliability. Split-half reliability for the LPS tests was calculated for the four subtests together. Split-half 
reliabilities for TIP data vary depending on the image-library used. Values for the CTB are standardized 
and detection performance measures of all x-ray screening tests except for the X-Ray ORT have been 
multiplied with an arbitrary constant due to security reasons. *Reliability measures for the X-Ray ORT 
were based on test results from novices. 
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conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. However, further 
analysis evidenced that the factor openness could be integrated in the full SEM as 
independent factor. However, we restricted to the four personality traits to avoid a 
too complex model with too many free parameters to be estimated compared to the 
sample size available. Furthermore, we calculated a CFA for the AVEM. As defined by 
the authors (Schaarschmidt & Fischer, 1996), we specified a model in which three 
first order factors were explained by the 11 indicators. We have chosen working 
engagement (AVEM_WE) as the most valid indicator to measure working strategy. 
Again, we decided to use only one indicator because of the small sample size 
available. As well ability was measured with four indicators only. Since the X-Ray 
ORT in the model was consistently not significant we have omitted this variable.  
According to all fit criteria the model (see Figure 4.2) is very satisfactory Χ2(63, N= 
97) = 67.00, p = .34, CFI = .992, RMSEA = .027, Pclose = .764, AIC = 151.00 
(saturated Model 210.00), BCC = 168.03 (saturated model 252.57), BIC = 256.00 
(saturated model 472.48), CAIC = 298.00 (saturated model 577.48)13. All 
coefficients are significant on the .05 level except for the effect of ability and 
personality which are only significant on the 9 and 13.5 percent level respectively. 
However, taking into consideration that the sample size is very small and that we 
have no random sample from a defined population, these significant levels can be 
accepted as relevant. Moreover, additional analysis using bays estimation instead of 
maximum likelihood which is better suited for non-normal data and small sample size 
according to Arbuckle (2005) resulted in highly significant effects14. Results show 
that factor loadings for ability, age and training were invariant over time. The 
variance of ability on detection performance in X-ray screening was estimated to be 
.24. Thus, ability has at least a weak and positive effect on the probability of 
detecting prohibited items in X-ray images of passenger bags holding all other effects 
constant. Further, standardized regression coefficient of .44 indicate that the training 
effect is much higher implying the importance of training and the knowledge what 
prohibited items look like in X-ray images. However, the strongest effect was found 
for age with -.69. Thus, the older the aviation security screeners, the worse the 
detection performance in X-ray screening. Moreover, the effect of personality is 
positive, but rather weak with .16 implying that persons who are more extrovert, 
                                                 
13 For the model (see Figure 2) we introduced an error correlation between the error of the indicator 
agreeableness and work engagement because of the high modification index which indicated a strong 
misfit of the model when we set the correlation to zero. 
14 Reestimation of the model with bayes procedure showed similar coefficients which were all highly 
significant. 
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conscientious, agreeable and less neurotic show increased detection performance. 
Results also show a slightly negative effect of work engagement on detection 
performance of -.21 although the bivariate relationship between detection 
performance and work engagement is positive. This implies a suppressor effect of 
the other independent variables leading to the negative coefficient between work 
engagement and detection performance. 
 
Last, we tested for direct, indirect and total effects with a reduced model which 
included the three most important predictors of detection performance, namely age, 
training and ability. We expect a direct effect of age on detection performance and 
ability, as well as a direct effect of ability and training on detection performance. In 
Detection Performance
X-Ray Screening
BDT
e1
1
PIT
e2
1
LPS8e5
LPS10e7
LPS9e6
Ability
Ravene4
d1
Age
Training
Personality
NEO_Ce11
NEO_Ae10
NEO_Ee9
NEO_Ne8
TIP
e3
1
AVEM_WE
- .61
. 70
.54
.71
.80
.82
.85
.78
r = .41
r = .01
r = .38
r = .21
r = - .75
r = - .28
r = .24
r = .42
r = -.06- .21
.16
.24
- .69
.44
r = - .23
r = - .04
r = - .22
.76 .86 .57
Figure 4.2. Structural model based on the 2007 data. Circles enclose factors and 
boxes enclose indicators. Standardized factor loadings are written in bold type. 
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contrast, age is expected to have a negative effect on both ability and performance. 
This model (Figure 4.3) had a very good fit to the data Χ2(24, N= 97) = 24.32, p = 
.44, CFI = .999, RMSEA = .012, Pclose = .707, AIC = 66.32 (saturated Model 
90.00), BCC = 71.64 (saturated Model 101.39), BIC = 118.82 (saturated model 
202.49), CAIC = 139.82 (saturated model 247.49).  
 
All direct, indirect and total effects are displayed in Table 3.7. Age shows the 
strongest direct effect in the model. Ability and detection performance is significantly 
lower for older employees -.74, p < .01 and -.57, p < .01, respectively. Further, 
results evidence that training influence the detection performance significantly .40, p 
Detection Performance
X-Ray Screening
LPS8
LPS10
LPS9
Ability
Raven
Age
Training
PIT BDT TIP
r = - .27 / .08 - .57 / - .46
.40 / .37
.26 / .14
.81 / .69
.82 / .80
.84 / .78
.78 / .78
.86 / .91 .75 / .76 .57 / --
- .74 / - .35
Figure 4.3. Direct and indirect effects (in bold type). Left for 2007 data (N = 97), 
right for the screener group (N = .130).  
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< .01. Ability has a positive effect on detection performance .26, p = .07. After 
controlling for age and training, ability is still positively associated with work 
performance. Furthermore, age has not only a direct, but also a significant indirect 
and negative effect on detection performance of -.19, p < .01.  This results in a total 
effect of age on detection performance of -.76, p < .01.  
 
Table 3.7 
Direct, indirect and total effects for both samples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model could be successfully replicated with already employed aviation security 
screeners Χ2(16, N= 130) = 17.78, p = .34, CFI = .996, RMSEA = .029, Pclose = 
.648, AIC = 57.78 (saturated model 72.00), BCC = 60.78 (saturated model 77.40), 
BIC = 115.13 (saturated model 175.23), CAIC = 135.13 (saturated model 211.23). 
For direct, indirect and total effects see Table 3.7. 
In order to test whether the effect of training and ability varies across different age 
groups, a multiple group comparison across low and high age groups (median split) 
was conducted for the 2007 sample. However, results show no significant interaction 
of age with ability and training (p > .10). In this sample the effect of both ability and 
training remains unchanged for the different groups. However, it could be expected 
that samples with higher variance would show different results.  
 
6.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The main goal of this study was to examine the relationship between different factors 
such as ability, personality traits, age etc. and detection performance in X-ray 
screening in order to define a reliable and valid pre-employment assessment. Factors 
 standardized 
coefficients 
 
direct 
 
indirect 
 
total 
2007 sample 
(N=97) 
Ability .26 -- .26 
Training .40 -- .40 
Age -.57 -.19 -.76 
     
Screener group 
(N=130) 
Ability .14 -- .14 
Training .37 -- .37 
Age -.46 -.05 -.51 
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that are rather related to abilities and are important for the X-ray screening task 
were evaluated primarily. Results of Experiment 1 show that all cognition tests from 
the CTB which are mostly tests from elaborated German intelligence test batteries 
load on one latent factor ability despite their semantic distinctions. Furthermore, this 
factor correlates highly with detection performance in X-ray screening for both 
samples. A multiple group confirmatory factor analysis evidences the equality of 
factor loadings across both samples additionally. However, results indicated that one 
constraint (TIP) had to be released as this indicator was significantly different across 
the groups. Reliability of the 2006 sample which was just sufficient may account for 
this difference. Nevertheless we tried to integrate this indicator because of his 
importance to the latent variable detection performance in X-ray screening. Our 
results also suggest that the whole CTB which consists of 12 tests can be reduced to 
four tests without reducing explained variance. Further a full SEM with the X-Ray 
ORT as additional factor showed that both factors display a significant effect on 
detection performance. Interestingly, as well the X-Ray ORT which measures the 
ability to cope with image-based factors in X-ray screening seems to be an important 
determinant. This result was unexpected as participants in both groups were selected 
based on their test results in the X-Ray ORT and therefore variability of both groups 
is rather small. Further, an additional analysis showed that job applicants who 
performed high in the X-Ray ORT had as well significantly better test results in the 
CTB. To sum up Experiment 1 showed that both the ability measured with the X-Ray 
ORT and the ability measured with the CTB play an important role for the X-ray 
screening task later on the job. The positive relationship between the X-Ray ORT and 
detection performance later on the job could also be shown in a previous study by 
Hardmeier et al. (2006a). Thus, the X-Ray ORT as well as the CTB can be used 
within a pre-employment assessment. However, to increase efficiency a reduction of 
the CTB from 12 to 4 tests only should be taken into consideration.  
In a next step all factors that can be relevant for the X-ray screening job and 
whereof reliable data are available were subjected to SEM. The model revealed that 
factor loadings for age and training are substantial. Thus, training hours increase the 
detection performance in both the competency assessment and on the job. This 
result is consistent with previous studies which showed that detection performance 
can be significantly improved with an individual adaptive training system (Hardmeier 
et al., 2006b; Koller et al., 2008). Further, a negative effect of age on detection 
performance could also be found by Schwaninger, Hardmeier, Riegelnig, and Martin 
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(in preparation). They could show that despite of their working experience older 
screeners performed significantly worse than their younger colleagues. Taking into 
consideration that the age range in this study was from 20 to 55 years only, this 
result is rather surprising. Further, ability has a weak and positive effect on detection 
performance. It could be expected that this effect would be stronger with larger 
sample size. Furthermore, it has to be considered that the sample used for this study 
shows relatively small variance as screeners were already selected based on their 
ability. Whether ability is even more important is a question that should be answered 
with a representative sample. Moreover, the four personality factors extraversion, 
conscientiousness, agreeableness and neuroticism show a rather weak, but positive 
effect on detection performance. It could be expected that these personality traits 
become even more important considering other tasks of aviation security screeners, 
such as the communication with passengers. Further analysis should investigate 
these relationships to decide if these personality factors should be measured within a 
pre-employment assessment. For working experience a negative effect on detection 
performance was found. However, the positive relationship between detection 
performance and working engagement alone implies a suppressor effect. In this 
study some indicator had to be neglected due to the small sample size. Further 
studies with larger sample size should investigate these effects more in detail. Last, 
an analysis about direct and indirect effects with the three most important factors 
age, training and ability showed that age influences detection performance directly, 
but also indirectly by a negative relationship with ability. Further, training and ability 
show a direct effect on the X-ray screening task only. This model could be replicated 
with another sample including aviation security screeners who were employed for at 
least four years. 
Despite the limitation of this study due to the small sample size and many free 
parameters to be estimated factor loadings for ability, age and training were 
invariant over time. This evidences the importance of all three factors for the X-ray 
screening task. Whereas ability can be measured within a pre-employment 
assessment, training have to be provided when employed. In order to interpret the 
age effect reliably, further studies should be done. Although older screeners seem to 
perform significantly worse, a study by Schwaninger et al. (in preparation) could 
show that some older screener perform on remarkably higher level than their 
younger colleagues. 
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TRAINING IN AVIATION SECURITY 
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7. THE ROLE OF RECURRENT CBT FOR INCREASING AVIATION 
SECURITY SCREENERS’ VISUAL KNOWLEDGE AND 
ABILITIES NEEDED IN X-RAY SCREENING 
 
7.1 ABSTRACT 
X-ray screeners have to know which items are prohibited and what they look like in 
X-ray images of passenger bags (knowledge-based factors). In addition, effective X-
ray screening requires the abilities to cope with bag complexity, superposition by 
other objects, and rotation of objects (image-based factors). Knowledge-based 
factors are expected to be highly dependent on training whereas image-based factors 
are related to visual-cognitive abilities and aptitudes (Schwaninger et al., 2005). 
To test to what extend these two factors are influenced by training, 334 screeners 
took two X-ray screening tests before and after two years of recurrent computer-
based training (CBT). The Prohibited Items Test (PIT) measures rather knowledge-
based factors, the X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) image-based factors. 
The results showed indeed a much better detection performance in the PIT after two 
years of training. Thus, CBT can increase the knowledge of prohibited items and 
what they look like in X-ray images of passenger bags substantially. The increase in 
detection performance in the X-Ray ORT was much smaller. This indicates that 
image-based factors are indeed related to visual-cognitive abilities and aptitudes that 
can be increased by CBT less effectively. The implications for selection and training 
of X-ray screeners are discussed15. 
 
7.2 INTRODUCTION 
Airport security has become very important in recent years. Since airports are 
confronted with new threat dimensions and a constantly increasing passenger flow, 
reliable and efficient detection of different threat items in X-ray images is an 
essential airport security task. During high passenger flow, screeners have only a few 
seconds to decide whether a bag is OK or whether it has to be hand-searched. 
Schwaninger et al. (2005) could show that detecting threat items in passenger bags 
                                                 
15 A slightly different version of this chapter was published at the 4th International Aviation Security 
Technology Symposium in Washington, D.C. 2006. I gratefully acknowledge the help of Adrian 
Schwaninger and Franziska Hofer in preparing the manuscript. 
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includes both, knowledge-based and image-based factors. That is, a screener has to 
know which items are prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images of 
passenger bags (knowledge-based factors). There are many threat items that look 
quite different in reality than in an X-ray image, which makes them difficult to 
recognize without training (Schwaninger, 2005b). Another difficulty results from the 
fact that some threat items look quite similar to harmless objects. Again other threat 
items like improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are normally not seen at checkpoints 
and without specific training they are therefore rather difficult to recognize. These 
knowledge-based factors are expected to be highly dependent on training since 
results from object recognition studies show that one can only recognize shapes if 
they are similar to the ones encountered before and stored in visual memory (for an 
overview see Schwaninger, 2005a). However, the interpretation of X-ray images is 
much more complex and is also dependent on image-based factors such as bag 
complexity, superposition and rotation of the target object itself. If a bag is close-
packed it is more difficult to detect a threat item within a short time because other 
objects can distract attention. Furthermore, the threat item can be superimposed by 
other objects in the bag, which can hamper detection performance as well. Moreover, 
if a threat item is shown in a rotated view it becomes harder to recognize it. A 
previous study from Schwaninger et al. (2005) showed large individual differences 
for novices and screeners regarding how well they can cope with such image-based 
factors. Furthermore, it could be assumed that these image-based factors are less 
dependent on training and more related to visual abilities and aptitudes which are 
relatively stable over time. 
To measure knowledge-based and image-based factors in X-ray screening relatively 
independent of each other, two X-ray screening tests, the Prohibited Items Test (PIT) 
and the X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) were developed. The PIT 
measures rather knowledge-based factors in X-ray screening and therefore includes 
all kinds of prohibited items according to international prohibited items lists. On the 
other hand the X-Ray ORT includes only guns and knives in X-ray images, but shown 
in different viewpoints with low and high superposition and in bags with different 
complexity levels and therefore measures mainly the image-based factors viewpoint, 
superposition and bag complexity. 
To test to what extend knowledge-based and image-based factors are influenced by 
training, 334 aviation security screeners took both X-ray screening tests before and 
after two years of recurrent computer-based training with X-Ray Tutor, which is an 
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individually adaptive training system for X-ray screeners (see Schwaninger, 2004; 
Schwaninger & Hofer, 2004 for details). 
 
7.3 METHOD 
7.3.1 Participants 
A total of 334 aviation security screeners (101 male and 233 female) between 23 
and 62 years (M = 46.71, SD = 8.37) participated in this study. When taking the PIT 
and the X-Ray ORT the first time, all of them had a working experience between one 
and 25 years (M = 7.54, SD = 5.13). Between the first and the second measurement 
all screeners received two years of recurrent Computer Based Training (CBT) with X-
Ray Tutor. Most screeners trained at least twice a week for 20 minutes. 
 
7.3.2 Materials and Procedure 
Prohibited Items Test (PIT) 
The Prohibited Items Test (PIT) measures rather knowledge-based factors in X-ray 
image interpretation tasks and includes X-ray images of all kinds of prohibited items. 
All of them can be classified into the seven categories guns, sharp objects, hunt and 
blunt instruments, chemicals, highly inflammable substances, explosives and others 
according to ECAC, ICAO and EU prohibited items lists. The test contains a total of 
160 X-ray images, half of them include one or more prohibited items, whereas the 
other 80 images are bags containing only harmless objects. 68 of the threat images 
contain exactly one prohibited item; the remaining 12 bags include two or three 
prohibited items16. As this test was developed to measure rather knowledge-based 
factors, all image-based factors are kept relatively constant. That is, all prohibited 
items were shown in a bag with medium bag complexity, medium superposition and 
in an easy view. 
The PIT is a computer based test and includes a self-explanatory instruction with six 
exercise trials to familiarize the participants with the test taking procedure. All X-ray 
images are shown for a maximum of 10 seconds on the screen. Then, participants 
have to decide whether the bag is OK (includes no prohibited item) or NOT OK 
(includes one or more prohibited items) by clicking on the respective button. 
                                                 
16 This was done to increase face validity of the test. Please note that only bags including one prohibited 
item were used for that data analysis. 
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Furthermore, they have to indicate how sure they are in their decision and to which 
of the seven categories the prohibited item belongs to17. The test is divided into four 
blocks of trials. After each block screeners had the possibility to take a short break. 
Trials are counterbalanced across all four blocks and the order within a block is 
random. The test takes about 45 minutes (short breaks included). 
A previous study with 453 X-ray screeners could show that the PIT is a reliable and 
valid instrument to measure knowledge-based factors in X-ray screening (Hardmeier 
et al., 2006a). Reliability was measured using Cronbach Alpha and Guttman split half 
reliabilities; the former ranging between .87 and .93 and the latter ranging between 
.87 and .94. Furthermore, convergent, discriminant and criterion-related validity 
support high validity of the PIT (for more details see Hardmeier et al., 2006a). 
 
X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) 
The X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) measures rather image-based 
factors in X-ray screening and therefore includes only typical gun and knife shapes as 
threat objects. These are shown in bags with different complexity levels, more or less 
superimposed by other objects in the bag. Furthermore, each gun and each knife is 
shown in an easy and rotated view. Thus, the X-Ray ORT consists of a total of 256 
trials: 2 threat categories (guns and knives) * 8 (exemplars) * 2 (bag complexities) 
* 2 (superpositions) * 2 (views) * 2 (harmless images vs. threat images). All images 
are shown in black and white so that this test can also be used for pre-employment 
assessment purposes where the meaning of color information as indicator for 
different materials is not known to novices. 
The procedure is similar to the PIT. After a self-explanatory introduction, participants 
receive eight exercise trials with feedback. The test is also subdivided into four 
blocks. Trials are counterbalanced across all blocks and random within each block. 
Contrary to the PIT, images in the ORT are displayed for four seconds only and then 
participants answer whether the bag was OK or NOT OK. Again, at the end of each 
answer participants have to indicate how sure they are in their decision. 
Detailed reliability and validity measures of this test can be found in Hardmeier et al. 
(2005). Overall, reliabilities with >.89 for Cronbach Alpha and >.78 for Guttman split 
half in the screener group are rather high. As well convergent, discriminant and 
criterion-related validity are given; for details see Hardmeier et al. (2005). 
 
                                                 
17 Please note that data analysis is based on the OK/NOT OK answers and not on the answer to which 
category a prohibited item belongs to. 
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X-Ray Tutor – Individually adaptive computer based training system 
X-Ray Tutor (XRT) is an individually adaptive training system to improve detection 
performance in X-ray screening. This CBT system creates individual training sessions 
adapted to each screener based on his learning history and thereby provides very 
effective and efficient training (for details see Schwaninger, 2004). XRT CBS 2.0 
Professional Edition includes a large image library with 25’140 fictional threat item 
(FTI) images depicting more than 500 different threat objects in many different 
viewpoints. XRT combines each FTI with an X-ray image of a passenger bag during 
the training session in real-time. The training software starts with easy views at the 
beginning of the training. Depending on the screeners’ learning history, image 
difficulty is increased by choosing more difficult viewpoints, increasing bag 
complexity and superposition adapted to each screener and FTI. 
During a training session the X-ray image is displayed for 15 seconds on the screen. 
Then, screeners have to press an OK or NOT OK button to indicate whether the bag 
is harmless or whether it has to be hand-searched. Immediate feedback is provided, 
i.e. whether a screener has correctly identified (hit) or missed the threat item (miss), 
whether he/she correctly rejected a harmless bag (correct rejection) or wrongly 
judged a harmless bag as being dangerous (false alarm). Furthermore, an 
information window showing the X-ray image of the threat item and a real 
photograph of it provide immediate detailed information about the threat item and its 
components in order to enhance perceptual learning. The effectiveness of X-Ray 
Tutor has been proven in several scientific studies, showing substantial increases of 
detection, less false alarms and faster response times (Schwaninger & Hofer, 2004; 
Ghylin, Drury, & Schwaninger, 2006). 
 
7.4 RESULTS 
Test results are calculated using the detection performance measure d’, which takes 
the hit rate and the false alarm rate into account. The hit rate shows how often a bag 
containing a threat item was judged as being not ok, whereas the false alarm rate 
shows how often a harmless bag was wrongly judged as not ok (Green & Sweets, 
1966). 
Figure 5.1a shows the difference in detection performance after two years of 
recurrent CBT for both tests, the PIT and X-Ray ORT. An analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with the within-participant factors test type (PIT, ORT) and measurement 
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(first, second) was calculated using d’ scores. There was a significant main effect of 
test type (PIT vs. ORT) η2 = .88, F(1, 333) = 2483.84, p < .001, a significant main 
effect of measurement (first vs. second) η2 = .77, F(1, 333) = 1129.58, p < .001 
and a significant interaction of test type and measurement η2 = .34, F(1, 333) = 
170.44, p < .001. As can be seen, CBT had a much higher influence on detection 
performance in the PIT than in the X-Ray ORT.  
Schwaninger et al. (2005) predicted a rather high training effect in the PIT and a 
small influence of training on image-based factors which depend mainly on visual 
abilities and aptitudes. The significant interaction between test type and 
measurement is consistent with this assumption and shows that image-based 
factors, i.e. the ability to cope with bag complexity, superposition and rotation of the 
threat item, can not be increased very much by training when compared to 
knowledge-based factors which depend highly on training.  
 
Figure 5.1b shows the difference in percentage for both tests, taking the first 
measurement as baseline using the following formula (m1 means first measurement 
and m2 means second measurement): 
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As predicted by Schwaninger et al. (2005), there were large effects of training on 
knowledge-based factors (85.0%) and rather low influence of training on image-
based factors (22.7%). 
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
PIT ORT
D
et
ec
tio
n 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 (d
')
first measurement
second measurement
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
PIT ORT
%
 D
iff
er
en
ce
Figure 5.1. Detection Performance with standard deviations in the PIT and ORT for the first and second 
measurement left and percent difference in these two tests right. 
a b
%
 R
el
at
iv
e 
In
cr
ea
se
 in
 d
‘
88/161 
 
7.5 DISCUSSION 
The detection of threat items in passenger bags depends on knowledge-based and 
image-based factors. Screeners have to know which objects are prohibited and what 
they look like in X-ray images in order to recognize them (knowledge-based factors). 
In addition, they have to be able to cope with effects of bag complexity, 
superposition, and viewpoint (image-based factors).  
In this study we investigated the role of training on knowledge-based and image-
based factors in aviation security screening using the two X-ray screening tests, PIT 
and X-Ray ORT as well as XRT, a computer based individually adaptive training 
system. Overall, results show that the increase in detection performance after two 
years of recurrent computer-based training was much smaller in the X-Ray ORT 
compared to the training effect in the PIT. These results support the assumption that 
the PIT measures rather knowledge-based factors which can be increased 
remarkably through training compared to image-based factors measured by the X-
Ray ORT, which are more difficult to increase by training. These results are as well 
consistent with results from a previous study by Schwaninger et al. (2005) which 
could show that the difference in X-ray detection performance between novices and 
aviation security screeners is much higher in the PIT than in the X-Ray ORT.  
As can be seen in Figure 5.1a, detection performance in the PIT increased 
remarkably after two years of recurrent computer based training. Thus, an 
individually adaptive computer based training system like XRT helps to learn and 
store all kinds of prohibited items in different views in the visual memory. 
Additionally, it provides an excellent tool to react immediately to new threats as the 
training library of XRT can be updated constantly in an easy and fast way. However, 
besides the knowledge of a screener the abilities to cope with the image-based 
factors viewpoint, superposition and bag complexity are also very important. 
Hardmeier et al. (2005) revealed large inter-individual differences regarding the 
visual abilities needed to cope with these image-based factors, which affected on the 
job performance. As this study shows, these abilities can only be trained to a limited 
extent and therefore should be measured in a pre-employment assessment to 
identify the candidates who are well-suited regarding these visual abilities. 
To summarize, both knowledge-based and image-based factors are very important in 
X-ray screening and can be measured relatively independent of each other using the 
PIT and X-Ray ORT. While knowledge-based factors can be enhanced remarkably by 
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adaptive computer-based training, image-based factors should already be measured 
and used for selecting candidates in pre-employment assessment. 
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8. INVESTIGATING TRAINING, TRANSFER AND VIEWPOINT 
EFFECTS RESULTING FROM RECURRENT CBT OF X-RAY 
IMAGE INTERPRETATION  
 
8.1 ABSTRACT 
X-ray screening of passenger bags is an essential task at airport security 
checkpoints. In this study we investigated how well airport security screeners can 
detect guns, knives, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other threat objects in 
X-ray images of passenger bags before and after three and six month of recurrent 
(about 20 min per week) computer-based training (CBT). Two experiments 
conducted at different airports gave very similar results. Training with X-Ray Tutor 
(XRT), an individually adaptive CBT, resulted in large performance increases, 
especially for detecting IEDs. While performance for detecting IEDs was initially 
substantially lower than for guns, IEDs could be detected as well as guns after 
several months of training. A large transfer effect was observed as well: Training 
with XRT helped screeners recognize new threat objects that were similar in shape as 
the trained objects. Threat recognition was dependent on the rotation of the objects. 
If depicted from an unusual viewpoint, prohibited items were more difficult to 
recognize. The results were compared to two conventional CBT systems. For one 
system no training and transfer effects were observed whereas small training and 
transfer effects were found for the other conventional CBT system18. 
 
8.2 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of aviation security has increased dramatically in the last years. As a 
consequence of the new threat situation, large investments were made into modern 
security technology. State of the art X-ray screening equipment offers good image 
quality, high resolution and many image enhancement functions. However, the 
decision whether an X-ray image of a passenger bag contains a prohibited item or 
not, is still being taken by a human operator, i.e. an airport security screener. Object 
shapes that are not similar to ones stored in visual memory are difficult to recognize 
                                                 
18 I gratefully acknowledge the help of Saskia Koller, Adrian Schwaninger and Stefan Michel in conducting 
the study and preparing the manuscript. A similar version was published in the Journal of Transportation 
Security, 2008. 
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(e.g., Graf et al., 2002; Schwaninger, 2004, 2005a). Schwaninger et al. (2005) have 
shown that X-ray screener performance depends on knowledge-based and image-
based factors. A prerequisite for good X-ray detection performance is knowledge 
about which objects are prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images. Such 
knowledge is acquired by computer-based, class-room and on the job training 
(knowledge-based factors). Image-based factors refer to image difficulty resulting 
from viewpoint variation of threat objects, superposition of threat objects by other 
objects in a bag, and bag complexity depending on the number and type of other 
objects in the bag. The ability to cope with image-based factors is related to 
individual visual-cognitive abilities rather than a mere result of training (Hardmeier 
et al., 2006b). Because many threat objects are not known from everyday 
experience and because objects look quite different in X-ray images than in reality 
computer based and on the job training, as well as job experience are expected to be 
important determinants of X-ray detection performance. This is illustrated in Figure 
1.2. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are normally neither seen at checkpoints 
nor in reality and therefore very difficult to recognize for untrained persons. 
Schwaninger and Hofer (2004) and Schwaninger, Hofer, and Wetter (2007) could 
show that detection of IEDs in hold baggage screening (HBS) can be significantly 
improved if people are trained with an individually adaptive training system. Thus, 
training helps to store unknown object shapes in visual memory. Furthermore, some 
threat items, e.g. a gas spray looks quite different in the X-ray image. Schwaninger 
et al. (2005) compared detection performance of novices with the one of aviation 
security screeners. A rather poor recognition of unfamiliar object shapes (e.g., self-
defense gas spray, electric shock device etc.) in X-ray images was found for novices. 
For experienced aviation security personnel, a much higher recognition performance 
was observed. Consistent with this result McCarley, Kramer, Wickens, Vidoni, and 
Boot (2004) reported a better performance after training for the detection of knives 
in X-ray images for novices. However, one could assume that the expertise for other 
threat categories than IEDs which are relatively often seen at checkpoints (such as 
knives) can be gained with job experience and on the job training alone and that 
individually adaptive training is far less important for these threat categories.  
When one takes into account the myriad of views that can be produced by a single 
object, the question arises how the human brain stores and recognizes objects even 
if they are presented in unusual views. In the object recognition literature, two types 
of theories can be distinguished: structural description theories and view-based 
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theories. The former assume that objects are stored in visual memory by their 
component parts and their spatial relationship. An objects-centered description of 
this nature was described by Marr and Nishihara (1978), who proposed that objects 
are hierarchically decomposed into their parts and spatial relations relative to object-
centered coordinates in order to access an object-centered 3D model in visual 
memory. In Biederman´s (1987) recognition by components (RBC) theory, non-
accidental properties like vertices, parallel vs. non-parallel lines, straight vs. curved 
lines etc. (see Lowe, 1985, 1987) are extracted from a line drawing representation of 
objects to define basic geometrical primitives (geometrical ions, “geons”) that are 
relatively orientation-invariant. A geon structural description (GSD) in memory is 
activated by extracting geons from the visual input and match geon properties and 
their spatial relationship with the GSD (Hummel & Biederman, 1992). 
For view-based theories, different approaches have been proposed. Examples are 
recognition by alignment to a 3D representation (Lowe, 1987), recognition by linear 
combination of 2D views (Ullman & Basri, 1991), recognition by view interpolation 
(e.g., using RBF networks) proposed by Poggio and Edelman (1990) and storing of 
multiple views for each object plus performing transformations (Tarr & Pinker, 1989). 
What view-based theories have in common is the assumption that objects are not 
stored in memory as rotation invariant structural descriptions but instead in a format 
which is viewer-centred. A more detailed discussion of structural description theories 
vs. view-based theories and more recent hybrid theories is beyond the scope of this 
paper (for reviews see for example Graf et al., 2002; Hayward, 2003; Kosslyn, 1994; 
Peissig & Tarr, 2007; Schwaninger, 2005a; Tarr & Bülthoff, 1998). However, it 
should be pointed out that empirical results seem to be correlated with the required 
level of recognition (Bülthoff, Edelman, & Tarr, 1995; Tarr, 1995): if the object has 
to be recognized at 'entry level', behavioral measures are less affected by changes in 
perspective. However, in the case of subordinate recognition in which fine 
discriminations are typically required, both response times and accuracy are far more 
sensitive to the specific viewpoint used. Furthermore, differences in the task a 
subject has to perform (Lawson, 1999) and the specific paradigm that is used 
(Verfaillie, 1992) can influence which level of representation is tapped (see also 
Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996). 
The first aim of this study is to investigate how well airport security screeners can 
detect guns, knives, IEDs and other prohibited items in X-ray images of passenger 
bags. The second aim is to examine whether screener detection performance can be 
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increased by conducting recurrent CBT and whether this increase can be shown for 
all threat categories. To this end, screeners conducted weekly recurrent CBT (about 
20 min per week). Detection performance was tested with the X-Ray Competency 
Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT) by Koller and Schwaninger (2006). This test measures 
how well people detect threat items in X-ray images of passenger bags. It was 
conducted at the beginning and then after three and six months of training. In 
addition to training effects, The X-Ray CAT allows measuring transfer effects, i.e. to 
what extent visual knowledge that was gained through CBT can be transferred to 
other threat items (see below). In the X-Ray CAT all prohibited items are depicted 
from a canonical (easy recognizable) perspective (Palmer et al., 1981) and unusual 
perspective which allows investigating viewpoint effects. The study was conducted at 
two mid-size European airports. In Airport 1 (Experiment 1) one group of screeners 
used adaptive CBT (XRT) whereas the other group of screeners (control group) used 
a conventional (not adaptive) CBT. In Airport 2 (Experiment 2) the same 
experimental design was used except for the fact that the control group used another 
conventional CBT system. This allows finding out if a training effect is as well 
dependent on the type of the CBT system used. 
 
8.3 EXPERIMENT 1 
8.3.1 Method 
8.3.1.1 Participants 
209 airport security screeners of a mid-size European airport participated in 
Experiment 1 and conducted the X-Ray CAT 1.0.0 three times with an interval of 
three months between the measurements. The adaptive CBT group (XRT group) 
consisted of 97 screeners who conducted weekly recurrent CBT using X-Ray Tutor 
(XRT) CBS 2.0 Standard Edition between all three test measurements. The control 
group consisted of 112 screeners who used a conventional (not adaptive) CBT. 
According to the security organization and their Appropriate Authority, airport 
security screeners of both groups conducted about 20 min CBT per week. Analysis of 
XRT training use showed that on average, each screener trained 20.26 minutes (SD 
= 3.65 min) per week. 
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Figure 6.2. Example of two x-ray images of similar 
looking threat objects used in the test. Left: a gun 
of set A. Right: Corresponding gun of set B.  
8.3.1.2 Materials 
The X-Ray Competency Assessment Test (X-Ray CAT) 
The X-Ray CAT consists of 256 trials based on 128 different X-ray images of 
passenger bags. Each of the bag images is used once containing a prohibited item 
(threat image) and once without any threat object (non threat image). Figure 6.1 
displays examples of the stimuli.  
Prohibited objects can be assigned to four categories as defined in Doc 30 of the 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC): guns, IEDs, knives and other prohibited 
items (e.g., gas, chemicals, grenades etc.). The threat objects have been selected 
and prepared in collaboration with experts of Zurich State Police, Airport Division to 
be representative and realistic. For each threat category 16 exemplars are used 
(eight pairs). Each pair consists of two prohibited items that are similar in shape (see 
Figure 6.2). These were distributed randomly into two sets, set A and set B. 
Prohibited items of set A (not threat bag images) are contained in the XRT CBS 2.0 
SE training whereas the items of set B are not. This allows testing for transfer 
effects. 
Every item is depicted from two different viewpoints. The easy viewpoint refers to 
the canonical (i.e. easy recognizable) perspective (Palmer et al., 1981). The difficult 
viewpoint shows the threat item with 
an 85 degree horizontal rotation or an 
85 degree vertical rotation relative to 
the canonical view (see Figure 6.2 for 
examples). In each threat category, 
half of the prohibited items of the 
difficult viewpoint are rotated 
vertically, the other half horizontally. 
Figure 6.1. Example images from the X-Ray CAT. Left: harmless bag (non threat 
image), right: same bag with a prohibited item at the top right corner (threat 
image). The prohibited item (gun) is shown also separately at the bottom right. 
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Set A and B are equalized concerning the rotations of the prohibited objects. 
Every threat item is combined with a bag in a manner that the degree of 
superposition by other objects is similar for both viewpoints. This was achieved using 
a function that calculates the difference between the pixel intensity values of the bag 
image with the threat object minus the bag image without the threat object using 
the following formula: 
 
Using this equation (division by object size), the superposition value is independent 
of the size of the prohibited item. This value can be kept relatively constant for the 
two views of a threat object, independent of the degree of clutter in a bag, when 
combining the bag image and the prohibited item. The bag images were visually 
inspected by aviation security experts to ensure they do not contain any other 
prohibited items. Harmless bags were assigned to the different categories and 
viewpoints of the threat objects in a way that their difficulty was balanced across all 
categories19. The false alarm rate (the rate at which screeners wrongly judged a 
harmless bag as containing a threat item) for each bag image served as measure of 
difficulty based on a pilot study with 192 screeners of another airport. 
The X-Ray CAT takes about 20 to 30 minutes to complete. Each image is shown for a 
maximum of 10 seconds on the screen. Screeners have to judge whether the bag is 
OK (contains no prohibited item) or NOT OK (contains a prohibited item). 
Additionally, screeners have to indicate the perceived difficulty of each image on a 
100 point scale (difficulty rating)20. The X-Ray CAT is built into the XRT training 
system (see below). The interface of the X-Ray CAT is the same as in XRT except 
there is no feedback and screeners do not have to click on the image to identify the 
threat object. 
 
 
                                                 
19 The eight categories of test images (four threat categories in two viewpoints each) are similar in terms 
of the difficulty of the harmless bags. This means, a difference of detection performance between 
categories or viewpoints can not be due to differences in the difficulty of the bag images. 
20 The difficulty ratings were not analyzed in study. 
SP = Superposition; ISN = Grayscale intensity of the SN (Signal plus Noise) image (contains a prohibited item); IN 
= Grayscale intensity of the N (Noise) image (contains no prohibited item); Object Size: Number of pixels of the 
prohibited item where R, G and B are < 253 
[ ]
ObjectSize
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The X-Ray Tutor (XRT) Training System 
X-Ray Tutor (XRT) is an individually adaptive training system for aviation security 
screeners. It contains a large image library with 400 different threat objects depicted 
in up to 72 views, more than 6000 bag images and millions of possible threat object 
to bag combinations (see Schwaninger 2004b for details). The individually adaptive 
training algorithm of XRT starts with showing threat objects depicted from easy 
viewpoints with little superposition by other objects in bags of little complexity. 
Based on each individual screeners´ learning progress, threat objects are shown in 
more difficult views, more complex bags and with more superposition. These 
parameters are adapted automatically by a scientifically validated algorithm for each 
screener and threat object while taking into account automatic image processing 
algorithms as explained in Schwaninger, Michel and Bolfing (2007). XRT first 
presents screeners prohibited objects in easy (canonical) views. The individually 
adaptive training algorithm determines for each screener which views are difficult to 
recognize and adapts the training so that the trainee becomes able to detect threat 
Figure 6.3. Screenshot of the XRT CBS 2.0 training system during training. At the bottom right a feedback 
is provided after each response. If a bag contains a prohibited item, an information window can be 
displayed (see bottom left of the screen). 
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items reliably even if prohibited objects are substantially rotated away from the 
easiest view. During the next difficulty levels, first superposition and then bag 
complexity is increased so that the trainee becomes able to detect threat items 
reliably even if they are superimposed by other objects or if the complexity of a bag 
is very high (for more information on XRT see Schwaninger, 2003b, 2004b, 2005c). 
During a training session each image is displayed for 15 seconds on the screen. 
Within this time screeners can use some image enhancement functions which are 
also available when working with the X-ray machine (e.g. grayscale, negative image, 
edge enhancement, etc.). If the image contains a prohibited item, screeners have to 
click on it and then click on the NOT OK button. If the bag is harmless they have to 
click on the OK button. After providing a confidence rating using a slider control, 
feedback is shown to inform the trainee whether the image has been judged 
correctly or not (see Figure 6.3). If the bag contains a threat item, it is highlighted 
by flickering and the trainee has the possibility to display information about the 
threat item (see bottom left of Figure 6.3). By clicking on the continue button the 
next image is shown. As a default setting, one training sessions takes 20 minutes. 
During this time screeners see between 150 and 300 images. 
8.3.1.3 Procedure 
As explained above, two groups of screeners participated in Experiment 1. The XRT 
training group conducted weekly recurrent CBT using XRT CBS 2.0 Standard Edition. 
The control group used a conventional (not adaptive) CBT which is also used at many 
airports worldwide. Compared to the XRT it contains a smaller threat image library 
and threat objects are not displayed in many different views. Furthermore, in the 
conventional CBT threat objects are not matched with different bags on the fly and 
there is no individually adaptive training algorithm. 
The XRT training group and the control group took the X-Ray CAT before, after three, 
and after six months of weekly CBT. This allows testing the effectiveness of both CBT 
systems for increasing X-ray image interpretation competency of airport security 
screeners. As explained above, half of the prohibited items in the X-Ray CAT are also 
contained in the XRT training system (although presented in different bags). The 
other half of the prohibited items of the X-Ray CAT is not part of the XRT training 
library. This allows testing for transfer effects, i.e. testing whether training with the 
detection of certain prohibited items helps increasing the detection of other 
prohibited items. Finally, as specified above in the section on the X-Ray CAT, all 
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prohibited items are depicted in easy and difficult view which allows testing effects of 
viewpoint on screener detection performance. 
8.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Detection performance was calculated using the signal detection measure d’ (Green 
& Swets, 1966), which takes into account the hit rate (correctly judged threat 
images as being NOT OK) and the false alarm rate (wrongly judged harmless bags as 
being NOT OK). D’ is calculated using the following formula: 
d´= z(H) – z(FA) 
H is the hit rate, FA the false alarm rate and z refers to the z-transformation. 
Performance values are not reported due to security reasons. However, effect sizes 
are reported for all relevant analyses and interpreted based on Cohen (1988), see 
Table 4.1. For t-tests, d between 0.20 and 0.49 represents small effect size; d 
between 0.50 and 0.79 represents medium effect size; d ≥ 0. 80 represents large 
effect size. For analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistics, η2 between 0.01 and 0.05 
represents small effect size; η2 between 0.06 and 0.13 represents medium effect 
size; η2 ≥ 0.14 represents large effect size. 
 
Table 4.1 
Classification of effect sizes based on Cohen (1988) 
 
 
Figure 6.5 shows the detection performance of the first, second and third 
measurement for both screener groups. As can be seen, there was a large 
improvement as a result of training in the XRT training group while there was no 
improvement in the control group. These results were confirmed by an ANOVA for 
repeated measures using d’ scores with the within-participant factor measurement 
(first, second and third) and the between-participant factor group (XRT training 
group and control group). There were large main effects of measurement, η2 = .28, 
F(2, 414) = 81.04, p < .001, and group, η2 = .19, F(1, 207) = 47.62, p < .001. 
There was also a large interaction of measurement and group, η2 = .25, F(2, 414) = 
68.67, p < .001, which is consistent with Figure 6.5 showing large performance 
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increases as a result of training for the XRT training group but not for the control 
group. 
 
Separate pairwise t-tests of detection performance d’ revealed no significant 
difference at the baseline measurement between the two groups t(177) = - 0.91, p 
= .363, d = 0.13, but already a significant difference in the second measurement, 
i.e. after three months of training, t(207) = 7.52, p < .001, d = 1.04. Additional 
paired-samples t-tests revealed significant differences for the XRT training group 
between all three test measurements but no significant differences for the control 
group (see Table 4.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group (left) vs. the 
control group (right) comparing first, second and third measurement. 
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D
et
ec
tio
n 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (d
')
First Measurement Second Measurement Third Measurement
100/161 
 
Table 4.2 
Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of first (t1), second (t2) 
and third (t3) measurement 
 
 t(96) p d 
XRT Training Group (t1 – t2) -9.80 < .001 1.12 
XRT Training Group (t2 – t3) -3.95 < .001 0.28 
 t(111) p d 
Control Group (t1 – t2) .54 = .59 0.05 
Control Group (t2 – t3) -1.89 = .06 0.17 
 
Figure 6.6 shows the detection performance of both screener groups broken up by 
prohibited item category and the three test measurements. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA with the within-participant factors measurement (first, second and third) and 
threat category (guns, IEDs, knives and other), and the between-participant factor 
group (XRT training vs. control) revealed the significant main effects and significant 
interactions given in Table 4.3a. In addition to the effects that were already found in 
the previous ANOVA, also the factor threat (or prohibited item) category was 
significant. As can be seen in Figure 6.6, guns were detected best, followed by 
knives, other prohibited items and IEDs at the first test measurement. There was a 
highly significant interaction between threat category and measurement. As can be 
seen in Figure 6.6, detection of IEDs was initially much lower than gun detection. 
After six months of training, screeners in the XRT training group could detect IEDs 
even slightly better than guns. This result implies that IED detection is not difficult 
per se but rather a matter of knowledge which could be gained with specific training. 
Note that in this study all IEDs contained a detonator, wires, explosive, a triggering 
device and a power source. Thus, our conclusions are only applicable to the detection 
of such multi-component IEDs. Large performance increases were also found for 
other prohibited items in this group. Detection performance for guns and knives, 
threat items which are relatively often seen at checkpoints, was quite high in the first 
measurement condition already for both groups. This supports the assumption that 
job experience helps to store object shapes and increases detection performance to 
some amount. Nevertheless, for guns a remarkably improvement as a result of 
training can be found while for knives only a small training effect was shown. Note 
that after six months of training, detection performance of knives is lower than the 
one for any other threat category in the XRT training group, although at baseline 
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measurement it was higher than the detection performance for IEDs or other threat 
objects. The interaction between threat category, group and measurement is also 
worth mentioning. As can be seen in Figure 6.6 this results from the fact that there 
was no training effect for the control group. Their detection performance remains at 
about the same level for each threat category even after six months of training with 
the conventional CBT system. 
Separate pairwise t-tests were conducted to compare detection performance at the 
first and the second measurement for both groups and each threat category 
separately (Table 4.4). The XRT training group showed a significant increase of the 
detection performance at the second measurement for the categories guns, IEDs and 
other threat objects. For knives, a significant difference could be found only in the 
third measurement. The comparison of the effect size d between the t-tests of the 
four threat categories confirms the earlier mentioned conclusion that the training 
effect was particularly big for IEDs and rather small for knives. Detection 
performance of the control group did not differ significantly between the 
measurements, confirming that the conventional CBT did not result in an increase of 
threat detection performance. 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
group broken up by prohibited item category and test measurement. 
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Table 4.3 
Results of the ANOVAs in Experiment 1 
 Factor df F η2 p 
a) 
Measurement (M) 
Threat Category (T) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
T x G 
M x T 
M x T x G 
2, 414 
3, 621 
1, 207 
2, 414 
3, 621 
6, 1242 
6, 1242 
83.96 
240.03 
56.20 
70.49 
45.05 
43.20 
40.65 
.29 
.54 
.21 
.25 
.18 
.17 
.16 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
b) 
Measurement (M) 
Set (S) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
M x S 
S x G 
M x S x G 
2, 414 
1, 207 
1, 207 
2, 414 
2, 414 
1, 207 
2, 414 
80.55 
4.18 
49.40 
67.99 
8.80 
51.32 
11.54 
.28 
.02 
.19 
.25 
.04 
.20 
.05 
< .001 
< .05 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
c) 
Measurement (M) 
Set (S) 
Threat Category (T) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
M x T 
M x S 
S x G 
S x T 
T x G 
M x T x G 
M x S x G 
M x S x T 
S x T x G 
M x S x T x G 
2, 414 
1, 207 
3, 621 
1, 207 
2,414 
6, 1242 
2, 414 
1, 207 
3, 621 
3, 621 
6, 1242 
2, 414 
6, 1242 
3, 621 
6, 1242 
87.69 
2.37 
236.79 
63.57 
71.16 
44.35 
10.93 
52.25 
74.00 
47.39 
41.04 
10.74 
3.84 
4.78 
2.99 
.30 
.01 
.53 
.24 
.26 
.18 
.05 
.20 
.26 
.19 
.17 
.05 
.02 
.02 
.01 
< .001 
= .13 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .01 
< .01 
< .01 
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 Factor df F η2 p 
d) 
Measurement (M) 
View (V) 
Threat Category (T) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
M x T 
M x V 
V x G 
V x T 
T x G 
M x T x G 
M x V x G 
M x V x T 
V x T x G 
M x V x T x G 
2,414 
1, 207 
3, 621 
1, 207 
2, 414 
6, 1242 
2, 414 
1, 207 
3, 621 
3, 621 
6, 1242 
2, 414 
6, 1242 
3, 621 
6, 1242 
84.10 
1768.63 
258.62 
61.91 
65.80 
41.33 
2.05 
3.27 
425.64 
40.86 
40.25 
2.23 
6.58 
3.08 
2.68 
.29 
.90 
.56 
.23 
.24 
.17 
.01 
.02 
.67 
.17 
.16 
.01 
.03 
.02 
.01 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
= .13 
= .07 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .05 
< .001 
< .05 
< .05 
 
 
Table 4.4 
Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of the four categories 
between the first (t1), second (t2) and third (t3) measurement 
 
XRT training group t(96) df p d 
Guns t1 – t2 - 5.96 96 < .001 0.70 
IEDs t1 – t2 - 13.03 96 < .001 1.53 
Knives t1 – t2 - 1.51 96 = .13 0.17 
Other t1 – t2 - 8.47 96 < .001 1.07 
     
Guns t1 – t3 - 4.69 96 < .001 0.60 
IEDs t1 – t3 - 15.88 96 < .001 2.00 
Knives t1 – t3 - 2.27 96 < .05 0.26 
Other t1 – t3 - 12.56 96 < .001 1.51 
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Control group t(111) df p d 
Guns t1 – t2 - 0.40 111 = .69 0.05 
IEDs t1 – t2 0.03 111 = .98 0.00 
Knives t1 – t2 0.83 111 = .41 0.09 
Other t1 – t2 -0.17 111 = .87 0.02 
     
Guns t1 – t3 -0.92 111 = .36 0.10 
IEDs t1 – t3 -1.05 111 = .30 0.08 
Knives t1 – t3 -0.73 111 = .47 0.08 
Other t1 – t3 -1.39 111 = .17 0.15 
 
 
The results of the analyses considering the two prohibited item sets of the X-Ray 
CAT, set A and set B, are shown in Figures 6.7 and 6.8. As explained above, set A 
are X-Ray CAT images which contain prohibited items which are part of the XRT 
image library. Set B are X-Ray CAT images which contain prohibited items that are 
not part of the XRT image library. By comparing training effects for set A and set B 
transfer effects can be investigated, i.e. whether training with XRT does not only 
improve detection of prohibited items that are part of the XRT image library (set A) 
but also the detection of other prohibited items that are visually similar (set B). 
Figure 6.7 shows the detection performance for both screener groups broken up by 
test set for all three measurements. It shows a clear increase in detection 
performance for the XRT training group, especially at the second measurement, after 
the first three months of training. For the control group, as in the previous analysis, 
no training effect is evident. The results of the repeated measures ANOVA with the 
within-participant factors measurement (first, second and third) and set (A vs. B) 
and the between-participant factor group (XRT training group vs. control group) can 
be seen in Table 4.3b. There was a significant effect of set in this analysis, which 
would imply a different detection performance for set A vs. set B. However, the 
effect is very small, as the effect size of η2= 0.2 clearly shows, which makes the 
difference quasi negligible. This is also supported by the small effect size for the 
interaction between set and measurement, η2= 0.4. Pairwise t-tests comparing both 
sets within one group at the first measurement revealed a significant difference of 
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the two sets only for the control group t(111) = - 2.82, p < .01, d = 0.17 but not for 
the XRT training group, t(96) = - 0.42, p = .68, d = 0.03. However, note that an 
effect size of d = 0.17 is very small which supports the assumption that the two sets 
are in fact very similar in their difficulty level. Pairwise t-tests showed a significant 
increase in detection performance at the second measurement for both sets for the 
XRT training group, set A, t(96) = - 10.27, p < .001, d = 1.19, set B, t(96) = - 7.68, 
p < .001, d = 0.92. These results indicate a large transfer effect, i.e. visual 
knowledge regarding the visual appearance of the prohibited objects of the XRT 
image library helped screeners to detect similar looking, but untrained objects in the 
X-Ray CAT (set B). Consistent with previous analyses, there was no training effect 
for the control group, neither for set A, t(111) = .76, p = .45, d = 0.08, nor for set 
B, t(111) = - 0.28, p = .78, d = 0.03.  
Figure 6.8 includes also the threat category in the analysis. The increase in detection 
performance for the XRT training group can also be seen for the different threat 
categories. Pairwise t-tests between the first and second measurement confirmed a 
significant (p < 001, all d > 0.62) increase in detection performance for the XRT 
training group for all threat categories per set except for knives (set A: p = .12, d = 
0.19, set B; p = .32, d = 0.12). In Figure 6.8, detection performance in Set A for 
guns shows a decrease between the second and third measurement. However, this 
Figure 6.7. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
group comparing first, second and third measurement for set A and set B separately. 
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difference was not significant (p = .13, d = 0.17). For the control group, detection 
performance between the first and third measurement was compared in order to 
maximize the chances for finding a significant training effect. Even here, for all 
categories in each set, the detection between the first and third measurement did 
not differ significantly (all p > .12, d < 0.18). 
The extended ANOVA with the additional within-participant factor threat category 
revealed the main effects and interactions as specified in Table 4.3c. The main effect 
of set was not significant but there were significant interactions with set (see Table 
4.3c). However, as can be seen in Figure 6.8, these interactions are rather small, 
which implies large transfer effects. 
Figure 6.9 shows the results of the viewpoint analysis. An ANOVA was conducted on 
d’ scores with the within-participant factors measurement, threat category and 
viewpoint and the between-participant factor group. It showed significant main 
effects of measurement, category, viewpoint and group. For details and interactions 
see table 4.3d. The large main effect of viewpoint indicates a higher detection 
performance for objects in easy (canonical) viewpoint compared to objects presented 
in a difficult (rotated) view (cf. Fig. 9). However, no significant interaction between 
viewpoint and training could be found. This would suggest that the viewpoint effect is 
unaffected by the training and could not be decreased. Pairwise t-tests showed a 
Figure 6.8. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
group comparing first, second and third measurement for set A and set B and each threat category 
separately. 
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significant increase in detection performance at the second measurement for both 
views in all categories for the XRT training group with the exception of knives in the 
easy view (p = .53, d = 0.07). All other comparisons were significant p < .05, d > 
0.31). For the control group no significant increase in detection performance could be 
found (all p > .10, d < .0.19), see Table 4.5 for details. Training with XRT has an 
effect not only on the objects in the easy view but also on those in the difficult view. 
The screeners could make the association between the rotated object they detected 
during training and the canonical view of the object which is displayed in the object 
information in XRT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
group comparing first, second and third measurement for both views and each threat category 
separately. 
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Table 4.5 
Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of the four categories for 
easy view (V1) and difficult view (V2) between the first (t1) and second (t2) 
measurement 
 
XRT training group t(96) p d 
Guns: V1t1 – V1t2 -4.21 < .01 0.53 
IEDs: V1t1 – V1t2 -12.25 < .001 1.42 
Knives: V1t1 – V1t2 0.64 = .53 0.07 
Other: V1t1 – V1t2 -8.95 < .001 1.12 
    
XRT training group t(96) p d 
Guns: V2t1 – V2t2 -6.03 < .001 0.70 
IEDs: V2t1 – V2t2 -11.45 < .001 1.43 
Knives: V2t1 – V2t2 -2.53 < .05 0.31 
Other: V2t1 – V2t2 -6.17 < .001 0.84 
    
Control group t(111) p d 
Guns: V1t1 – V1t2 -0.21 = .84 0.02 
IEDs: V1t1 – V1t2 -0.76 = .45 0.08 
Knives: V1t1 – V1t2 -0.66 = .51 0.07 
Other: V1t1 – V1t2 -1.26 = .21 0.13 
Guns: V2t1 – V2t2 -0.67 = .50 0.09 
IEDs: V2t1 – V2t2 0.71 = .48 0.07 
Knives: V2t1 – V2t2 1.65 = .10 0.19 
Other: V2t1 – V2t2 0.64 = .53 0.07 
 
In summary, a large and significant training effect was found for the group who 
trained with XRT for three and six months compared to the control group who used 
another CBT for the same time. A significant training effect has been observed for all 
four threat categories (guns, knives, IEDs and other), whereas the extent of the 
effect varied between categories. A large transfer of the acquired knowledge about 
the visual appearance of trained objects (set A) to untrained but similar looking 
objects (set B) was found for the XRT training group but not for the control group. 
This means that training with XRT helped screeners to detect other prohibited items 
which were not part of the training. Substantial effects of viewpoint effect could be 
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observed, i.e. unusual views of prohibited objects were much harder to detect than 
canonical views. 
 
8.4 EXPERIMENT 2 
The main aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the results of Experiment 1 at another 
European airport. In addition, another conventional CBT was used for the control 
group. Thus it could be investigated whether conventional CBTs differ from each 
other regarding training effectiveness compared to XRT. 
8.4.1 Method 
8.4.1.1 Participants 
163 airport security screeners of another mid-size European airport participated in 
Experiment 2. All screeners conducted the X-Ray CAT 1.0.0 three times with an 
interval of three months between the measurements. The adaptive CBT group (XRT 
group) consisted of 84 screeners who conducted weekly recurrent CBT using X-Ray 
Tutor (XRT) CBS 2.0 Standard Edition between all three test measurements. The 
control group consisted of 79 screeners and they used another conventional CBT 
than the control group of Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, according to the security 
organization and their Appropriate Authority, airport security screeners of both 
groups conducted about 20 min CBT per week. Analysis of XRT training use showed 
that on average, each screener trained 20.92 minutes (SD = 2.87) per week. 
8.4.1.2 Material and Procedure 
Materials and procedure in Experiment 2 were the same as in Experiment 1. Again, 
all screeners took the X-Ray CAT at the beginning and after three and six months of 
CBT. The only difference was the conventional CBT for the control group, which was 
another one than in Experiment 1. As well this CBT is used at many airports 
worldwide. As the conventional CBT used in Experiment 1, this CBT has a much 
smaller threat image library than XRT and threat objects are not displayed in many 
different view. As well this CBT includes no individually adaptive trainings algorithm 
and there is a fixed combination of threat items in bags. 
 
8.4.2 Results and Discussion 
This section is structured the same way as in Experiment 1. Figure 6.10 shows the 
detection performance d’ for both groups and all three test measurements. As in 
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Experiment 1, individual d´ scores were subjected to repeated measures ANOVA with 
the within-participant factor measurement (first, second and third) and the between-
participant factor group (XRT training group and control group). Again, there were 
large main effects of measurement η2 = .50, F(2, 322) = 163.52, p < .001, group, 
η2 = .26, F(1, 161) = 56.34, p < .001, and a significant interaction of measurement 
and group η2 = .33, F(2, 322) = 78.40, p < .001. The large interaction is consistent 
with Figure 6.10 showing a much larger performance increase as a result of training 
for the XRT training group when compared to the control group. This was confirmed 
by independent samples t-tests. There was no significant difference between both 
groups for the first measurement t(161) = -.22, p = .83, d = 0.03, but a highly 
significant difference already in the second measurement t(161) = 6.66, p < .001, d 
= 1.05 after three months of training. As in Experiment 1, additional paired-samples 
t-tests revealed significant differences for the XRT training group between all 
measurements. In contrast to Experiment 1, there were also significant differences 
for the control group between the first and second measurement, although not 
between the second and third measurement (see Table 4.6). Thus, the conventional 
CBT used in Experiment 2 did also result in increased detection performance 
although substantially less than XRT. 
 
Figure 6.10. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
group comparing first, second and third measurement. 
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Table 4.6 
Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of first (t1), second (t2) 
and third (t3) measurement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11 shows the detection performance of both screener groups broken up by 
prohibited item category and the three test measurements. Again, a clear effect of 
training on the detection performance can be seen for the XRT training group with 
the largest increase after the first three months of training. However, also the control 
group shows a slight increase in detection performance at least for the second 
measurement. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) with threat category as additional 
within-participant factor showed significant main effects and significant interactions 
(for details see Table 4.7a). The results are comparable to those in Experiment 1.  
 t(83) p d 
XRT Training Group (t1 – t2) -12.21 < .001 1.57 
XRT Training Group (t2 – t3) -7.07 < .001 0.65 
 t(78) p d 
Control Group (t1 – t2) -3.67 < .001 0.36 
Control Group (t2 – t3) -0.91 = .37 0.07 
Figure 6.11. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
group comparing first, second and third measurement for each threat category separately. 
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Most importantly, detection of guns was best initially, while detection of IEDs was 
much lower. After six months of recurrent adaptive CBT, screeners of the XRT 
training group could detect IEDs even slightly better than guns. This nice replication 
of the results obtained in Experiment 1 clearly shows that IED detection is not 
difficult per se but only a matter of the right training. As mentioned above this 
conclusion can only be made for multi-component IEDs. As in Experiment 1 detection 
of guns was best, followed by knives. Both threat categories contain threat objects 
which are relatively often seen at checkpoints. Again job experience, that is 
comparing X-ray images and the content of passenger bags, seems to have a 
considerably influence on the detection performance. Nevertheless, training improves 
the performance significantly which shows that job experience alone is not enough to 
store all kind of shapes. As shown in Table 4.8, t-tests between the first and second 
measurement revealed significant training effects for the XRT training group for all 
threat categories with large effect sizes (all d > .0.80). In contrast to Experiment 1, 
there were also significant effects for the control group, although with rather low 
effect sizes (all d < 0.56). Thus the conventional CBT used in Experiment 2 also 
resulted in performance increases although much less than XRT. 
 
Table 4.7 
Results of the ANOVAs in Experiment 2 
 Factor df F η2 p 
a) 
Measurement (M) 
Threat Category (T) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
T x G 
M x T 
M x T x G 
2, 322 
3, 483 
1, 161 
2, 322 
3, 483 
6, 966 
6, 966 
160.78 
234.85 
64.98 
78.54 
37.63 
26.24 
16.67 
.50 
.59 
.29 
.33 
.19 
.14 
.09 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
b) 
Measurement (M) 
Set (S) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
M x S 
S x G 
M x S x G 
2, 322 
1, 161 
1, 161 
2,322 
2, 322 
1, 161 
2, 322 
156.12 
58.45 
56.03 
82.16 
8.88 
31.37 
15.52 
.49 
.27 
.26 
.34 
.05 
.16 
.09 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
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 Factor df F η2 p 
c) 
Measurement (M) 
Set (S) 
Threat Category (T) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
M x T 
M x S 
S x G 
S x T 
T x G 
M x T x G 
M x S x G 
M x S x T 
S x T x G 
M x S x T x G 
2, 322 
1, 161 
3, 483 
1, 161 
2, 322 
6, 966 
2, 322 
1, 161 
3, 483 
3, 483 
6, 966 
2, 322 
6, 966 
3, 483 
6, 966 
162.28 
41.88 
231.83 
71.93 
84.18 
27.50 
11.42 
36.23 
33.59 
40.15 
16.87 
10.09 
1.48 
3.69 
2.64 
.50 
.21 
.59 
.31 
.34 
.15 
.07 
.18 
.17 
.20 
.10 
.06 
.01 
.02 
.02 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
= .18 
< .05 
< .05 
d) 
Measurement (M) 
View (V) 
Threat Category (T) 
Group (G) 
M x G 
M x T 
M x V 
V x G 
V x T 
T x G 
M x T x G 
M x V x G 
M x V x T 
V x T x G 
M x V x T x G 
2, 322 
1, 161 
3, 483 
1, 161 
2, 322 
6, 966 
2, 322 
1, 161 
3, 483 
3, 483 
6, 966 
2, 322 
6, 966 
3, 483 
6, 966 
152.62 
1849.85 
216.74 
70.32 
80.05 
26.57 
2.99 
0.62 
288.98 
34.91 
14.95 
1.21 
2.82 
1.69 
1.89 
.49 
.92 
.57 
.30 
.33 
.14 
.02 
.00 
.64 
.18 
.09 
.01 
.02 
.01 
.01 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
= .05 
= .43 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
= .30 
< .05 
= .17 
= .08 
 
 
 
 
114/161 
 
Table 4.8 
Results of the t-tests comparing the categories between first (t1), second (t2) and 
third (t3) measurement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By an ANOVA with measurement and set as within-participant factors and group as 
between-participant factor, we investigated if training effects can also be shown for 
threat objects which were not included in the training sessions. There were main 
effects and interactions for all factors showing similar results as in Experiment 1 (see 
Table 4.7b for details). As in Experiment 1, a large transfer effect was found (see 
Figure 6.12). Not only for the prohibited items of set A, which were included in the 
training library of XRT, but also for the untrained prohibited objects of set B, 
screeners of the XRT training group showed a large increase in detection 
performance after training. Paired-samples t-tests between the first and second 
measurement showed training effects for both sets and also for both groups whereas 
again large effect sizes were found for the XRT training group and small effect sizes 
XRT training group t df p d 
Guns t1 – t2 -6.01 83 < .001 0.86 
IEDs t1 – t2 -12.84 83 < .001 1.74 
Knives t1 – t2 -5.81 83 < .001 0.80 
Other t1 – t2 -12.30 83 < .001 1.64 
     
Guns t1 – t3 -8.19 83 < .001 1.15 
IEDs t1 – t3 -20.22 83 < .001 2.70 
Knives t1 – t3 -10.97 83 < .001 1.48 
Other t1 – t3 -16.46 83 < .001 2.18 
     
Control group t df p d 
Guns t1 – t2 -2.19 78 < .05 0.23 
IEDs t1 – t2 -3.60 78 < .01 0.42 
Knives t1 – t2 -2.73 78 < .01 0.33 
Other t1 – t2 -1.46 78 < .15 0.18 
     
Guns t1 – t3 -2.72 78 < .01 0.34 
IEDs t1 – t3 -4.61 78 < .001 0.56 
Knives t1 – t3 -2.05 78 < .05 0.23 
Other t1 – t3 -2.59 78 < .05 0.30 
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for the control group (trained group set A: t(83) = - 13.10, p < .001, d = 1.77 and 
set B: t(83) = - 9.53, p < .001, d = 1.24, control group set A: t(78) = -2.32, p < 
.05, d = 0.24 and set B: t(78) = - 3.00, p < .01, d = 0.32). Pairwise t-tests showed 
no significant difference in the difficulty of set A and Set B for both groups at the first 
measurement (XRT training group: t(83) = 1.16, p = .25, d = 0.10, control group: 
t(78) = 1.93, p = .06, d = 0.19). 
Figure 6.13 includes also the threat category in the analysis. Paired samples t-tests 
were calculated in order to investigate if the training effect between the first and 
second measurement was significant for each category in both sets for the XRT 
training group. Results revealed significant effects for all categories in each set (p < 
.01, d = 0.51 for knives in Set B, p < .001, d > 0.74 for all other categories). Thus, 
as in Experiment 1, XRT resulted in large detection performance increases even for 
prohibited objects that are not part of the XRT image library (X-Ray CAT image set 
B). For the control group the difference between the first and third measurement was 
calculated in order to maximize the chances for finding a significant training effect. 
The following t-tests were significant: IEDs for both sets, knives only for set A, and 
other threat objects for both sets (p <.05, d > 0.23). All other values were not 
significant (p > .06, d < 0.28) and reveal no effect of training between the different 
measurements. 
Figure 6.12. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
group comparing first, second and third measurement for set A and set B separately. 
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As in Experiment 1, individual d´ scores were subjected to an extended ANOVA with 
the within-participant factors measurement, X-Ray CAT image set, threat category 
and the between-participants factor group. All main effects and interactions were 
significant except the interaction between measurement, set and threat category 
(see Table 4.7c for details). In contrast to Experiment 1 the ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of set and significant interactions with set. However, as can be seen in Figure 
6.13 they were rather small, which implies large transfer effects. As in Experiment 1 
the results clearly show a training effect for each category and in both sets. This is 
consistent with the results of the t-tests explained above. The training effect that 
was found for the control group revealed itself also in the sets, that is, there was a 
transfer effect for the control group, too. 
Last, the effect of viewpoint was investigated calculating a four-way ANOVA. Results 
show clear main effects of measurement, view, threat category and group. For 
details on interactions please refer to Table 4.7d. As illustrated in Figure 6.14, the 
detection performance is clearly much higher for objects that are shown in the easy 
view (View 1) than for the objects that are shown from an unusual viewpoint (View 
2). This effect is valid for all threat categories and for the XRT training group as well 
as for the control group. However, the viewpoint effect is not the same for different 
Figure 6.13. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
group comparing first, second and third measurement for set A and set B and each threat category 
separately. 
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threat categories. The graphs in Figure 6.14 suggest that the largest viewpoint effect 
can be observed for the detection of knives, the smallest one for IEDs. 
As in Experiment 1, pairwise t-tests showed a significant increase in detection 
performance at the second measurement for both views for the XRT training group 
for all four threat categories (p < .01, d > 0.49. For the easy view, the control group 
showed a significant effect for IEDs only (p < .05, d = 0.32), all other t-tests were 
not significant (p > .07, d < 0.25). For the difficult view all t-test with one exception 
were significant for the control group (p < .05, d > 0.26). Only the training effect of 
knives in the rotated view was not significant p = .07, d = 0.24 (see Table 4.9 for 
details). But the results show that although some significant effects in the control 
group were observed, effect sizes were small compared to those of the XRT training 
group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.14. Detection performance with standard deviations for the XRT training group vs. the control 
group comparing first, second and third measurement for both views and each threat category 
separately. 
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Table 4.9 
Results of the t-tests comparing the detection performance of the four categories for 
easy view (V1) and difficult view (V2) between the first (t1) and second (t2) 
measurement 
 
XRT training group t(83) p d 
Guns: V1t1 – V1t2 -3.59 < .01 0.49 
IEDs: V1t1 – V1t2 -10.93 < .001 1.51 
Knives: V1t1 – V1t2 -4.35 < .001 0.48 
Other: V1t1 – V1t2 -9.79 < .001 1.42 
Guns: V2t1 – V2t2 -5.46 < .001 0.82 
IEDs: V2t1 – V2t2 -9.99 < .001 1.45 
Knives: V2t1 – V2t2 -5.79 < .001 0.88 
Other: V2t1 – V2t2 -10.33 < .001 1.40 
    
Control group t(78) p d 
Guns: V1t1 – V1t2 -1.07 = .29 0.13 
IEDs: V1t1 – V1t2 -2.64 < .05 0.32 
Knives: V1t1 – V1t2 -1.87 = .07 0.25 
Other: V1t1 – V1t2 -0.05 =.96 0.01 
Guns: V2t1 – V2t2 -2.35 < .05 0.26 
IEDs: V2t1 – V2t2 -3.24 < .01 0.41 
Knives: V2t1 – V2t2 -1.81 = .07 0.24 
Other: V2t1 – V2t2 -2.11 < .05 0.28 
 
 
In summary, very similar results as in Experiment 1 have been found in Experiment 
2. A large and significant training effect was observed for the group who trained with 
XRT compared to a control group who used a conventional CBT for the same time. A 
significant training effect has been observed for all four categories (guns, knives, 
IEDs and other) for the XRT training group, whereas the effect size varied between 
categories. Also a large transfer of the acquired knowledge about the visual 
appearance of trained objects (set A) to untrained but similar looking objects (set B) 
was found for the XRT training group. Additionally a viewpoint effect could be 
observed which shows that unusual views of forbidden objects are much harder to 
detect than canonical views. In contrast to Experiment 1, the control group also 
showed increases of detection performance, which implies that the conventional CBT 
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used in Experiment 2 is more effective than the one used in Experiment 1. Moreover, 
there was also a transfer effect for the control group. 
 
8.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The first aim of this study was to investigate how well airport security screeners can 
detect guns, knives, IEDs and other prohibited items in X-ray images of passenger 
bags. Two experiments conducted at two European airports provided very similar 
results. A computer-based test (X-Ray CAT) was conducted before and after three 
and six months of weekly (about 20 min per screener) CBT at each airport. The first 
measurement revealed that guns were detected best, followed by knives, other 
prohibited items and IEDs. This result implies that job experience has already an 
effect on the detection of threat items. Threat objects like guns and knives which are 
relatively often taken along by passengers and therefore more often seen at 
checkpoints are detected better than IEDs which are normally not seen on the job. 
Nevertheless, the effect of job experience is quite small compared to a trainings 
effect which can be achieved with an individually adaptive CBT. In both experiments 
and airports, one group used an adaptive CBT (XRT) with individually adaptive 
algorithms, a large library of prohibited items depicted in a variety of different views, 
and automatically created prohibited item to bag combinations. The other group used 
a conventional CBT system with no adaptive algorithms, a smaller image library, and 
fixed combinations of threat items in bags. While XRT was used in both experiments 
and airports, two different conventional CBT systems were used for the control 
groups of Experiment 1 (airport 1) and Experiment 2 (airport 2). At both airports, 
XRT training group results revealed a training effect for all types of threat objects 
(guns, knives, IEDs, and other prohibited items). However, effect sizes differed 
remarkably for the four categories. While guns were detected best and IEDs were 
detected worst at the beginning, IED detection of the XRT training group was as 
good, or even slightly better, than gun detection after several months of training. 
This shows that the detection of IEDs is not difficult per se, but rather depending on 
the training of screeners. However, all IEDs used in this study contained a detonator, 
wires, explosive, a triggering device and a power source. Therefore, these 
conclusions are only applicable to the detection of such multi-component IEDs. A 
large training effect for IEDs can be expected because they are usually not 
encountered at airport security checkpoints and therefore not known to screeners 
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without enhanced training in IED detection. In a study with hold baggage screeners, 
large training effects for IEDs were also found, which is very consistent with results 
of this study (Schwaninger & Hofer, 2004). The relatively large training effect for the 
category “other” which includes self defense gas spray, electric shock devices etc. 
might be also explained by less on the job exposure of these prohibited items. In 
contrast to IEDs and other prohibited items, guns seem to be well known by 
screeners either because of their typical shape or the frequency by which they are 
encountered at the airport security screening checkpoint (e.g. toy guns). Therefore, 
detection performance before training is already high for guns and a large 
improvement is impossible. It is also noticeable that detection for knives showed the 
smallest training effect in both experiments. Although the detection was at the 
baseline measurement higher than for IEDs and other prohibited items, after six 
months of training screeners’ performance was poorest for knives. On average, 
knives are smaller than IEDs and other threat items and show less diagnostic 
features. This might be a reason for the lower detection performance increase for 
this threat category. 
While training with XRT resulted in large training effects, the tested conventional CBT 
systems were less effective. In Experiment 1, there were no training effects at all, 
while only small training effects were observed for the conventional CBT system used 
in Experiment 2. This could be due to one or a combination of the following reasons: 
First, the conventional CBT systems tested in this study do not feature individually 
adaptive training algorithms like XRT. Second, in contrast to XRT, the conventional 
CBT systems did not contain such a large image library with many prohibited items 
depicted from a variety of different viewpoints, especially IEDs. Third, while in XRT 
prohibited items are blended into X-ray images of passenger bags on the fly using 
scientifically validated and individually adaptive algorithms based on image 
measurement as described in Schwaninger et al. (2007), the conventional CBT 
systems used in Experiment 1 and 2 have only fixed combinations of prohibited 
items in bags. Finally, we had to rely on the statement of the appropriate authority 
and the security companies regarding the amount of training that was conducted by 
screeners of the control group and the XRT training group, which should have been 
on average 20 min per week per screener. Analysis of XRT training data showed, that 
this was clearly fulfilled for screeners of the XRT training group at both airports. 
Since the X-Ray CAT is composed of two comparable (similar looking) sets (set A and 
set B) whereof only the threat objects of set A were included into the XRT training 
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system, transfer effects can be tested, i.e. whether training with certain prohibited 
items helps increasing detection of other prohibited items that are not contained in 
the training. Overall, the comparison of the two sets A and B at the baseline 
measurement (before training) shows no significant difference. However, in 
Experiment 1 there was a slight difference for the control group between the two 
sets indicating that the two sets are not exactly equal in terms of image difficulty for 
this sample. But this possible objection to the transfer effect can be disapproved with 
two arguments: first, the effect size was only small according to the conventions by 
Cohen (1988) and second, only one of the two control groups showed a significant 
difference. Therefore, the transfer effect in the results of the XRT training group can 
be attributed to the training of set A only. The small training effect for the control 
group in Experiment 2 is also reflected in the detection increase of both sets after 
training. Although the conventional CBT system of this control group did not contain 
any objects from the test, the training with this training system apparently also leds 
to a transfer of the knowledge to the objects in the test. In another study it would be 
interesting to compare the objects that are comprised in the two training systems 
used by the control groups regarding their similarity to the test objects. Contrary to 
our results, Smith, Redford, Gent and Washburn (2005) found a large decrease in 
screeners’ detection performance when specific trained objects were replaced with 
new images belonging to the same categories (see also Smith, Redford, Washburn, & 
Taglialatela, 2005). According to these authors, improvement in screening 
performance is attributable only to specific-token familiarity that developed for the 
original images and not to a category generalization. They state constraints on 
categorization and the use of category-general information when humans face visual 
complexity and have to identify targets within it. Our results can be interpreted in 
support of generalization of visual learning in X-ray image interpretation. However, it 
might be possible that the objects of the untrained set in our study are so similar to 
the trained objects that a specific-token familiarity led to the detection performance 
increase and not a true generalization effect. The lacking transfer effect in knives 
would along these lines mean that the objects in set A and set B are not similar 
enough in shape to generate a specific-token familiarity. Therefore only the learnt 
objects could generate a training effect but not the unlearnt ones. For Schwaninger 
and Hofer’s (2004) findings of a large increase in detection performance of IEDs after 
recurrent CBT with other members of the category than those included in the test, it 
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would mean, that those objects were very similar in order to create a specific-token 
familiarity and therefore a training effect. 
In both Experiments a large viewpoint effect was also revealed. This is consistent 
with view-based theories of object recognition (for reviews see for example Tarr & 
Bülthoff, 1995a, 1998; Graf et al., 2002; Hayward, 2003). After training, easy and 
difficult views were recognized much better. Interestingly, there was no significant 
interaction between measurement and viewpoint, i.e. although training resulted in 
improved performance for difficult views, the viewpoint effect (impairment for 
unusual vs. canonical views) remained stable even after six months of training. 
However, it must be pointed out that the XRT training algorithm only provides the 
screeners with unusual views of objects once a screener can detect a prohibited item 
well when depicted from easy perspective. That is, when screeners start to train with 
XRT all threat objects are shown in easy views. Only if these objects are detected 
reliably, the difficulty level is increased for a certain threat item by showing it in 
more difficult views (Schwaninger, 2004b). Thus, it is unclear whether a significant 
interaction between viewpoint and measurement would have been observed if the 
training duration would have been increased (e.g. to one year). The conclusion 
stands to reason that recognition of forbidden objects in X-ray images is dependent 
on exposure which has very important implications for an adaptive training system. 
It has been assumed that different views of each object become associated with one 
another during object rotation, either through active learning or through passive 
experiencing of the successive appearance of nearby views (Földiák, 1991; Stryker, 
1991). Hence, it is important that during training screeners are getting feedback 
which forbidden object has been detected or missed. This feedback shows the 
photograph and also the X-ray image of that forbidden object always in the canonical 
view whereas the forbidden object merged into a bag is presented in different 
viewpoints. This leads to an association between an unusual view of an object and 
the canonical view which results in a sequential pairing of these views with each 
other (Wang, Obama, Yamashita, Sugihara, & Tanaka, 2005). This association, which 
forms during learning, is thought to underlie object recognition ability across changes 
in viewing angle (Palmeri & Gauthier, 2004). 
For our future studies, it could also be interesting to increase the interval between 
the end of training and the testing of training transfer, as corresponding literature 
usually tests transfer of training after a considerable period of time in order to 
measure the stability of the transfer (e.g., Saks & Belcourt, 2006). In any case, our 
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findings show that the knowledge about the visual appearance of forbidden objects, 
which airport security screeners acquire during recurrent CBT, can be transferred to 
similar looking, but not previously seen objects and also the effect that rotated views 
are much harder to detect can be decrease with training. To make sure that objects 
are well detected it is important that a large and representative image library of 
prohibited objects is used and that these objects are learned from different 
viewpoints. Additionally the library should be updated constantly to adapt to new 
threats. Overall, this study has shown that adaptive CBT can be a powerful tool to 
increase screeners’ X-ray image interpretation competency in an efficient and 
effective way. 
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PART III                                                                   
AGE-EFFECTS IN AVIATION SECURITY SCREENING 
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9. USE IT AND STILL LOSE IT: THE INFLUENCE OF AGE AND 
JOB EXPERIENCE ON DETECTION PERFORMANCE IN X-RAY 
SCREENING  
 
9.1 ABSTRACT 
In recent years, research on cognitive aging increasingly focuses on cognitive 
development across middle adulthood. However, still little is known about the 
longterm effects of intensive job-specific training of fluid intellectual abilities.  We 
examined the effects of age and job-specific practice of cognitive abilities on 
detection performance in airport X-ray security screening. In experiment 1 (N = 308; 
24-65 years), we examined performance in the X-Ray Object Recognition Test, a 
speeded visual detection task in which participants have to find threat items in X-ray 
images of passenger bags. In experiment 2 (N = 155; 20-61 years) object 
recognition that was closer to the practical task of baggage screening was evaluated. 
Results from both experiments show high performance in older adults and significant 
negative age correlations that cannot be overcome by more years of job-specific 
training. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of lifespan cognitive 
development and training concepts21.  
 
9.2 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, cognitive aging research is increasing its focus on the effects of 
midlife development on developmental changes in old age. Part of the renewed 
interest in midlife development were longitudinal results from representative 
population samples suggesting cognitive performance to be differentially variable and 
showing little covariation between changes across domains of cognitive functioning 
(Martin & Zimprich, 2005). However, whereas changes in experience-related 
knowledge seem to be small across middle age, fluid abilities demonstrate average 
declines from the ages of 30 onward (e.g., Schaie, 2005). These average declines 
might be due to the variability in job-induced stimulation of fluid abilities across 
individuals within representative population samples and the typically low 
                                                 
21 I gratefully acknowledge the help of Mike Martin and Adrian Schwaninger in preparing the manuscript. I 
thank Judith Riegelnig for providing the data of this study. 
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experimental control over job-related cognitive stimulation in representative 
samples. Therefore, an examination of the effects of job-related stimulation of fluid 
abilities in aviation security screening was examined.  
X-ray screening of passenger bags is a highly demanding task which includes both, 
experience related knowledge and fluid abilities. Schwaninger et al. (2005) defined 
knowledge-based and image-based factors to be important in the X-ray screening 
task. Screeners need to know which items are prohibited and what they look like in 
X-ray images. Such knowledge-based factors are related to the memory component 
of visual object recognition and depend strongly on training (Schwaninger & Hofer, 
2004). Image-based factors include the effects of superposition and viewpoint of the 
threat item, as well as bag complexity (Schwaninger et al. 2005; see Figure 1.3). 
Threat objects are more difficult to recognize when superimposed by other objects 
(effect of superposition) or when depicted from a difficult viewpoint (effect of 
viewpoint). Furthermore, it is more difficult to detect a threat item in a close-packed 
bag as other objects in the bag distract attention (effect of bag complexity). These 
factors are more related to abilities of visual and spatial cognition. Thus, processes 
such as visual search, spatial imagination, working memory, attention and perception 
which are associated with an age-related decline should be important determinants 
in X-ray screening performance, and older adults should show lower performance 
compared to younger adults.  
Previous findings on visual search and aging could show that older people perform 
slower and less accurate to locate targets than younger ones as the number of 
distractors increases (Humphrey & Kramer, 1997; Kramer & Atchley, 2000). In 
addition, older adults make more eye movements and tend to fixate areas for a 
longer time (Scialfa, Thomas, & Joffe, 1994). Laberge and Scialfa (2005) even 
assumed that the tendency to examine areas repeatedly reflect age-related declines 
in visual working memory. The influence of aging on spatial imagination or mental 
rotation tasks have been investigated in many research studies (e.g., Berg, Hertzog, 
& Hunt, 1982; Campos, Pérez-Fabello, & Gómez-Juncal, 2004; Dror & Kosslyn, 
1994). Applying a spatio-visual capacity test, Campos et al. (2004) could show that 
imagining and conceiving objects in three dimensions is affected by aging. Likewise, 
Dror and Kosslyn (1994) found a relatively impaired image rotation of the elderly. 
Furthermore, they reported a decrease of image activation with aging, i.e., the 
process of accessing and activating visual memories. This image activation process 
can be supposed to be rather important in the X-ray image interpretation task. In 
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addition, spatial cognition tasks are often related to endogenous sex steroids, in 
particular testosterone and estradiol. Janowsky, Oviatt, and Orwoll (1994) reported 
better performance in a spatial cognition task when elderly people had received an 
androgen supplementation. Also Hampson (1995) reviewed some recent evidence 
suggesting that testosterone treatment is often associated with significant 
improvement in spatial cognition. As androgen level changes across the lifespan, age 
can impair spatial cognition. Note however, that evidence for a beneficial effect of 
higher androgen levels on cognition in older men could not be found by Wolf and 
Kirschbaum (2002). Overall, findings on age differences in abilities related to visual 
screening tasks suggest age differences with lower screening performance in old 
versus young adults.  
In a demanding task such as X-ray screening, working memory and attention could 
play an important role. During rush hours at larger airports, the decision whether a 
bag is OK (contains no threat item) or NOT OK (contains a threat item) has to be 
made within 3-5 seconds. Working memory is described as the central executive that 
processes information at a conscious level (Baddeley, 1986). Various studies 
reported a decrease of working memory capacity with aging (Cherry & Park, 1993; 
Salthouse & Babcock, 1991). Furthermore, screeners have to be constantly vigilant 
which requires sustained attention across time. Results concerning the relationship 
between aging and sustained attention are not consistent (for an overview see Roger 
& Fisk, 2001). However, Deaton and Parasuraman (1993) found lower performance 
for vigilance tasks with a cognitive component, such as identification or decision 
about an item. There is also evidence that aging has a negative influence on 
perception as age-related changes of eye structures lead to decrease in sharpness 
and brightness of visual stimuli (Cabeza, 2001). Furthermore, deficits in color 
sensitivity due to the loss of photoreceptors were reported (Fozard & Gordon-Salant, 
2001). The decrease of receptors also influences visual processing in the periphery. 
An eye tracking study revealed a repeating search in the same location of elderly 
people compared to younger ones (Scialfa et al., 1994). 
Although aging seems to affect cognitive processes, there is some evidence that 
older adults might be able to compensate for their cognitive deficits using their 
working experience adopting more efficient strategies (Zec, 1995). In addition, one 
may assume that extensive practice with a task as is the case with experienced 
screeners having trained the task on the job for hundreds and thousands of hours 
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over many years should improve performance in all age groups (e.g., Kliegl, Smith, 
& Baltes, 1989; Maguire, Gadian, & Johnsrude, 2000). 
In this study the effects of job-related stimulation of fluid abilities in airport security 
screeners exposed to extensive amounts of speeded visual search and detection 
tasks was examined. This was designed to answer four questions: First, are critical 
levels of detection performance achieved across an age range from 20-65 years of 
age. We expect that despite potential age effects, all age groups reach a high and 
critical level of performance. Second, do age-related differences in job-specific fluid 
performance exist when persons are practiced in that ability and may use any 
strategy available in the workplace to maximize their performance. Based on findings 
of age-related declines in fluid abilities across middle age, age differences in 
screening performance are expected. However, if on-the-job practice of the required 
skills may compensate for these declines, then no age effects are expected. Third, do 
older workers profit more from job experience than younger workers. It may be the 
case that practicing screening skills is more important for screening performance in 
old versus young age, because of the importance of practice to overcome deficits in 
underlying abilities that are at peak in younger ages. Fourth, one may argue that in 
reality threat items occur rather seldom and that, therefore, larger amounts of 
practical experience of the older screener could not be used. Therefore, it was 
investigated if age effects differ depending on the task demands, i.e., when a 
frequent decision about the threat potential of an item versus the rare detection of a 
threat event are required.  
 
9.3 EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 examined whether fluid abilities which are needed in X-ray screening 
tasks decline across an age range form 20 to 65 years and whether detection 
performance of experienced aviation security screeners is on a higher level than 
performance of novices. The influence of age on detection performance in an X-ray 
screening test as a speeded visual search and detection task was investigated. 
Additionally, a correlation should show if experience and practice might compensate 
a negative effect of aging and whether detection performance increases with more 
working experience. 
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9.3.1 Method 
9.3.1.1 Participants 
In Experiment 1, a total of 308 cabin baggage screening (CBS) screeners between 24 
and 65 years of age (M = 50.28, SD = 9.43) working more than an average of 30 
percent for at least 2.6 years (M  = 10.38, SD = 5.56) participated in this study. 
Screeners who did not differ in job-related knowledge performed the X-Ray Object 
Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT), a speeded visual task in which participants have to 
decide for 256 images if it contains a threat item or not. An outlier analysis was 
performed and values higher or lower than two standard deviations from the mean 
were excluded, that is 17 screeners. 
9.3.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
For Experiment 1, a computer-based X-ray screening test, the X-Ray ORT was used 
(Hardmeier et al., 2005). The test was conducted in a well lit computer classroom 
with ten HP Compaq d530 CMT computers using the PCQuest software. The X-ray 
images were presented on full screen size at a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels on a 
17-inch TFT monitor. Brightness and contrast settings on each screen were set to 65 
and 40, respectively.  
The X-Ray ORT requires subjects to recognize guns and knives in passenger bags. It 
starts with a self-explanatory instruction including some exercise trials to familiarize 
the participants with the test taking procedure. After each image which is displayed 
for 4 seconds on the screen, screeners have to decide whether the bag is OK (no gun 
or knife in it) or NOT OK (a gun or knife in it). In addition, they have to indicate how 
sure they are in their decision clicking on a 90 point rating scale. The test takes 
about 45 minutes to complete. Varying bag complexity, superposition and the 
rotation of the threat item systematically, the X-Ray ORT measures visual abilities 
needed to cope with image-based factors in X-ray screening. Therefore, eight guns 
and eight knives are twice displayed in an easy and rotated view in bags with low 
and high complexity level. Half of the threat items are shown with little and half of 
them with high superposition. (for details see Hardmeier et al., 2005; Schwaninger 
et al., 2005). The test includes a total of 256 X-ray images in grayscale, half of them 
contain either a gun or a knife, and the other 128 images are harmless bags. The 
test is subdivided into four blocks, the order of blocks is counterbalanced across 
participants, and the order of trials within a block is random.  
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Reliability and validity measures of the X-Ray ORT were calculated based on 453 
screeners (Cronbach Alpha measures > .89 and split half reliabilities > .78). 
Criterion-related validity was calculated correlating test results in the X-Ray ORT with 
Threat Image Projection (TIP) data. TIP data allows to measure on the job 
performance by displaying fictional threat items into real passenger bags (for more 
information about TIP data please see Experiment 2). Correlation of r = .51, p < .01 
suggests that image-based factors measured by the X-Ray ORT are indeed important 
determinants of on the job performance in X-ray screening. For more details on 
reliability and validity see Hardmeier et al. (2005). 
 
9.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Detection performance in the X-Ray ORT was calculated using the detection 
performance measure d’ (Green & Sweets, 1966). To avoid that a screener could 
reach a high hit rate by simply judging all bags as NOT OK d’ takes into account the 
hit rate and the false alarm rate. According to the signal detection theory there are 
four possible outcomes depending on the presence of a threat item and the decision 
of the screener (see Figure 7.1). Judging a threat image as NOT OK results in a hit 
whereas judging a harmless bag as 
NOT OK results in a false alarm. 
Furthermore, judging a threat image as 
OK results in a miss and judging a 
harmless bag as OK results in a correct 
rejection. Hence, a good screener 
would detect nearly all threat items in 
passenger bags (high hit rate) and 
hardly ever send harmless bags to be hand-searched (low false alarm rate). D’ is 
calculated by the formula z(hit) – z(false alarm). Furthermore, the detection 
performance measure d’ is independent of the criterion. That is, if a screener is more 
anxious to miss an object, he judges more bags as NOT OK and thus both, the hit 
and false alarm rate increases.  
Correct 
RejectionMiss
Decision 
bag OK
False AlarmHITDecision bag NOT OK
No threat itemThreat item
Figure 7.1. Four possible answers when judging an 
x-ray image. 
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To make sure that critical levels of detection performance were achieved across an 
age range from 20-65 years of age, detection performance between experts and 
novices was compared (see Figure 7.2). Novices were 284 job applicants between 19 
and 56 years (M = 38.61, 
SD = 10.14) who took the 
X-Ray ORT within the pre-
employment assessment 
procedure. An analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) revealed 
a significant difference 
between these two groups 
η2 = .28, F(1, 590) = 
230.24, p < .01. This result 
is also consistent with 
previous findings which 
showed that detection 
performance of aviation security screeners in the X-Ray ORT is on a higher level than 
those of novices (Schwaninger et al, 2005).  
As expected, a partial correlation between detection performance d’ and age of 
screeners controlling for years since employment showed a significant negative 
correlation between age and results in the X-Ray ORT (pr = -.27, p < .01). Figure 
7.3 shows the correlation between d’ and age in years. Results provide evidence that 
age-related differences in job-
specific fluid performance even 
exist in when persons are 
practiced in that ability and may 
use any strategy available to 
maximize their performance. 
Thus on average, in the X-ray 
screening test, older screeners 
had a lower detection 
performance than younger ones 
which can be most probably 
related to several visual and 
cognitive functions which decline 
Figure 7.2. Detection performance d’ of experts and novices in 
the X-Ray ORT for four age categories. 
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Figure 7.3. Correlation between detection performance (d’) 
and age for cabin baggage screener. 
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with age. A partial correlation between d’ in the X-Ray ORT and years since 
employment with age as control variable was also calculated. Result of pr = -.04, p = 
.48 indicates that detection performance in the X-Ray ORT can not be increased by 
on the job practice or experience and thus older screeners who are generally more 
experienced than their younger colleagues cannot profit more from practice on the 
job.  
 
9.4 EXPERIMENT 2 
As could be shown in Experiment 1, there is a correlation of age on detection 
performance in the X-Ray ORT, a speeded visual search test. The aim of Experiment 
2 was to replicate the age effect on X-ray screening tasks with another sample of 
screeners and examine whether similar effects can be found when using an on-the-
job measure of X-ray detection performance. Furthermore, it can be investigated if 
age effects differ depending on the task demands, i.e., a frequent decision about the 
threat potential of an item versus the rare detection of a threat event are required. 
To this end, TIP data was used. TIP is a technology of current X-ray equipment that 
allows the projection of fictional X-ray images of threat objects into X-ray images of 
real passenger bags (usually ever 30-100 bags). TIP data thus provide a valid 
measure of on-the-job performance in X-ray screening. Again, a partial correlation 
between detection performance d’ and years since employment should investigate 
whether experience tends to mitigate the effect of aging.  
 
9.4.1 Method 
9.4.1.1 Participants 
In Experiment 2, 155 CBS screeners between 20 and 61 years (M = 37.92, SD = 
10.34) took the X-Ray ORT and detection performance on the job was measured 
using TIP data over one to two years. Again, screeners were working a minimum of 
12 hrs/week for at least 1.61 years (M = 5.98, SD = 3.60) and are comparable in 
job-related knowledge. Again, an outlier analysis was calculated and all values higher 
or lower than two standard deviations from the mean were excluded. Thus, five 
screeners were excluded for the X-Ray ORT and 11 for the TIP data analysis. 
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9.4.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
All aviation security screeners took the X-Ray ORT in a well lit computer classroom. 
The X-ray screening test was run on Priminfo computers using the PCQuest software. 
All X-ray images were presented on full screen size at a resolution of 1024 x 768 
pixels on a 17-inch TFT monitor. Brightness and contrast settings on each screen 
were the same, 100 and 97, respectively.  
In addition, TIP data were evaluated. For CBS screeners, the TIP system displays 
fictional threat items into X-ray images of real passenger bags in random order (1-
3% of all bags). After each TIP image screeners receive a feedback message that a 
fictional threat item was present so that no negative impact on screening operations 
occurs. A standard library based on FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) which is 
available on current TIP systems was used and TIP data were aggregated over a 
period of two years22. 
 
9.4.2 Results and Discussion 
Overall, the results from Experiment 1 could be replicated. A partial correlation 
between detection performance in the X-Ray ORT and age of screeners controlling 
for years since employment was significant pr = -.27, p < .01. Thus, on average 
increased age of aviation security screeners was associated with decreased detection 
performance in the interpretation of X-ray images. Furthermore, Experiment 2 
examined whether the long term correlation between age and detection performance 
can also be shown when measuring performance on the job using TIP. Again, the 
partial correlation between d’ in TIP and age of screeners taking years of 
employment as control variable into account, showed a significant negative effect (pr 
= -.34, p < .01) and indicates that older screeners perform also worse in everyday 
working life when practice on the job is given. Figure 7.4 shows the correlations 
between detection performance d’ and age of screeners in the X-Ray ORT and the 
TIP. The correlation of r = - .18, p < .05 between d’ in the X-Ray ORT and years in 
age already indicates that in this sample experience in the X-Ray ORT could have a 
positive influence on detection performance. 
 
                                                 
22 For CBS TIP data the number of harmless bags have to be estimated using TIP to bag ratio. 
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Partial correlation between d’ and years since employment controlling for age was in 
fact significant in the X-Ray ORT (pr = .35, p < .01), but not for TIP data (pr = .02, 
p = .78). Especially on the job no beneficial effect of experience on detection 
performance could be found. Contrary to the previous result, screeners who are 
employed for a long time seem to profit more from experience in the X-Ray and with 
sufficient amount of practice might be able to achieve similar performance levels as 
young adults. This effect could be due to the different selection procedure of new 
employees at the two airports. 
Overall, the results from Experiment 1 were replicated. Furthermore, analysis of on-
the-job data (TIP) showed clear evidence that the occurrence of threat items does 
not influence detection performance and has therefore neither a beneficial influence 
on performance of older or younger workers. 
 
9.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this study, we investigated the influence of age on X-ray detection performance of 
airport security screeners using two different X-ray screening tasks. Additional 
analyses showed if the age effect could be reduced by means of working experience. 
Overall, the result revealed that increased age was in fact associated with decreased 
detection performance in X-ray screening. There were clear long term correlations 
between d’ in the X-Ray ORT and age. This effect of aging could also be found with 
TIP data, a measure of detection performance on the job. Further analyses on 
correlations between detection performance in X-ray screening and years of 
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Figure 7.4. Correlation between detection performance (d’) in the X-Ray ORT (left) and TIP (right).  
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employment suggest that practice on the job does generally not help to increase 
detection performance in both test conditions.  
Considering detection performance in the X-Ray ORT, a speeded visual search task, 
results from both European airports show clear long term correlations between 
recognizing guns and knives in X-ray images of passenger bags and the age of 
screeners. Furthermore, this age effect could also be shown with TIP data, a more 
realistic task in which all kind of threat items are projected into X-ray images of real 
passenger bags in random order. Taken together, our results suggest stable negative 
age effects in a selective sample of airport security screeners that were not 
overcome by the amount of job experience and extensive job-specific use of speeded 
visual search and detection abilities.  
In general correlations between detection performance and years of employment 
support the assumption that practice on the job does not help to increase 
performance in X-ray screening. However, results regarding the X-Ray ORT were not 
consistent. In Experiment 1 no effect could be found whereas Experiment 2 revealed 
a rather large correlation between the detection of guns and knives in the X-Ray ORT 
and years since employment. This positive correlation could be due to the different 
selection procedures at airports. Since years, at Airport 1 job applicants were 
selected with some basic X-ray images among other tests. As the X-Ray ORT 
measures mainly fluid abilities needed in X-ray screening it could be that due to this 
selection criterion, screeners at Airport 1 were better in the interpretation of X-ray 
images when they got employed compared to screeners of Airport 2 and thus show 
no effect of working experience. Furthermore, this positive effect of working 
experience on X-ray screening could only be shown for the X-Ray ORT. No influence 
of practice on TIP performance could be found.  
Moreover, correlations shown in Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 reveal large interindividual 
differences. In fact, there are screeners over 60 years who perform on a remarkably 
higher level than some screeners that are half their age. The question whether this 
difference between older screeners is due to specific abilities to cope with the image-
based factors or rather a guided, systematic training on the job have to be 
investigated in further studies. As Schwaninger et al. (2005) pointed out, the 
importance of knowledge-based factors in X-ray screening tasks should be taken into 
account. In order to recognize prohibited items in passenger bags, one has to know 
what they look like in X-ray images. The appearance of some objects in X-ray images 
is quite different than in reality (for example a teaser). Furthermore, some objects 
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such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are normally not seen at checkpoints. 
Thus, working experience alone is probably not sufficient to attenuate the age-
related differences in X-ray screening. Previous studies in airport security could show 
that specific individually adaptive computer-based training increases detection of 
threat items in passenger bags (Koller et al., 2008; Schwaninger & Hofer, 2004). To 
this end aviation security screeners did not received specific computer-based 
training, but show a rather high amount of working experience (up to 26 years). 
Whether a specific job-related training can reduce the age effect has to be 
investigated in further studies.  
In general, most of our findings are consistent with earlier findings on age-related 
changes in cognition across middle adulthood. However, this study on age effects in 
airport security provides further insights into area specific applications and 
transferability of research studies into real world conditions. Our result about the 
domain specific age effect is in agreement with previous studies which could show 
that age influences different processes such as visual search, spatial imagination, 
working memory and attention. However, overall our results are not consistent with 
studies showing an experience-related increase in performance. Zec (1995) for 
example reported that experienced individuals adopt more efficient strategies and, 
thus, increase their performance. It could also be assumed that older screeners 
might compensate their deficits with their knowledge, working experience and 
probably working strategy. However, with one exception there were no significant 
partial correlations between detection performance (X-Ray ORT and TIP) and years 
since employment when age was controlled for. Thus, in general aviation security 
screeners cannot compensate their decline in job specific fluid abilities with higher 
working experience. This holds true for both types of tasks examined as detection 
performance in TIP did also not increase with more working experience. However, 
further studies should investigate if older worker can compensate a negative age 
effect through a reflected job experience such as systematic adaptive training 
systems.  
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10. TRAIN IT OR LOSE IT: THE INFLUCENCE OF AGE AND 
TRAINING ON DETECTION PERFORMANCE IN X-RAY 
SCREENING  
 
10.1 ABSTRACT 
X-ray screening of passenger bags is a highly demanding task which requires visual 
cognition abilities and the knowledge about the appearance of threat items in X-ray 
images. A previous study has shown that age of screeners has a negative effect on 
the detection performance in X-ray screening which could not be compensated with 
working experience. As X-ray screening strongly depends on training rather than 
working experience alone, the influence of training compared to working experience 
on both, visual cognition abilities and knowledge in X-ray screening was investigated. 
It was found that the age effect regarding image-based factors remains similar 
before and after two years of training. However, for knowledge-based factors an 
even larger age effect could be found. Learning effects for the detection of all kinds 
of prohibited items and the interaction between the ability to cope with image-based 
factors and the knowledge in X-ray screening were discussed. Further, the question 
whether training would compensate age related declines if older screeners have had 
more training according to their age, have to be investigated in future research 
studies23.  
 
10.2 INTRODUCTION 
Research on cognitive aging has shown a negative relation between age and 
cognitive performance for different tasks. Not only specific processes such as spatial 
imagination and visual search are affected by aging (Dror & Kosslyn, 1994; Campos 
et al., 2004; Humphrey & Kramer, 1997; Kramer & Atchley, 2000; Laberge and 
Scialfa, 2000), but also more general structures and processes used for temporarily 
storing and manipulating information. For example Salthouse and Babcock (1991) as 
well as Cherry and Park (1993) reported a decrease of working memory with aging. 
Further, attention which implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal 
effectively with others is often impaired when people grow older (Roger & Fisk, 
                                                 
23 I gratefully acknowledge the help of Mike Martin and Adrian Schwaninger in designing the study. 
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2001). A negative effect of age was also found in the field of aviation security for the 
X-ray screening task. Schwaninger, Hardmeier, Riegelnig, and Martin (in 
preparation) revealed a rather large age effect for the detection of threat items in X-
ray images of passenger bags. These declines could be attributed to the required 
visual cognition processes in X-ray screening. A screener has to recognize prohibited 
items regardless of high bag complexity, superposition and rotation (image-based 
factors). Therefore, age-related visual cognition processes such as visual search, 
figure-ground segregation and mental rotation are needed. Whereas previous studies 
could have shown that such age declines on the job can be compensated quite often 
by working experience (Zec, 1995; Kliegl et al., 1989), no decrease for age related 
declines with working experience could be found for the X-ray screening task 
(Schwaninger et al., in preparation). As the detection performance in X-ray screening 
is influenced significantly by training, working experience alone is probably not 
sufficient to reduce the age-related differences. According to Schwaninger and Hofer 
(2004), Schwaninger (2005), Koller et al. (2008) detection performance in X-ray 
screening can be increased significantly with an individual adaptive training system 
as the appearance of prohibited items in X-ray images often differs remarkably from 
the appearance in reality. Items like electric shock devices, self-defense gas-sprays 
or plastic pistols look quite different in reality and without specific training they are 
hardly ever recognizable in an X-ray image. Again other items like improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) are normally not seen at checkpoints and have therefore to 
be memorized with a training system. As well Hardmeier et al. (2006b) found a 
significantly increase in detection performance for experienced aviation security 
screeners after two years of individually adaptive training. Thus, results imply that 
experience is probably not enough to store the visual appearance of all kinds of 
prohibited items in the visual memory. Especially considering that some threat items 
like IEDs are normally not seen at checkpoints. A training system enables 
considerably more exposure to threat items linked with direct feedback compared to 
the one on the job. 
In this study we investigated the influence of age and training on detection 
performance for both, image-based and knowledge-based factors. Image-based 
factors were defined by Schwaninger et al. (2005) and refer to the ability to cope 
with bag complexity, superposition and rotation of threat items in X-ray images. In 
contrast to image-based factors, knowledge-based factors show whether a screener 
knows which items are prohibited and what they look like in X-ray images. To 
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measure these factors relatively independent of each other two X-ray screening tests 
were used. The X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) measures image-based 
factors relatively independent of knowledge as only guns and knives are used. The 
Prohibited Items Test (PIT) includes all kinds of prohibited items in an easy view 
whereas bag complexity and superposition were kept relatively constant and thus 
measures mainly knowledge-based factors. First, the influence of age on detection 
performance in both tests was investigated before and after two years of training. 
Based on the previous study, we expect a negative effect of age on detection 
performance for both tests. Whether the detection performance increase for image-
based and knowledge-based factors differs for older and younger screeners remains 
to be shown. As image-based factors are assumed to be relatively stable abilities, the 
increase after training (which is expected to be rather small) should be comparable 
for younger and older screeners. However, in the PIT different performance increases 
are likely. Based on these findings, further analyses should investigate whether the 
learning effect depends on the baseline performance and whether an interaction 
between ability of screeners and performance increase can be observed. Again, the 
influence of age on these learning effects is discussed.  
 
10.3 METHOD 
10.3.1 Participants 
The data for this study was collected as part of the recurrent verification of screening 
competency for aviation security screeners. Data from 334 screeners (101 male and 
233 female) who took both tests in 2004 and 2006 was used. Ages ranged from 23 
to 62 years (M = 46.71, SD = 8.37) and mean working experience was 7.54 years 
(SD = 5.13, range: 1 to 23 years) when taking the first test run in 2004. Between 
the two measurements screeners had on average two times 20 minutes individually 
adaptive CBT with X-Ray Tutor (Number of logins: M = 207.88, SD = 112.12). For 
the analyses values higher or lower than 3 standard deviations from the mean were 
excluded (for the X-Ray ORT five and for the PIT four screeners).  
10.3.2 Materials and Procedure 
X-Ray Object Recognition Test (X-Ray ORT) 
Image-based factors in X-ray screening were measured using the X-Ray ORT which 
is a reliable and valid X-ray screening test to identify the ability to cope with bag 
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complexity, superposition and viewpoint of threat items relatively independent of 
training. Therefore, only guns and knives are used in this test and all X-ray images 
are displayed in grayscale only. All eight guns and eight knives in the test are shown 
from two different viewpoints (easy and difficult). Each view is then combined with 
two bags of low and two bags of high complexity level once with low and once with 
high superposition. Thus, in total each gun and each knife is shown eight times in 
different conditions. The test includes a total of 256 trials: 2 weapons (guns and 
knives) * 8 (exemplars) * 2 (views) * 2 (superpositions) * 2 (bag complexities) * 2 
(harmless vs. threat image).  
The X-Ray ORT is a computer-based test in which each X-ray image is displayed for 
4 seconds on the screen. Then participants have to give the answer whether the bag 
was OK (contained no gun or knife) or NOT OK (contained a gun or knife) clicking on 
the respective button on the screen. Furthermore, they have to indicate how sure 
they are in their decision clicking on a 90 point rating scale. The test starts with a 
self-explanatory instruction including eight exercise trials to familiarize the 
participants with the test taking procedure. In this phase participants receive a 
feedback whether their answer was correct or not showing the solution. In the test 
itself no feedback was given to participants anymore. As the X-Ray ORT should 
measure the visual abilities to cope with the three image-based factors and not the 
knowledge of test participants, all eight guns and eight knives either in the frontal or 
rotated view were shown for 10 seconds to them before the test started.  
The test is subdivided into four blocks and participants have the possibility to take a 
short break after each block. The test takes about 45 minutes to complete. For more 
details about the X-Ray ORT as well as its reliability and validity measures see 
Schwaninger et al. (2005) respectively Hardmeier et al. (2006a).  
 
Prohibited Items Test (PIT) 
Knowledge-based factors in X-ray screening were measured with the PIT. The PIT 
includes all kinds of prohibited items in X-ray images. All threat items in the PIT can 
be classified into seven categories according to ICAO, ECAC and EU prohibited items 
lists. Thus, a total of 19 guns, 27 sharp objects, 14 hunt and blunt instruments, 5 
highly inflammable substances, 17 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 3 chemicals 
and 13 other prohibited items (such as self-defense gas spray) were used. All threat 
items are shown in an easy view. For all trials bag complexity and superposition were 
kept relatively constant. The PIT includes a total of 160 trials, half of them are 
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harmless bags, the other half include at minimum one prohibited item. 68 of all 
threat images include one prohibited item only and the remaining 12 trials include 
half two and half three prohibited items at once24.  
Again, participants had to decide whether the bag was OK (included no prohibited 
item) or NOT OK (included one or more prohibited items) clicking on the respective 
button on the screen. Furthermore, they had to indicate to which of the threat 
category the prohibited item(s) belong(s) to and how sure they were in their decision 
clicking on a 50 point rating scale25. Images were displayed for maximum 10 seconds 
on the screen. For the answer no time limit was given. By clicking the space bar the 
next image could be shown. Like the ORT, the PIT is computer-based and includes an 
introduction and some exercise trials that participants get used to the test taking 
procedure. Contrary to the test condition, participants were given a feedback about 
the correct answer for the exercise trials. The PIT takes about 45 minutes to 
complete and includes four blocks. After each block participants had again the 
possibility to take a short break. For reliability and validity measures of this test 
please see Hardmeier et al. (2006a). 
 
X-Ray Tutor (XRT) 
The X-Ray Tutor (XRT) is an individually adaptive training system for aviation 
security screeners. Screeners see X-ray images for 15 seconds on the screen and 
have to answer whether the bag is OK (included no prohibited item) or NOT OK 
(included a prohibited item). Then they receive an immediate feedback whether their 
answer was correct or not. Further, screeners can review any X-ray image to learn 
where the threat item was located. A threat information window is displayed showing 
the threat items in both the X-ray image and in reality (photograph). The training 
system contains 500 threat items in six basic views which are additionally mirrored 
(4x) and plane rotated (3x) and 6000 X-ray images of passenger bags. Threat items 
are combined with passenger bags based on the individually adaptive training 
algorithm of XRT. This algorithm provides screeners with X-ray images adapted in 
their difficulty to screeners’ individual performance. For more information about X-
Ray Tutor or its effectiveness, see Schwaninger (2005) and Koller et al. (2008). 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Only trials including one prohibited item were analyzed.  
25 For analysis only OK and NOT OK answers were used. 
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Procedure 
All participants took both tests as part of the recurrent verification of screening 
competency which included a total of four tests. All screeners completed first the X-
Ray ORT followed by the PIT, the bomb detection test (BDT) and a computer-based 
questionnaire (CBQ). The last two tests are not part of this study. Tests were taken 
in a well lit computer-classroom including 10 HP computers. The test was run on a 
17-inch monitor set at a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. Participants used a standard 
key-board and a “Microsoft Optical Wheel Mouse” to give the answers. 
 
10.4 RESULTS 
Results in both tests were calculated using the detection performance measure d’. D’ 
is a psychophysical measure which takes into account the hit-rate and the false 
alarm rate. A good screener should reach a high hit rate without rejecting too many 
harmless bags. For more information about d’ see Green and Swets (1966), 
MacMillan and Creelman (1991).  
The result section is organized as follows. First, effects of age on image-based and 
knowledge-based factors before and after two years of training are reported. Then 
training effects for the PIT were investigated and discussed in reference to young 
and elderly screeners.  
10.4.1 Effect of age on image-based and knowledge-based factors  
Figure 8.1 provides the correlations between detection performance and age of 
screeners. Partial correlation between d’ and age of screeners taking working 
experience into account revealed a significant effect for the X-Ray ORT pr = -.27, p 
< .01 and a significant effect for the PIT pr = -.22, p < .01 at the baseline 
measurement (2004). After two years of training (2006) partial correlations 
controlling for working experience and training hours revealed again a significant 
negative partial correlation for the X-Ray ORT pr = -.34, p < .01 and a even larger 
one for the PIT pr = -.40, p < .01. Thus, the results show a decrease in the detection 
of prohibited items with age for both tests before and after two years of training with 
XRT. Whereas the age effect seems to remain relatively stable across both 
measurement conditions in the X-Ray ORT, it is clearly larger after training regarding 
the PIT (see Figure 8.1c and 8.1d).  
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To test whether the performance increase before and after two years of training is 
similar for younger and older screeners, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with 
measurement (2004, 2006) as within-participant factor, age (Q1, Q4) as between-
participant factor and training and years since employment as covariate was 
conducted (see also Figure 8.2). For the between-participant factor age the first 
quartile (M = 39.94, SD = 4.90) and last quartile (M = 57.24, SD = 2.11) was 
calculated and used for analysis26. Taking training and working experience into 
account, results showed a significant main effect of measurement F(1, 157) = 19.83, 
p < .01 , η2 = .11,  a significant main effect of age F(1, 157) = 44.40, p < .01, 
η2 = .22, and no significant interaction between measurement and age F(1, 157) = 
0.00, p = .97 for the X-Ray ORT. Further, both interactions between measurement 
and the covariates were not significant (p > .07). However, the ANCOVA for the PIT 
                                                 
26 Results showed similar effects calculating a median split instead of quartiles. 
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Figure 8.1. Correlation between detection performance (d’) and age for (a) the X-Ray ORT 2004, (b) 
the X-Ray ORT 2006, (c) the PIT 2004 and (d) the PIT 2006. 
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revealed a significant main effect of measurement F(1, 157) = 72.34, p < .01, η2 = 
.32, a significant effect of age F(1, 157) = 42.52, p < .01, η2 = .21 and a significant 
interaction between measurement and age F(1, 157) = 13.52, p < .01, η2 = .08. 
Interactions between measurement and training as well as working experience were 
also significant F(1, 157) = 17.34, p < .01, η2 = .10 and F(1, 157) = 6.28, p < .05, 
η2 = .04 respectively. Thus, an increased detection performance could be found for 
both tests due to the training system. The ability to cope with image-based factors 
and the knowledge about prohibited items was worse for older screeners compared 
to younger ones before and after two years of training. Whereas detection 
performance increase with training was similar for younger and older screeners 
regarding to image-based factors, it was different in the PIT. Performance increase of 
older screeners was much smaller than the one of younger ones although on average 
they trained significantly more (t(159) = -3.,92 p < .01). However it has to be noted 
that the correlation between age and training was r = .27, p < .01 only.  
Generally, the large individual differences in detection performance in the PIT after 
two years of training (see also Figure 8.1d) imply that differences between screeners 
increase in this first training phase. Thus, it can be assumed that some screeners 
learn more and probably faster than their colleagues. 
10.4.2 Learning effect in the PIT  
Interestingly, detection performance of both, younger and older screeners varied 
enormously after two years of training in the PIT (Figure 8.1d). Controlling for 
working experience and training we found a rather large relationship between 
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Figure 8.2. Detection performance in the X-Ray ORT (left) and the PIT (right) for the youngest (Q1) 
and the oldest (Q4) screeners. 
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detection performance at the baseline measurement and the relative increase27 in 
detection performance r = - .64 (p < .01). Similar partial correlations were found for 
younger (r = - .69, p < .01) and older screeners (r = - .65, p < .01). Consistent with 
previous findings and learning theories the training effect is larger for screeners who 
perform poorly at the beginning. 
Furthermore, we investigated whether screeners who perform on a high level in the 
X-Ray ORT and thus have the ability to cope with image-based factors perform as 
well better in the PIT and show a larger training effect compared to people with poor 
detection performance in the X-Ray ORT. Low and high performer in the X-Ray ORT 
were defined with a median split28. An ANCOVA with the within-participant factor 
measurement (2004, 2006) and the between-participant factor ability (low vs. high 
performer) controlling for age, working experience and training revealed a significant 
main effect of measurement F(1, 
315) = 66.77, p < .01, η2 = .18 and 
ability F(1, 315) = 77.61, p < .01, 
η2 = .20, but no significant 
interaction between measurement 
and ability F(1, 315) = 1.25, p = 
.27. All interactions between 
measurement and the covariates 
were also significant p < .01, η2 > 
.03 Thus, screeners with high visual 
cognition abilities perform as well 
better in the PIT before and after 
two years of training. However, the 
increase in detection performance 
was similar for both groups. The 
ability to cope with image-based 
factors has no positive effect on the 
learning capacity (see also Figure 
8.3). As can be seen in Figure 8.3 
similar results were found for 
                                                 
27 % Relative Increase in d’ = (m2 - m1)/m1 (m1 means first measurement and m2 means second 
measurement). 
28 Results using quartiles instead of the median showed similar effects. We decided to use a median split in 
order to have an enough large sample size available when calculating the ANCOVA for younger and older 
screeners only. 
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younger (Q1) and older screeners (Q4) (see Table 5.1). Although the main effect of 
measurement was not significant for both groups, Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons between the two measurements showed significant effects (p < .01) 
confirming training effectiveness. Again, there was a significant effect of ability, but 
no significant interaction between measurement and ability implying that despite 
different abilities the learning effect within these two years was similar.  
 
Table 5.1 
Results of the ANCOVA for both, younger and older screeners 
 
Younger screeners 
(Q1) 
N = 80 
Factor df F p η2 
Measurement 75 1.53 .22 .02 
Ability 75 27.68 < .01 .27 
Measurement * Ability 75 0.68 .41 .01 
Measurement * Age 75 0.88 .35 .01 
Measurement * Experience 75 7.35 < .01 .09 
Measurement * Training 75 10.94 < .01 .13 
Older screeners 
(Q4) 
N = 80 
Measurement 75 2.72 .10 .04 
Ability 75 15.27 < .01 .17 
Measurement * Ability 75 0.71 .40 .01 
Measurement * Age 75 1.39 .24 .02 
Measurement * Experience 75 1.17 .28 .02 
Measurement * Training 75 4.22 < .05 .05 
 
10.5 DISCUSSION 
The main objective of this study was to investigate whether the age effect in X-ray 
screening is similar for visual cognition processes and the knowledge in X-ray 
screening respectively. Further, we examined whether this age effect remains similar 
after two years of training. We could show that age-related declines can be seen for 
both tasks before and after two years of training with an individually adaptive 
training system. Thus, neither experience nor training can compensate age related 
declines in this study. These results are not consistent with previous studies which 
showed that older workers can compensate age-related declines quite often with 
working experience (Zec, 1995; Kliegl et al., 1989). These contradictory findings can 
be explained as follows. The influence of working experience for the X-ray screening 
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task is relatively small as learning effects on the job are limited. On the one hand a 
screener sees only some prohibited items in everyday work. For example IEDs are 
normally not seen at checkpoints. On the other hand, most prohibited items that are 
brought along by passenger are too seldom seen to form a visual memory 
representation of these objects. Thus, with working experience alone a screener is 
not able to familiarize with all possible prohibited items needed to represent all 
different types of threat items in the visual memory (Hardmeier et al., 2006b; Koller 
et al., 2008). As the training system in this study was implemented in 2004 and 
therefore older screeners cannot profit more from the training due to their longer 
employment smaller training effects for older screeners could have been expected. 
Many studies report impaired visual cognition processes with age which can be 
assumed to be relevant for the learning process (Salthouse & Babcock, 1991; Deaton 
& Parasuraman, 1993). However, future studies should investigate whether training 
can help to reduce the age effect in X-ray screening if screeners who are employed 
since years have accordingly more training. Moreover, results from longitudinal 
studies would be interesting in order to find out how performance changes over the 
years for screeners employed in younger days. Interestingly, results showed more 
training hours for older screeners which are generally employed for a longer time 
implying that older screeners try to compensate their decline with more training. 
Contradictory results were found related to memory awareness. However, many 
studies reported that older people rather overestimate their performance than vice 
versa (Bruce, Coyne, & Botwinick, 1982; Murphy, Sanders, Gabriesheski, & Schmitt, 
1981). Based on the results of this study it can be assumed that this overestimation 
of one’s own capabilities is probably reduced in areas requiring high expertise.  
Results also revealed that the learning effect in the PIT is smaller for screeners who 
perform already on a relatively high level compared to screeners with poor detection 
performance at the beginning. This can be expected as learning effects are generally 
larger at the beginning and decrease with increasing expertise. This effect can be 
seen for younger and older screeners.  
Further we investigated whether an interaction between the ability of screeners and 
the learning effect could be found. Results showed a similar performance increase in 
the PIT for people with low and high abilities to cope with image-based factors. In 
this initial training stage it does not matter whether people are able to cope with 
image-based factors or not. However, it should be noted that this fact does not 
reduce the importance of visual cognition abilities. First, screeners with good abilities 
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perform on a significantly higher level. Second, prohibited items in the PIT were 
shown in an easy view and with medium superposition and bag complexity. However, 
in real life these factors always play along and should be considered. Third, it could 
be argued that the same increase of able screeners who performed already on a 
higher level is relatively more valuable. Interestingly, the learning effect of older 
screeners differs not from the one of younger screeners. 
In summary, this study clearly showed the relatively large effect of age on detection 
performance in X-ray screening as well after training. However, it remains to be 
shown whether older screeners could compensate age-related declines if their 
training would match their working experience or in other words if their training 
experience would have started when they got employed.  
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